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Introduction
Essays on Heterogeneity, Irreversibility and Aggregate Fluctuations" explores
the connections between micro structure and technologies available to the agents operating in
the economy and the dynamic of aggregate output and productivity. The thesis aims at further
understanding the linkages between investment decisions of heterogeneous rms, the industry
structure, and the aggregate dynamic of the economy.
The hypothesis explored in this dissertation is that the dynamic of the industry structure,
the patterns of selection of rms and investment within an industry bear information as of the
e¢ ciency with which the economy operates.
The thesis consist of three essays organized in chapters.
Chapter I, "E¢ ciency with Equilibrium Marginal Product Dispersion and Firm
Selection" investigates conditions under which reductions in marginal product of capital dis-
persion induce Pareto improving allocations. The economy is one in which dispersion in marginal
products arise endogenously due to uncertainty and irreversible capital investment. The main
result is that it is possible for allocations that display higher marginal product dispersion to be
closer to the e¢ cient one than allocations with lower marginal product dispersion. The intu-
ition for such result is that the relevant statistic to assess e¢ ciency is the covariance between
the contributions of the rms to aggregate output and their shadow value of capital. Hence,
allocations where rms with disparate marginal product contribute little to aggregate output,
can be closer to the e¢ cient allocation than allocations with lower dispersion, but where those
with disparate marginal product contribute disproportionately more to output.
This essay contributes broadly to the study of optimal policy in economies with rm selection
and heterogeneity. Existence of the competitive equilibrium is shown indirectly by providing
a decentralization result of the e¢ cient allocation. This result is of interest for the growing
literature analyzing productivity gains from reallocation of factors across production units, and
rm selection; as well as for the design of productivity enhancing policies.
Chapter II, "Industry Dynamics, Investment and Business Cycles" investigates
the quantitative implications of irreversibilities in investment for aggregate productivity. Ir-
reversibilities in investment induce marginal product dispersion in equilibrium when there is
uncertainty in the economy. Through it, it a¤ects aggregate productivity but also rm selec-
tion, which feeds back to the former through general equilibrium e¤ects. I study a general
equilibrium model with heterogeneous rms and aggregate uncertainty only. Investment, entry
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and exit decisions are modeled as real options and in each period, rms compete monopo-
listically. The main result of the essay is that e¢ ciency losses associated to rm selection are
quantitatively more important than those associated to lower equilibrium dispersion in marginal
products, i.e. capital reallocation. This result supports other studies which have empirically
documented productivity gains from changes in the pattern of rm churning in an industry.
I show also that the ine¢ ciency induced by imperfect competition in the intermediate goods
market interacts with the market incompleteness described in the rst chapter. Which ine¢ -
ciency is more important dictates the directions of the optimal policy. I calibrated the model
economy to the US manufacturing sector and compute the implied optimal policy to implement
the e¢ cient allocation. The optimal policy implies subsidies to entry, the size of the subsidy
is predicted higher in good times. In equilibrium there are more rms operating in the market
under the e¢ cient allocation. Upgrade costs are subsidized to induce better selection of rms
in the market. The policy as of scrap values varies with the aggregate state and the technology
operated by the rm. In good times, scrap values are lower for all capacities except for the
bottom ones, to generate exit of the least productive units. In bad times, scrap values for the
bottom capacities are predicted lower, and the scrap value of the rms at the top of the pro-
ductivity/size distribution is higher. The latter induces exit by rms that are possibly capacity
constrained.
Finally, this essay also shows that the relationship between aggregate productivity and
dispersion in marginal products is not monotonous, and in particular, is not independent of
the degree of uncertainty that rms face when investing. This result is important in view of
the growing literature with cross country comparisons with measures of marginal and average
product dispersion. In particular, it highlights that the e¢ cient level of dispersion observed in
an economy need not equalize the level of dispersion is another, and that their relationship will
depend on the characteristics of the environment in which rms operate.
Chapter III, "Aggregate Fluctuations and the Industry Structure of the US
Economy" documents changes in the input matrix of the US economy, and analyzes its im-
plications for the relevance of sector specic and neutral shocks in aggregate uctuations. The
paper contributes to two strands of literature. The rst one is the one characterizing linkages
between sectors in the economy, and its relevance for the response of aggregate output to shocks.
In this paper the focus is put on fairly aggregated sectors (Equipment and Consumption), but
unlike the previous literature the intensity of trade is allowed to change as observed in the
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data. The essay is also related to the literature that studies the implications of investment
specic and neutral shocks to aggregate volatility of output in economies that display invest-
ment specic technical change. The model economy analyzed in this paper is consistent with a
balanced growth path in which investment specic technical change can be accommodated and
intermediate good linkages across sectors do not vanish.
The main nding is that an economy where the input output entries are allowed to uctuate
as in the data generates larger amplication of shocks and a stronger role for neutral shocks
than a comparable economy with a xed input output structure. This result highlights the
importance of modeling input output linkages in the now plain vanilla model of real business
cycles with investment specic and neutral shocks.
3
Chapter I: E¢ ciency with Equilibrium Marginal Product
Dispersion and Firm Selection
1 Introduction
The increased availability of rm level data has risen interest on the implications of rm hetero-
geneity in productivity, employment and capital allocations, for aggregate productivity. Recent
work by Hsieh and Klenow (2009), has spawn o¤ a growing literature that argues that measures
of dispersion in revenue total factor productivity1 for narrowly dened industries, can explain
cross country disparities in aggregate total factor productivity (TFP). Part of the dispersion in
revenue total factor productivity can be attributed to dispersion in marginal product of inputs,
which is ubiquitous in industrial data2. From a static point of view, di¤erences in marginal
products can be associated to loses in aggregate productivity and welfare. If such disparities
are generated through nancial frictions3 or policy distortions4, welfare and aggregate pro-
ductivity improves whenever dispersion is reduced. Dispersion can also be generated through
features of the technology that rms operate (i.e. adjustment costs as in Asker et al. (2013) and
Midrigan and Xu (2009)). In this case, dispersion can be consistent with dynamically optimal
investment decisions, and it is not clear whether lower dispersion in marginal products would
be productivity or welfare improving.
Little theoretical work has been done on the implications for e¢ ciency of dispersion in
marginal products that arise as the outcome of dynamically optimal investment decisions in
economies with endogenous rm selection. In this paper, I address this question by focusing in
an economy with dispersion in marginal product of capital generated through irreversible and
indivisible investment. I consider the problem of a planner that faces the same technological
restrictions that rms in the market face, and asks under which conditions a reduction in
dispersion in marginal products is Pareto improving. The main result is that it is possible
for an economy with higher marginal product dispersion to be closer to the e¢ cient allocation
than a comparable economy with lower dispersion. This result is relevant for the assessment of
1For a discussion on measures of revenue and quantity TFP see (Foster et al. (2008))
2For cross country evidence refer to Asker et al. (2013). For evidence for Korea, refer to Midrigan and Xu
(2009). Also, Hsieh and Klenow (2009) provide evidence for the US, India and China. For evidence in Latin
America, see Buso et al. (2013).
3See Buera and Shin (2011), Moll (2013), Midrigan and Xu (2009) and the extensive literature thereafter.
4Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) analyze a broad range of policy distorsions.Barstelman et al. (2013) document
and study the impact of distorsions that are correlated with the size of rms.
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potential productivity gains from reallocation of factors that induce less dispersion in marginal
products. In our economy, such reallocation need not be e¢ ciency improving. The reason is
that the relevant statistic to assess e¢ ciency gains is the correlation between the distribution of
marginal products and the contribution of the rms to aggregate productivity. I also show that
a market arrangement that would induce the e¢ cient allocation when there is no equilibrium
dispersion in marginal product of capital, fails to generate the e¢ cient outcome when the
allocation displays dispersion in marginal products. However, the e¢ cient allocation can be
decentralized under the same market structure, provided state contingent taxes and subsidies
available.
The paper develops an innite horizon model of investment by heterogeneous rms, with
endogenous rm selection and idiosyncratic and aggregate uncertainty (Section 2). Firms pro-
duce goods out of capital and labor, and a Hicks neutral productivity level. Firms are entirely
equity owned and rent capital and labor in competitive markets. The rm is identied by the
realization of an exogenous idiosyncratic shock and an endogenous component of idiosyncratic
productivity, i.e. a process. A process is dened as a productivity shifter and an associated
minimum operating capacity in terms of capital. At the beginning of the period, after shocks
are realized, rms decide whether to exit or not the market and if so, which process to operate.
Entry, exit and process investment decisions are modeled as real options. The exercise of any of
these options entails a one time xed cost. Investment in processes is indivisible, because only a
nite set of technologies (and associated minimum capacities) is available. It is also irreversible,
in the sense that disinvestment in technology entails the rm liquidation in the current period,
and a new draw of productivity in the next one.
Due to the real options feature of the model there are states of the world where rms hold a
particular process while being constrained by its minimum capacity (holding excess capacity).
The marginal product of capital for a constrained rm is lower than that of a comparable
unconstrained rm. The identity of the rms that are constrained depends on the realization
of current shocks in view of the history of shocks that the rm has experienced. For example, if
a rm experiences a sequence of positive shocks, it is more likely to invest in better processes.
But better processes have higher minimum running capacities. So when a negative shock hits,
the rm is more likely to be running at overcapacity. The result resembles earlier intuitions
drawn in Caballero and Hammour (1998) when analyzing factor specicity. The distribution of
productivities and marginal products depends on the vintage structure of the rms operating
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in the market, and are endogenously related to each other. Endogenous selection of rms is
therefore key in assessing the e¢ ciency with which an economy operates 5.
In generating marginal product dispersion, I focus on a mechanism that relates to the liter-
ature on capital adjustment costs and Ss adjustment policies6. However, the adjustment policy
in the model is asymmetric because the minimum capacity constraint only generates marginal
product of capital below the interest rate in the market 7. The empirical evidence supports
the existence of minimum running capacities at the plant level. They had been documented in
the energy industry, and the chemical industry among others8. In industries where output is
produced on production lines, such as the car industry, minimum scales are also relevant9.
When rms are capacity constrained, the price of capital in the market does not reect
their opportunity cost of capital nor does it reect the heterogeneity in its shadow value for
more and less constrained rms. Prot maximization is not enough to generate the e¢ cient
allocation of rms across technologies. Suppose rst that there is a unique process that rms
operate and that we allow for entry and exit. At which cost should the planner price the new
activity generated upon entry? If marginal products are equalized, the entry of a new rm
does not expand or reduce the space spanned in this economy10. When marginal products
are di¤erent the space of possible tradable activities and transfers of capital across them gets
possibly enlarged by a new dimension. I show that the planner prices the new activity at the
average cost of capital in the market. In the market allocation, I assumed that rms pay for
capital in a spot market at a cost that in equilibrium equals the marginal product of capital
of rms that are unconstrained. This is the standard assumption in a plain vanilla model of
industry dynamics. Notice that if we assume away entry and exit, these problem disappears
when the space spanned is xed. When in addition we assume, as in this paper, that rms can
choose across technologies, the problem exacerbates as for each technology the space spanned
gets larger or smaller depending on the adoption decisions of the rms in the market.
The fundamental source of ine¢ ciency in the economy is a form of market incompleteness.
The same market structure is enough for the rst welfare theorem to hold in the comparable
5Theoretical work by Hopenhayn (1992) and Melitz (2003) point out the relevance of endogeneous selection
for aggregate productivity. Empirical work by Eslava et al. (2004) also highlights the important of selection in
shiting aggregate productivity.
6Early work include Dixit and Pyndick (1994), Mariotti et al. (2006) and Caballero and Engel (1999).
7An Ss adjustment policy has the potential to generating marginal product above or below the interest rate.
8See Fuss (1981), Lyons (1980) and Tybout (2000)
9See Rodrik (1988) and Rhys (1977)
10One could think of rms, as assets with returns proportional to their idyosincratic productivity as in Diamond
(1967)
6
economy with heterogeneity, rm selection and equalization of marginal products (for example
Hopenhayn (1992) or Bilbiie et al. (2012)). The literature that studies e¢ ciency in economies
with selection and rm heterogeneity is sparse. A recent paper that studies the characteristic
of the constrained optima in an economy with distortions in revenue product and endogenous
entry and exit is Fattal Jaef and Hopenhayn (July 2012). They nd that while the competitive
allocation generates the e¢ cient allocation of resources across a given set of technologies, it fails
to generate the e¢ cient level of entry and exit, and hence the e¢ cient measure of active rms.
The model analyzed here departs from their environment in several ways. First, this model
studies allocations where marginal product dispersion occurs in equilibrium, in their economy
the marginal product of labor is equated across rms. Second, the allocation of technologies run
by the rm is endogenous, the allocation of employment and capital need not e¢ cient in the
competitive equilibrium. Third, the patterns of entry and exit in the competitive equilibrium
can be below or above the e¢ cient one depending on the endogenous joint distribution of
marginal products and productivity11. I am explicit about this feature by constructing market
allocations that while displaying higher marginal product dispersion, are closer to the e¢ cient
allocation (Section 5). This feature of the model highlights the importance of assessing the
impact of dispersion in marginal products on aggregate productivity within a general equilibrium
framework, where both selection and investment are intertwined and endogenously determined.
This paper contributes to the work initiated by Lucas and Prescott (1971). They showed that
a competitive equilibrium can be decentralized as an industry equilibrium in which the planner
maximizes overall surplus in the economy by allocating labor across rms. I show existence and
uniqueness of the e¢ cient allocation in an economy with irreversible and indivisible investment
(Section 3). Furthermore, I show that there is a pseudo planner problem whose equilibrium
allocation coincides with the decentralized solution as long as state contingent subsidies and
taxes are available (Section 4). This taxes and subsidies are applied to the costs incurred by the
rms when entering, upgrading process, or exiting the market12. The equivalence result follows
closely the result described in Jones and Manuelli (1990) to study policy questions in convex
economies with growth.
The study of optimal policy in economies with heterogeneous rms is not new. It has been
11 In a recent paper, Cooper and Schott (2014) show that to correctly assess gains from reallocation in an
economy with aggregate uctuations the joint distribution of productivity and marginal products needs to be
track.
12Hence, the decentralization mechanism bypass the absence of state contingent claims for every possible
realization of the distribution of marginal product of capital.
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done in models of international trade under oligopolistic competition in prices and quantities
(Eaton and Grossman (1986)). For a model of industry dynamic without capital accumulation
Lee and Mukoyama (2008) study the impact of alternative policies on labor regulations. How-
ever, their policies are ad hoc in the sense that there is no notion of e¢ ciency associated to
them. They consider i.i.d. policies and policies correlated with the productivity of the rms.
Guner et al. (2008) study policies that target the size of the establishment, which in turn is
correlated with their idiosyncratic productivity, and nd a substantial role in shaping aggregate
productivity. This paper contributes to the literature by providing an algorithm to solve for the
optimal policy in economies where the e¢ cient allocation displays marginal product dispersion.
2 Environment
This is an innite horizon economy with time indexed by t: There is a nal good which agents
use for consumption and capital accumulation. The preferences of the planner in this economy
are dened over consumption strems Ct of nal output. Preferences are characterized by U :
R+ ! R+:
Assumption 1: U is concave, monotonically increasing and di¤erentiable. Also, U 0(0) =
+1:
The discount factor is  and the planner maximizes the present discounted value of the
stream of consumption.
Final output Yt is produced by means of a continuum of intermediate goods through tech-
nology h : R+ ! R+:
Yt  h
Z
yitdi

Assumption 2: The production function h : R+ ! R+ is di¤erentiable and satises h(0) =
0, h0(0) = +1 and h0(y) > 0 for all y 2 R+:
Intermediate goods are substitutes in the production of nal goods, as only the aggregate
amount of intermediates determines nal output.
Intermediate goods, yt are produced by combining capital (kt) and labor (lt) and the tech-
nology operated by the rm. Productivity is assumed Hicks neutral.
yit  stzit ni f(lt; kt)
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Productivity entails three components: an exogenous and an endogenous idiosyncratic one,
and an exogenous aggregate shock.
The exogenous component of idiosyncratic productivity follows a Markov process with tran-
sition probabilities Pz(zt+1; zt) for all zt+1; zt 2Z [z; z]. The exogenous aggregate shock
is denoted st and follows a Markov process with transition probabilities Ps(st+1; st) for all
st+1; st 2S [s; s] :S is nite.
The endogenous component of productivity can be interpreted as a process for production.
Each process is characterized by a productivity shifter,  n and a minimum capacity constraint,
kn. Processes are ordered so that ( n <  n+1) and (kn < kn+1) for all n  N   1. In other
words, more productive processes entail a higher minimum capacity constraint. Processes are
chosen from the set N  [0; N ], where 0 indicates the rm is not operating and has exit the
market. The adoption of a process is costly.
Assumption 3: The function f is di¤erentiable, increasing in both arguments and satises
f(0; 0) = 0, fl(0; 0) = fk(0; 0) = +1. Also, it displays decreasing returns to scale in capital
and labor, such that stzt nf(lt; kt)(1  ) = kfk + lfl
The aggregate state of the economy is described by t =

st; zt;

vnt 1
	N
n=1
;Kt

and includes
the realization of exogenous aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks, st and the vector zt respectively;
the distribution of rms per process inherited from the previous period, vnt 1 for n  N ; and
the available aggregate stock of capital. I denote vnt (z; st)  vnt ([z; z) ; st) the measure of rms
with productivity at most z and technology n when the aggregate state is st: The law of motion
of the distributions is denoted by T S .
The timing of decisions is as follows. The planner observes the realization of the aggregate
and idiosyncratic shocks, and takes the aggregate stock of capital and the distribution of rms
in the market as given. At that point it can decide whether or not to add production units to
the market (entry). If entry is positive it pays I(st) units of the nal good. The idiosyncratic
productivity of the rm entering the market is unknown before entry and all rms enter with
the worse process. Immediate upgrades are allowed once the idiosyncratic state is revealed. The
productivity of a rm entering the market is drawn from G(z):
Assumption 4: The function G(z) is absolutely continuous Z.
The planner also decides which rms to liquidate, for which he receives ne (st) per rm of
type n; and nally which rms to upgrade in process at cost In+1(st) (if upgrading a rm from
process n to n + 1): Downgrades in processes are not allowed. To induce it, the planner has
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to liquidate the rm and enter a new one. After all decisions on processes, entry and exit
are completed, the planner chooses the allocation of capital and labor. After production takes
place, the aggregate stock of capital depreciates at rate b. Also, some production units are
liquidated exogenously with probability , for which the planner gets a scrap value of fe :
Assumption 5: The scrap value if forced to exit, is less than or equal the scrap value
when choosing to exit fe  ne (st). Without loss of generality, fe = 0. Also, the cost of
upgrade is higher or equal to the di¤erence in scrap values, In+1  n+1e  ne .
Hence, no resources can be generated simply by upgrading rms in the market.
Assumption 6: The cost of entry is higher than the scrap value of the less productive
process I  1e. Also, for any s1; s2 2 S with s1 > s2, the entry cost satises I(s1) <
I(s2) +
Z
1e(s1)dG(zit) 
Z
1e(s2)dG(zit):
The rst part of assumption 6 prevents generating resources by entering rms in the market,
irrespective of whether they produce or not. The second part of the assumption is used later
to assure that the measure of entrants is procyclical. The condition requires that entry cost do
no "raise" too much during upturns, potentially desincentivizing entry.
As much as possibly I will refer to the cost structure as p(st) =
h
fne gNn=1 ; fIngN 1n=1 ; I
i
3 E¢ cient Allocation
Dene the problem of the planner as follows
V (t) = max
Ct; Kt+1; Yt, fzet ( n)gNe=1; fzut ( n)gNn=2;Mentt ;lit;kit
U (Ct) + EV (t+1) (EA)
subject to
Ct +Kt+1   (1  b)Kt + IM entt +Upgrade Costs = Yt + NX
n=1
neM
n
et
h
0@X
j
Z
stzit jf(lit; kit)di
1A = Yt
Z
lidi = 1, and
Z
kidi = Kt
ki  k if  i =  n
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vt = T
S(vt 1) and the exogenous transitions Ps and Pz
where "Upgrade Costs" equals,PN 1
n=1 I
n

Mnut +M
ent
t
 
G(zu( n+1t )) G(zu( nt ))

+ IN

Mnut +M
ent
t (1 G(zu( nt )))

;
Mnet(t 1;t) is the measure of exits for rms running process n, Mnut(Xt 1; Xt) is the
measure of incumbent upgrades in state t to technology n; M entt (t) is the corresponding
measure of entrants. (See the Appendix for a detailed description).
Theorem 1 The e¢ cient allocation exists and it is unique.
For expositional purposes the full proof can be found in the Appendix. Heuristically it goes
as follows. The problem would be a standard concave problem if there were no sunk costs
to technology adoption and no minimum capacity constraint that may bind in equilibrium.
The presence of a continuum of heterogenous rms mitigates potential non-convexities in the
aggregate set as in Mas-Colell (1977). The operator that describes the planners problem is
dened in the set of bounded absolutely continuous measures, and a unique xed point is
shown to exist. Among others, the existence of this equilibrium relies on the characteristics of
the law of motion for the distribution of rms. For example, we need to make sure that the law
of motion per process maps from and into the set of bounded absolutely continuous measures.
3.1 Law of Motion for the distribution of rms
I rst show that in an economy without aggregate shocks, the economy has an invariant measure
of rms across productivities.
Dene the state space for the distribution as a Cartesian product AZxN with a typical
subset characterized by A  ZxN :Let B be the sigma algebra of A. The space (A,A) is a
measurable space. Let v(A) be the measure of agents in set A. Let z((z; n) ;ZxN ) be the
probability that a rm with current state (z; n) transits to the set A next period. Hence
z(A,A)! [0; 1] describes the law of motion of the system with idiosyncratic shocks only.
z((z; n) ;ZxN ) =
Z
z02Z


n0(z0; n) 2 N	Pz(z0; z)
where  is an indicator function, and n0(z0; n) the optimal technology selection policy.
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Dene the operator T  as
vzt+1(ZxN ) = T
(vt+1) 
Z
z2Z
z((z; n) ;ZxN )d(vzt (z; n))
Assumption 7: The cost structure for upgrade across technologies is such that  T =  N
if the rm experiences an arbitrary long sequence of good realizations of the idiosyncratic shock,
fzgTt=1for T > bT (fIngNn=1) nite.
Assumption 7 would be violated for example if the cost of upgrading to a particular process
n  N goes to innity, i.e. In !1. In this case, even under the best realizations of the shock
the rm never nds optimal to upgrade to process n or better. This would in turn violate the
monotone mixing condition needed to proof existence and uniqueness of the invariant measure.
Proposition 1 The operator T  has a unique xed point in the space of measures dened over
the measurable space (A,A).
Now, augment the set A to include the state space for the realizations of the aggregate shock,
i.e ASxZxN with typical subset characterized by As  SxZxN . Let s((s; z; n) ;SxZxN ),
the probability that a rm with current state (s; z; n) transits to the set A next period.
s((s; z; n) ;SxZxN ) =
X
s02S
Z
z02Z


n0(s0; z0; n) 2 N	Pz(z0; z)Ps(s0; s)
In general the law of motion of the distribution of rms in the market is described by an
operator T S
vt+1(SxZxN ) = T
S(vt) 
X
s2S
Z
z2Z
s((s; z; n) ;SxZxN )d(vt (s; z; n))
The operator T S is described in detail in the appendix.
If we consider the projections of vt on the space N , vnt ; it is possible to describe properties
of the probability measure per technology.
Lemma 1 The measure of rms per process vnt ;belongs to the space of bounded and continuous
measures on SxZ:
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3.2 Allocation
3.2.1 Capital Labor Ratios
In this section I describe the characteristics of the e¢ cient allocation. Let kt (
l
t) be the
lagrange multiplier associated to the feasibility constraint on aggregate capital (labor), it the
lagrange multiplies associated to each of the minimum capacity constraints of the production
units operating in the market. Let t the shadow value of consumption, i.e. the lagrange
multiplies associated to the nal goods feasibility constraint, and nt the shadow value of a rm
operating process n.
The optimality conditions for labor and capital yield
kit
lit
=
lt
kt   it
fkkit
fllit
where fkkfll corresponds to the ratio of factor shares of total output under Assumption 3.
If the minimum capacity requirement is binding, the rm adjusts its resource allocation
through the exible factor, in this case labor. However, capital labor ratios are not equalized
across production units 13. The capital labor ratio of constrained rms is higher than that of
unconstrained rms. In a static model with complete markets, disparate capital labor ratios are
a sign of ine¢ ciencies in the allocation. In the current set up however, these gaps are consistent
with optimality.
Assumption 8: f is separable in labor and capital when in logs, i.e log(f(l; k)) =
log( bf(l)) + log( bf(k))
Under Assumption 8 labor and capital allocations can be described as a function of the
productivity of the rm xnit = zit 
ni
t , and its marginal product of capital 
k
t   it.
l(xnit ; Xt) =
f 1l (x
ni
t ; 
k
t   it)R
f 1l (x
nj
t ; 
k
t   it)dj
k(xnit ; Xt) = Kt
f 1k (x
ni
t ; 
k
t   it)R
f 1k (x
nj
t ; 
k
t   it)dj
where f 1l indicates the inverse of the marginal product of labor, and f
 1
k is dened likewise.
If there is no dispersion in marginal product of labor (i.e. no rm is constrained), labor and
13 In models where rms are nancially constrained, the capital labor ratios of constrained rms is usually lower
than that of unconstrained rms. Constrained rms hold less capital than they would if unconstrained, and have
a higher marginal product of capital than the equilibrium cost of capital. In this model, constrained rms hold
more capital than otherwise, and their MPK is lower than the interest rate.
13
capital demands are proportional to the relative productivity of the rm versus the rest of the
economy14.
In the analysis that follows it is useful to dene two statistics, namely Z l =
R
f 1l (x
nj
t ; 
k
t  
jt)dj and Zk =
R
f 1k (x
nj
t ; 
k
t  jt)dj. Both are statistics of productivity adjusted by the mar-
ginal product of capital across all the rms in the economy. Capital labor ratios can alternatively
be characterized in terms these statistics Z l and Zk.
k
l
= Kt
f 1k =f
 1
l
Zk=Zl
When there is no dispersion in marginal products, f
 1
k =f
 1
l
Zk=Zl
= 1 and capital labor ratios are
equalized.
3.2.2 Aggregates
All static decisions of the planner are summarized in the equilibrium capital and labor alloca-
tions. In studying the dynamic decisions, i.e. capital accumulation and rm allocation across
processes, it is useful to rewrite aggregate output in terms of the static allocation.
Let the measure of rms operating in the marketMt =
PN 1
n=1 v
n
t (z
u( n+1t ;t); st)+v
N
t (z; st)
where zu( n+1t ;t) is the upgrade threshold from process n to n+1, and dene a scaled measurebvnt = vntMt : Replacing capital and labor allocations in the aggregate production function, we obtain
Y (t) = h
 
NX
n=1
Z
stzit 
nf(
f 1l
Zl
;
f 1k
Zk
Kt)dv
n
t (zit; st)
!
Under Assumption 8 one can rewrite it as
Y (t) = h(TFPtf(1;Kt))
Dene total factor productivity as
14These are the demands for capital and labor in a plain vanilla industry dynamic model alla Hopenhayn
(1989).
l(xnit ; Xt) =
f 1l (x
ni
t )R
f 1l (x
nj
t )dj
k(xnit ; Xt) = Kt
f 1k (x
ni
t )R
f 1k (x
nj
t )dj
14
TFPt =Mt
X
n
Z
stzit 
n
t f(
f 1l (x
ni
t ; 
k
t   it)
Zl
;
f 1k (x
ni
t ; 
k
t   it)
Zk
)dbvnt (zit; st)15
In other words, aggregate e¢ ciency is determined by the realization of the exogenous shock,
the measure of active rms in the market Mt (as usual in models with curvature in the prot
function), and moments of the distribution of realized productivities for those rms. To better
understand the impact of marginal product dispersion on the measures of e¢ ciency in the
economy, describe TFP as
TFPt =Mt
X
n
Z
stzit 
n
t f(
f 1l
Zl
; 1)f(1;
Zl
Zk
f 1k
f 1l
)dbvnt (zit)
If there are no rms capacity constrained, every rm has the same capital labor ratio, ZlZk
f 1k
f 1l
=
1;and the model boils down to the canonical rm dynamic one where
TFPt =Mt
X
n
Z
stzit 
n
t f(
f 1l
Zl
; 1)f(1; 1)dbvnt (zit)
3.2.3 Industry Structure
With this characterization of the production possibility frontier of this economy, we can now
describe the allocations of rms across processes, entry and exit.
If one computes the value for the planner of a change in the measure of rms operating
technology n, one obtains
nt
t
=
@Yt
@Mnt
+ Et
et+1 nt+1
t+1

(1)
where the expectation is taken over the realizations of the aggregate state. From the optimality
condition, 
n
t
t
can be interpreted as the average contribution to aggregate output of a rm of
type n at time t plus the discounted value of its average contribution tomorrow (valued at
todays nal goods).
Exit. In the e¢ cient allocation the exit condition reads
ne (st) =
@Yt(t)
@zet ( 
n;t)
1
dvn(zet )
+ Et
het+1V Fnt+1(zt+1; zet ( n;t); t+1)i (2)
where et+1 = (1   )t+1t is the pricing kernel, V Fnt+1(zt+1; zet ( n;t); t+1) is the expected
15 If we were to do a standard accounting exercise on aggregate output in this economy, total factor productivity
would equal h(TFP ) under the assumption of additivity in intermediate inputs.
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value of the rm with current productivity zet ( 
n;t) for the planner. It equals the value of the
rm if it retains its process n, times the probability that the rm nds optimal to do so; plus the
value of an upgraded rms minus the cost of upgrade, times the probability that it nd optimal
to upgrade, plus the scrap value of the rm adjusted by the probability of observing a low
enough shock (see the appendix for an explicit expression). The expectation in 2 is computed
over the aggregate shock. Aggregate shocks a¤ect the thresholds for upgrade and exit tomorrow
and hence the probability of each of those events occurring.
The contribution to output of the marginal rm is
@Yt(t)
@zet ( 
n;t)
1
dvn(zet )
= h0
Z
yitdi

stz
e
t 
nf(
f 1l
Zl
;
f 1k
Zk
Kt)  t Yt
Kt
ket
In other words, it equals the output of the rm this period, minus the opportunity cost of capital
allocated to that production unit. The planner values that cost as proportional to the average
productivity of capital in the market. Under assumption 8, the expression t YtKt equals the
marginal cost of capital kt only when no rm in the market is constrained16.
This a key object in the characterization of the allocation.
Upgrade. Optimality in upgrade thresholds is obtained when the cost of upgrade equalizes
the gains in output from the upgrade, plus the discounted value of any future gains.
In+1u (st) =
@Yt(t)
@zut ( 
n+1;t)
1
dvnt (z
u
t )
+ Et
het+1  V Fn+1t+1 (z; zut ; t+1)  V Fnt+1(z; zut ; t+1)i (3)
The derivative of aggregate output with respect to the upgrade threshold is the di¤erence
in the contribution to output of the marginal rm when operating technology n or n+1: Notice
that the second term in the contribution of the rm to output is independent of the process it
is running as long as the share of capital in total revenue is the same. Hence, when computing
the di¤erence in contribution the second term cancels out.
Entry. Finally, the e¢ cient level of entry is obtained when the cost of entry equals the
16This fact becomes evident when we rewrite the contribution to output as
@Yt(t)
@zet ( 
n;t)
1
dvn(zet )
= h0
Z
yitdi

stz
e
t 
nf(
f 1l
Zl
;
f 1k
Zk
Kt)f(1  )  t
 
1
Kt
X
n
Z
kt   it
kt   et
kitdi   1
!
g
When no rm is constrained, it = 0 for all rms in the market, so that the contribution to output reduces to
h0
 R
yitdi

stz
e
t 
nf(
f 1
l
Zl
;
f 1
k
Zk
Kt) (1  ).
16
expected value for the planner of an arbitrary rm.
tI(st) = 
1
t (G(z
2
ut) G(z1et))+
N 1X
n=2
(nt   tIn(st)) (G(zn+1ut ) G(znut))+
 
Nt   tIN (st)

(1 G(zNut))
(4)
The term 
n
t
t
can be interpreted as the expected value for the planner of an arbitrary rm
running process n. Hence, the optimality condition for entry equalizes the cost of entry, It to
the expected social value of the rm, net of any cost it might incur in adopting a process.
4 Market Allocation
Before showing a mechanism that decentralized the e¢ cient outcome as a market allocation, it
is useful to understand why a market arrangement that is usually assumed in economies with
heterogeneity and rm selection would fail to induce the e¢ cient outcome.
The full description of the market structure can be found in the appendix. In this section I
highlight the key features needed to understand the source of the ine¢ ciency.
There is a representative consumer that rents capital and labor to the rms operating in
the market at cost wt and rt respectively. The household trades shares of the rms operating
in the market, and receives dividends from them at the end of each period (this dividends
include any cost incurred in process adoption, entry or the liquidation value of the rms17).
There is a representative rm producing in the nal goods sector who purchases goods from the
intermediate good producers.
Given the relevant aggregate state of the economy, Xt =

st; fvnt gNn=1 ;Kt

, intermediate
good producers maximize the value of the rm: They choose capital and labor, given the re-
strictions on minimum capacity imposed by the technology, and decide which process to operate
and when to exit. The free entry condition of the planners allocation is imposed to pin down
the level of entry.
The value of the rm is Wt(xnt ; Xt) when the aggregate state is Xt; the rm is operating
process n; and its idiosyncratic state is xnt = zt 
n
t :
If n < N; the value of the rm is
Wt(x
n
t ; Xt) =Maxfne (st);Wt(xn+1t ; Xt)  In+1(st); fWt(xnt ; Xt)g (5)
17This market structure is analogous to the one chosen by Bilbiie et al. (2012)
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subject to
Xt+1 =  f (Xt)
where fWt(xnt ; Xt) is the continuation value of the rm when it decides to operate without
upgrade in process and  f is the perceived law of motion of the aggregate state for the rm.
The continuation value is
fWt(xnt ; Xt) = (xnt ; Xt) + Et het+1Wt+1(xnt ; Xt+1)i 18
where (xnt ; Xt) are equilibrium prots and et+1(Xt; Xt+1)   (1  ) U 0(C(Xt+1))U 0(C(Xt)) is the sto-
chastic discount factor of the household adjusted for the probability of survival of the rm, et+1
to save notation. If the rm is operating the best technology, there is no possibility of upgrade
so the second term in the value function W disappears.
Proposition 2 fWt(xnt ; Xt) is monotonic increasing in idiosyncratic productivity; z for any n 
N . Hence, the optimal exit strategy of the rm is a trigger strategy such that if z < ze( nt ; Xt)
the rm exits the market; if z  zu( n+1t ; Xt) the rm upgrades technology; if ze( n; Xt)  z <
zu( n+1; Xt) the rm produces using the n-th process. If the rm operates n = N , there is no
further upgrade.
Hence, as in the e¢ cient allocation, the allocation of rms across technologies and the
exit decisions are characterized by thresholds,

ze( nt ; Xt); z
u( n+1t ; Xt)
	
for n  N and t =
1; 2; :Before comparing this policy to the e¢ cient one, let me dene a competitive equilibrium.
4.1 Competitive Equilibrium
Denition 1 A competitive equilibrium is a system of thresholds

ze( nt ; Xt); z
u( n+1t ; Xt)
	
for
n  N and t = 1; 2; ::: , distribution of rms fvtg1t=0, a law of motion   for the aggregate state
of the economy, Xt =

st; fvnt gNn=1 ;Kt

, a measure of entrants

M entt
	1
t=0
with productivities
drawn from G(z), and consumption, aggregate capital and share holdings functions,n
C(Xt);Kt+1(Xt); fan(Xt)gNn=1
o1
t=0
such that given the rental rates and the price of shares
fr(Xt); w(Xt); Pn(Xt)g1t=0, the cost structure c(st) =
h
fne gNn=1 ; fIngN 1n=1 ; I
i
, the exogenous
18The expectation is computed over the realization of the aggregate and the idyosincratic shock
Et
et+1Wt+1(xnt ; Xt+1) =Pst+12S Ps(st+1=st)et+1(Xt; Xt+1) R Pz(z0; z)Wt+1(xHt ; Xt+1)dz0.
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laws of motion for aggregate shocks, Ps, and idiosyncratic shocks,Pz; and the initial stock of
capital in the economy K0 and share holdings, an0 = 1 8n  N;
i) The representative consumer maximizes utility (as in (14))
ii) Firms in the intermediate goods sector maximize their value (as described by 5)
iii) Firms in the nal good sector maximize prots.
iv) Free entry holds, as in (25)
v) Mt =M entt +
PN
n=1 (1  )Mnt 1  Mnnt where Mt =
PN 1
n=1 v
n
t (z
u( nt ; Xt)) + v
N
t (z):
vi) Markets clear
(a)
PN
n=1
R
l(xt; Xt)dv
n
t (zit) = 1
(b)
PN
n=1
R
k(xt; Xt)dv
n
t (zit) = Kt
(c) ant = 1, 8n  N and t = 1; 2; :::::
(d) Feasibility in the goods market.
vii) Consistency for the law of motion of the aggregate state:   =  f =  c.
4.2 Market Allocation versus E¢ cient Allocation
The main di¤erence between the e¢ cient allocation vis a vis the market allocation stems from the
allocation of rms across processes, exit and entry patterns. The reason is that the opportunity
cost of capital in the e¢ cient allocation is equalized to the average product of capital, and not
to the marginal product of capital, the opportunity cost that rms account for in the market.
When there is marginal product dispersion, the entry of a new rm in the market possibly
spans a whole new dimension of transfers across production units. The planner accounts for
this by using the average cost of capital as the relevant opportunity cost of capital. When there
is no dispersion, the opportunity cost of capital is identical for all the rms in the market, the
average and marginal products coincide and hence the market allocation is e¢ cient.
Disparities in the industry structure are important because they determine the equilibrium
distribution of rms observed in the market, and the through it, a¤ect the allocation of cap-
ital and labor across rms, equilibrium factor prices and the incentives for aggregate capital
accumulation. All of these are described in the appendix.
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In a previous section we showed that the exit condition in the e¢ cient allocation is
ne (st) =
@Yt(t)
@zet ( 
n;t)
1
dvn(zet )
+ Et
het+1V Fnt+1(zt+1; zet ( n;t); t+1)i
The exit condition in the market allocation is
nt (st) = (x
n
t ; Xt) + Et[
et+1Wt+1(xnt ; Xt+1)]
where the second term is the discounted value of the rm for every realization of the aggregate
and idiosyncratic shocks.
If one computes the value for the planner of a change in the measure of rms operating
technology n, one obtains
nt
t
=
@Yt
@Mnt
+ Et
et+1 nt+1
t+1

(6)
where the expectation is taken over the realizations of the aggregate state. Hence, 
n
t
t
can be
interpreted as the average contribution to aggregate output of a rm of type n at time t plus the
discounted value of its average contribution tomorrow (valued at todays nal goods). Given
the denition of the expected value of the rm for the planner, V Ft+1 and the recursion on
the shadow value of a rm with technology n (6), disparities in the exit threshold between the
market and the e¢ cient allocations stem from di¤erences in prots vis a vis the contribution of
the rm to total output.
The equilibrium prot function dictates
(zet 
n ; Xt) = h
0
Z
yitdi

stz
e
t 
nf
 
f 1l
Zl
;
f 1k
Zk
Kt
!
f(1  )  t

rt
MPKet
  1

g (7)
In the e¢ cient allocation, the contribution to output of the marginal rm is
@Yt(t)
@zet ( 
n;t)
1
dvn(zet )
= h0(
Z
yitdi)stz
e
t 
nf(
f 1l
Zl
;
f 1k
Zk
Kt)f(1  ) t( 1
Kt
X
n
Z
kt   it
kt   et
kitdi  1)g
When the marginal product of capital of all rms equals the cost of capital in the market, the
second term drops from both expressions and the prots of the rm coincide with the rm con-
tribution to aggregate output. Hence, the optimal exit threshold is the same across allocations
as the optimality conditions coincide. The optimality conditions are the same because given
the recursion in 6, the expected value of a rm for the planner is the discounted expected value
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of prots. When there is a least one rm constrained by the minimum capacity requirement,
the term in curly brackets di¤er. Proposition 4 describes the implications for the behavior of
exit thresholds.
Proposition 3 Suppose that there is at least one rm constrained by the minimum capacity.
If the marginal rm exiting the market, given a particular process, is not constrained, the plan-
ner has an additional incentive to keep the rm active vis a vis the rm. Ceteris paribus,
the exit threshold for the planner is lower than the one in the market allocation. If the mar-
ginal rm is constrained by the minimum capacity, and the marginal product of capital of the
constrained rm is the same in the e¢ cient and market allocation, the exit threshold di¤ers.
Ceteris paribus, it is lower (higher) in the e¢ cient allocation than it is in the market allocation
if 1Kt
P
n
R  
kt   it

kitdi < (>)rt.
Upgrade. Optimality in upgrade thresholds dictates
In+1u (st) =
@Yt(t)
@zut ( 
n+1;t)
1
dvnt (z
u
t )
+ Et
het+1  V Fn+1t+1 (z; zut ; t+1)  V Fnt+1(z; zut ; t+1)i (8)
The derivative of aggregate output with respect to the upgrade threshold is the di¤erence
in the contribution to output of the marginal rm when operating technology n or n + 1: If
this di¤erence coincides with the di¤erence in prots, the optimality conditions in the e¢ cient
and the market allocation coincide. In general, when the equilibrium displays marginal product
dispersion they do not.
Proposition 4 Suppose that there is at least one rm constrained by the minimum capacity.
Ceteris Paribus, if the marginal rm upgrading process is not constrained and the share of
capital in total revenue is the same across processes, the decision for upgrade is the same for
the planner and the rm. Ceteris paribus, if the rm upgrading technology is constrained by
the minimum capacity after the upgrade, and the marginal product of capital is the same across
allocations, the threshold for upgrade is lower (higher) in the e¢ cient allocation than it is in
the market allocation if 1Kt
P
n
R  
kt   it

kitdi < (>)rt.
Entry. When the value of an arbitrary rm is the same in the market and e¢ cient allocation,
the free entry condition induces e¢ ciency in entry. Otherwise,
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Proposition 5 Suppose that there is at least one rm constrained by the minimum capacity,
and that rms that have upgraded are unconstrained. If the marginal rm exiting the market for
the less productive process is not constrained, ceteris paribus, the planner generates more entry
than the market allocation. If the marginal rm is constrained by the minimum capacity, and
its marginal product of capital is the same in the e¢ cient and market allocation, ceteris paribus,
the planner generates more (less) entry than the market allocation if 1Kt
P
n
R  
kt   it

kitdi <
(>)rt.
The second assumption at the beginning of the proposition is key. For example, if the shadow
value of capital for rms that upgrade to a given process is higher (lower) in the market allocation
than in the planners one, the upgrade threshold is lower (higher) in the market allocation. The
expected value of the rm in the market is higher (lower) in the market allocation inducing more
(less) entry than the e¢ cient one. The phenomenon can occur for any of the process available,
possibly with di¤erent directions. To assess whether entry levels are lower or higher than the
e¢ cient level a general equilibrium assessment is necessary.
5 Decentralization
The failure of the rst welfare theorem under the current market structure, can be solved in
several ways. One way to complete markets would be to allow for vertical integration of the
nal and intermediate producer. Whereas possible, this decentralization is bind to generate the
centralized solution almost by assumption. Furthermore, it requires the nal good producer to
gather a lot of information as of the proceeds of each single production unit in the market. It
needs to observe its capital demand, but also the realization of the productivity shock of the
rm. Notice that when there is marginal product dispersion it is possible for two rms with
di¤erent levels of productivity to generate the same prots or dividends, i.e. a high productivity
constrained rm, and a low productivity unconstrained one. With marginal product equalization
in this economy, dividends map one to one to the realization of the shock.
In this section I propose a simpler decentralization mechanism. To implement it, it is not
necessary to know the idiosyncratic productivity of the rm at any point in time. It is however
necessary to know the process they are operating and the aggregate state of the economy.
Augment the cost structure to account for transfers, i.e. bp(st) = hfne gNn=1 ; fIngN 1n=1 ; I;Ti
The e¢ cient allocation was solved for a cost structure bp = hfne gNn=1 ; fIngN 1n=1 ; I; 0i = c.
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The idea of this decentralization is to change such cost structure in the market allocation c
6= p; so that the market and e¢ cient allocations produce the same distribution of rms across
technologies, and the same number of rms operating in the market. I do this indirectly. First,
I solve a modied centralized problem whose allocation coincides with the market allocation.
Then I show how to choose c to generate the e¢ cient outcome.
Dene an alternative centralized problem as follows
V (t) = max
Ct; Kt+1; Yt, fzet ( n)gNe=1; fzut ( n)gNn=2;Mentt ;lit;kit
U (Ct) + EV (t+1)
(Pseudo-Planner Problem)
subject to
Ct +Kt+1   (1  b)Kt + IM entt +Upgrade Costs = Yt + Tt + NX
n=1
neM
n
et
h
0@X
j
Z
stzit jf(lit; kit)di
1A = Yt
Z
lidi = 1, and
Z
kidi = Kt
ki  k if  i =  n
vt+1 = T
S(vt) and the transitions Pz and Ps
where the main di¤erence with the problem of e¢ ciency is a transfer Tt that a planner takes a
given.
Theorem 2 a) For a given transfer scheme bp, the solution to this centralized problem exists
and it is unique.
b) There exist a cost structure
nbp (st)o1
t=0
such that the allocation of rms that solves this
modied planners problem coincides with the competitive allocation.
The argument for part (a) is the same as in the Theorem 1 and hence omitted. For part b),
the proof has two steps. Analogous to Jones and Manuelli (1990), rst I dene an operator on
the transfers, 
 (T (t)) and prove that it has a xed point. At the xed point, the feasibility
constraint of the planner and competitive equilibrium are the same. Second, I need to dene
prices and a cost structure such that the optimality conditions hold in both cases. The price
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of capital and salaries are dened such that the optimal consumption and capital accumulation
paths for the representative consumer coincide with those predicted by planner. To assure that
the allocation of rms coincides, I use the linearity of the optimality conditions in both the
market and the centralized problem. I show that one can dene a unique set of subsidies/taxes,
b (t) such that the thresholds of the decentralized problem satisfy the necessary conditions
of the planner. I show that the transfer generated by b (t) ; T(b (t)) is a xed point of 
.
Hence, the equivalence is proven. Note that if the equilibrium was Pareto optimal, then b (t)
should be equal to zero across all states.
Corollary 1 The solution to the competitive equilibrium exists
Corollary 2 The e¢ cient allocation can be decentralized as a competitive allocation whenever
state contingent subsidies/taxes are available.b c (t)
The linearity in the optimality conditions of the rm allows me to recover the policy that
would generate the e¢ cient outcome as a market allocation.
6 Application
As explained when comparing the market and e¢ cient allocation, the private and social value
of a rm may in general di¤er when the equilibrium displays marginal product dispersion.
This section analyzes the contribution of a rm to output vis as vis its prots, for alternative
distributions of exogenous idiosyncratic productivity; zit and shadow value of capital; it. To
simplify the analysis I assume there are only two processes available, and technologies are Cobb-
Douglas, being  the share of capital in value added. Under this assumption, the prots of the
marginal rm in the market operating process n are
(xt; Xt) =
Yt
Z l

z n
MPKt
 1
1 

(1  )  [ rt
MPKt
  1]

(PV)
The contribution of the rm to aggregate output is
@Yt(t)
@zet ( 
n;t)
1
dvn(zet )
=
Yt
Z l
(
z n
(MPKt)
 )
1
1 

(1  )  [Z
l
Zk
1
MPKt
  1]

(SV)
The disparities that we have described generally in the previous section hold here. I rst
compare SV to PV for a given a distribution of rms productivity in the market and a distrib-
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ution of shadows values of capital. I construct shadow values so that only rm using the worse
technology are constrained. The distribution of productivities and shadows values are depicted
in the top three panels of Figure 1.
The bottom right panels in Figure 1 are constructed such that as we move along the hor-
izontal axis to the right, less rms are constrained. The blue line is the ratio of SV to PV
for a given marginal product of capital of the marginal exiting rm. It is lower than one for
all realizations indicating that the foregone output in the planners allocation is higher than
that accounted in the market allocation. Hence, if the scrap values are the same, the threshold
for exit has to be higher in the market allocation than it is in the e¢ cient allocation. When
there are no constrained rms in the market both values coincide. The measure of dispersion
in dispersion in marginal product of capital is lower as we move to right of the panel.
Next I allow for lower shadow value of capital for rms that have already upgraded. I start
with an economy in which rms that have upgraded have no low marginal product of capital.
I simulate alternative distributions for marginal product of capital such that I replace the
marginal product of capital of the most productive rms running the worse technology (I set it
equal to the interest rate in the market), and let rms that have upgraded have lower marginal
product of capital (be constrained). I generate the replacement such that the dispersion in
marginal products of capital is the same across allocations. In the last two realizations of the
distributions of marginal products I drops its dispersion by allowing more rms operating the
worse technology to be unconstrained.
Figure 2 depict the results of the simulations. Although the rst 5 simulations have distri-
butions of marginal product of capital with the same dispersion, the market and the e¢ cient
allocation depart from each other. As more rms operating the better technology are con-
strained SV gets relatively larger than PV, indicating that the losses in e¢ ciency do not depend
only on the observed dispersion but on the identity of the rms that have lower marginal prod-
uct than the interest rate. In the last 2 simulations, the dispersion is lower than before. While
the gap between SV to PV closes initially, the market value of the rm is further away from the
social value, than in the simulation with higher dispersion in marginal product.
In these exercises, I have taken the distribution of shadow values of capital exogenously. It is
expected that the disparities between SV and PV are reinforced or smoothed as the distribution
in marginal products is allowed to vary endogenously in general equilibrium.
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7 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the extensive literature linking disparities in marginal product of
capital to di¤erences in aggregate productivity across economies. It builds a formal framework
for the study of e¢ ciency in economies where dynamically optimal investment decisions of rms
operating under uncertainty and endogenous rm selection, can generate dispersion in marginal
products as an equilibrium outcome.
First, I show that a market arrangement that would induce the e¢ cient allocation in an
economy with no equilibrium dispersion in marginal product of capital, fails to generate the
e¢ cient outcome when the allocation displays dispersion in marginal products. The distribution
of marginal products is a state of the economy and agents should be allowed to trade upon them
for markets to be complete. I sidestep the absence of those assets, by providing a decentralization
result that relies on changing entry and upgrade costs, as well as scrap values of rms, to generate
the e¢ cient allocation of rms across technologies.
Second, I show that it is possible to construct economies with higher marginal product
dispersion, that are closer to the e¢ cient allocation than comparable economies with lower dis-
persion in marginal products. This feature highlights the importance of studying the connection
between marginal product dispersion and aggregate productivity within a general equilibrium
framework, where the e¢ cient allocation can be characterized.
While the focus of this paper is solely on marginal product of capital dispersion, it is known
that similar indivisibilities and indivisibilities in investment are present in labor markets. Ex-
ample of those are overhead labor costs, and ring costs. It is likely that dispersion in marginal
product of labor and capital interact with each other, possibly to compensate one another.
Whether higher joint dispersion in marginal product of labor and capital is detrimental for
aggregate productivity and welfare remains to be shown. Likewise, the interactions between
this source of marginal product dispersion (a technological one) with others such as nancial
frictions, remains to be studied.
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Technical Appendix
7.1 Probability Measures
7.1.1 Existence and Uniqueness, v : A!A
Proof of Proposition 2. To prove it, I use Theorem 2 in Hopenhayn and Prescott (1992).
To do use the theorem I need to add an order to the space A. Dene the order " " such
that a0  a if and only if a0 = a  fz;Ng or a = a  fz; 0g or z0 = z and n0 > n: Then,(A,)
is an ordered space. If we add the Euclidean measure, A is a complete metric space.
First,  is a transition function, as it is a probability measure on (A,B) and is a measurable
function. This is true because both Pz and Ps are measurable and the composition of measurable
functions is measurable, as well as because of the continuity of n0(n; z0). Continuity of n0 implies
that for all SxZxN 2B(A), f(z; n) 2 A : ((z; n)) 2 ZxN g 2B(A):
Second,  satises monotonicity. In other words for any increasing, measurable and bounded
function f :A! R
if a1  a2 then (Tf)(a1) =
Z
a02A
f(a0)(a1; da0)  (Tf)(a2)
is increasing.
Under Assumption 9, z are not serially negatively correlated. The optimal policy dictates
that rms using better processes (higher n) exit "after" rms with worse processes. Hence,
if a1 > a2;  assigns measure zero to realizations of z0 that have positive measure under n1.
Upgrades are costly, so conditional on the productivity level z0; if a rm with technology n
upgrades to technology n + 2 it is also optimal for the rm with process n + 1 to upgrade to
n+ 2. The latter implies that the policy function n0(n; z0) is non-decreasing, which completes
the proof of monotonicity of :
Finally we need to check that the monotone mixing condition is satised. Stated formally,
there exist an element a 2 A and integer t such that
t(a; [a; a]) > 0 and t(a; [a; a]) > 0
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To show this property, assume a = a and take a sequence of "good shocks",fzgt=1The optimal
policy and the cost structure (Assumption 7) dictates that the rm upgrades technologies to
reach the best technology available. Hence, a 2 [a; a]. Suppose instead that we start with
a = a and take a sequence of bad shocks" fzgt=1 While there is no downgrade in the process
operated by the rm, the optimal policy dictates that the rm exits. Hence, a 2 [a; a].
Under this three assumption, T  has a unique xed point in the space of measures.
7.1.2 Projections on the Space N (Law of Motion,n)
Let the measure of exits at any point in time
M1et(Xt 1; Xt) = (1  )
Z
ze( nt ;Xt)z
Z
v1t 1(z 1)Pz(z; z 1)dz 1dz +M
ent
t G(z
e( 1; Xt))
Mnet(Xt 1; Xt) = (1  )
Z
ze( nt ;Xt)z
Z
vnt 1(z 1)Pz(z; z 1)dz 1dz
In other words, it equals the measure of rms whose current idiosyncratic productivity compo-
nent is below the current exit threshold plus entrants whose productivity draw is lower than
the exit threshold for the lowest technology available.
The measure of incumbent upgrades equals
Mnut(Xt) = (1  )
"Z
zzu( nt ;Xt 1)
Z
vn 1t 1 (z 1)P (z; z 1)dz 1dz
#
8n > 1
the measure of rms running technology n   1 whose current realization of idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity is above the upgrade threshold for process n.
With these denitions we can characterize the law of motion of the distribution of rms per
process.
If 1 < n < N the law of motion is characterized by
vnt (bz) = (1  ) R bzze( nt ;Xt) R zu( n+1t 1 ;Xt 1)ze( nt 1;Xt 1) P (z; z 1)dvnt 1(z 1)dz zu( nt ; Xt) > bz > ze( nt ; Xt)
vnt (bz) = (1  ) R bzzu( nt ;Xt) R zu( n+1t 1 ;Xt 1)ze( nt 1;Xt 1) P (z; z 1)dvnt 1(z 1)dz+
+Mnut +M
ent
t (G(bz)  zu( nt ; Xt)) zu( n+1t ; Xt) > bz  zu( nt ; Xt)
vnt (bz) = 0 o=w
(9)
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If n = 1 the law of motion is
vnt (bz) = (1  ) R bzze( nt ;Xt) R zu( n+1t 1 ;Xt 1)ze( nt 1;Xt 1) P (z; z 1)dvnt 1(z 1)dz
+M entt (G(bz) G(ze( n; Xt))) zu( n+1t ; Xt) > bz > ze( nt ; Xt)
vnt (bz) = 0 o=w
For n = N , the law of motion is
vnt (bz) = (1  ) R bzze( nt ;Xt) R zu( n+1t 1 ;Xt 1)ze( nt 1;Xt 1) P (z; z 1)dvnt 1(z 1)dz zu( nt ; Xt) > bz > ze( nt ; Xt)
vnt (bz) = (1  ) R bzzu( nt ;Xt) R zu( n+1t 1 ;Xt 1)ze( nt 1;Xt 1) P (z; z 1)dvnt 1(z 1)dz
+Mnut +M
ent
t (G(bz)  zu( nt ; Xt)) z > bz  zu( nt ; Xt)
vnt (bz) = 0 o=w
(10)
In other words, the measure of rms running process n with productivity at most bz, equals
the measure of rms operating in the previous period whose current idiosyncratic productivity is
larger than the current exit threshold and at most bz minus the measure of exogenous liquidations,
plus the measure of entrants with productivity up to bz if bz is larger than the upgrade threshold,
and the measure of upgrades. If n = 1 there are no upgrades for incumbents, and if n = N
there is no option for further upgrade.
Proof of Lemma 1. I split the proof in two. First, I show that the measure of absolutely
continuous with respect to the lebesque measure on the real line, hence continuous. Then I
show that the measure is bounded.
Lemma 2 (AC) The measure associated to the distribution of types is absolutely continu-
ous(AC) with respect to the lebesque measure on the real line
Proof. The claim follows from the absolute continuity of the exogenous distribution of types.
We prove by induction.
By denition
v10(z) =

G(z) G(ze( 10; X0))
1 G(ze( 10; X0))

vn0 (z) =

G(z) G(zu( n0 ; X0))
1 G(ze( 10; X0))

8n > 1
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Take a sequence of of intervals (ak; bk)Kk=1 and let
KX
k=1
jvn0 (bk)  vn0 (ak)j  "
Replacing by the denition
KX
k=1
 11 G(ze( 10; X0)) (G(bk) G(ak))
  "
Let b" = " 1 G(ze( 10; X0)) :By absolute continuity of G, there exist b such that
KX
k=1
jbk   akj  b
Because " was arbitrary, and (ak; bk)Kk=1 too, v
n
0 is absolutely continuous.
Suppose vnT is absolutely continuous. By denition,v
n
T+1(z) follows either 9, ?? or 10. Hence,
it is the sum of absolutely continuous functions which process that vnT+1 is absolutely continuous.
By induction, vnt is absolutely continuous for arbitrary t.
Lemma 3 (M) The feasible measure of rms in the market is bounded
Proof. By denition, the total measure of rms in the market isMt =
PN 1
n=1 v
n
t (z
u( n+1t ; Xt); st)+
vNt (z; st): Using the aggregation results, one could right the feasibility constraint of the economy
as
Ct = h(Mt]TFP tf(1;Kt))) Kt+1 + (1  b)Kt
+
NX
n=1
neM
n
et   (IM entt +Upgrade Cost)
Mt = (1  )Mt 1 +M entt  
NX
n=1
Mnet
where ]TFP t = TFPtM 1t .
A strategy to make the measure of rms grow without bound would be to never exit rms and
enter as much as possible. Now, because entry is costly, optimality dictates that the marginal
cost of an entrant equalizes the marginal return,
h0(((1  )Mt 1 +M entt )]TFP tf(1;Kt))) = It
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which pins down a nite level of entry M entt at each t. Replacing the entry level into the
dynamic equation for the measure of rms we obtain
Mt =
(h0) 1 (It)
]TFP tf(1;Kt)
which is bounded as f displays decreasing returns to scale in capital.
Alternatively, a strategy to make the measure of rms shrink without bound would be to
never enter rms and exit as many as possible. Such strategy implies that the number of rms
equals zero in nite time. Under Assumption 2 h0(0)!1 and h(0) = 0. Hence, such strategy
is not feasible.
Existence and Uniqueness of the centralized allocation
Before moving to the next result dene  as the set of bounded absolutely continuous
functions from A SxZxN! R+: Hence, vt 2  8t as shown in Lemma 1. Let, K  R the
feasible set for capital. Because there are decreasing returns to capital in the aggregate and
there is no growth in the economy, it is without loss of generality to assume K is compact.
Lemma 4 (U) U : R+ ! R+ is bounded.
Proof. U(Ct) can potentially be unbounded above or below. However, the feasible measure of
rms in the market is always bounded above and away from zero (Lemma (M)). Also, due to
decreasing returns in capital, the aggregate level of capital is bounded. Finally, the sets S and
Z and n0 : SxZxN!N is continuous, hence bounded too. From the feasibility condition in the
economy, aggregate consumption is bounded and under assumption 1 (continuity) U(Ct) too.
7.2 E¢ cient Allocation (existence)
Proof of Theorem 1. We can write the planners problem in terms of the operator z as
zV (t) = Max
(vt;Kt+1)2 (st;vt 1;Kt)
U (C(st; vt 1;Kt; vt;Kt+1)) + Et [V (t+1)]
Let H(SxxK) be the set of functions (functional) f : SxxK ! R continuous except
potentially at the origin and bounded in the norm
kfk = sup
ktk=1;t2SxxK
kf(t)k
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z : H(SxxK)! H(SxxK):
From Lemma (U) and Assumption 1 we know that U is bounded and continuous.
The state space SxxK is compact. We have shown that s is a probability measure and
hence satises the Feller property. We know that T S (the transition function) maps a convex
compact set into itself (Lemma AC). T S : ! .
Hence z is a contraction, with a unique xed point in SxxK:
7.3 Market Structure
7.3.1 Households
The representative household derives utility from consumption of the nal good Ct.
The household is endowed with a unit of labor that for simplicity, is assumed to be supplied
inelastically to the rms in the economy. She receives a wage wt for those services. She can
also accumulate capital Kt, priced in terms of the nal good (the numeraire) and rent it at
price rt. The aggregate stock depreciates at rate b: Finally, the household can buy shares
of N di¤erent mutual funds that entitle it to the dividends generated by the rms operating
alternative processes in the economy. After dividends are paid, mutual funds shares ant can be
traded.
Her problem reads
max
Ct;nLt ;n
H
t ;Kt+1
E0
1X
t=0
tU(Ct) (11)
subject to
Ct +Kt+1   (1  b)Kt +X
nN
Pnt a
n
t = wt + rtKt +
X
nN
(dnt + P
n
t ) a
n
t 1
Xt+1 =  c(Xt)
where Pnt is the price of shares a
n
t of a mutual fund of rms operating process n at period
t+1, which pay dividends dnt+1 and can be sold tomorrow at price P
n
t+1: The discount factor
is  2 (0; 1). In computing the return to the share holdings, the agent needs to forecast the
law of motion of the distribution of rms in the market for each possible realization for the
exogenous aggregate shock, st. The aggregate state of the economy Xt =

st; fvnt gNn=1 ;Kt

entails the exogenous shock, st; the distribution of rms per process, vnt for n  N ; and the
available aggregate stock of capital. I denote vnt (z; st)  vnt ([z; z) ; st) the measure of rms with
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productivity at most z and technology n when the aggregate state is st: The subjective law of
motion of the aggregate state for the representative consumer is denoted by  c.
The optimality conditions of the problem are standard. The price of shares is the present
discounted value of all future dividends of the portfolio of rms in period t+ 1with technology
n, adjusted by the corresponding pricing kernel
Pnt = Et
1X
=t+1
 t
U 0(C )
U 0(Ct)
dn
7.3.2 Final Goods Sector
There is a representative competitive rm with a technology, h : R+ ! R+ that transforms
intermediate inputs yit into a nal goods Yt. Each intermediate good producer is identied with
i. The nal good producer takes the set of producers as given, and maximizes prots.
Maxyit Yt  
Z
pityit di
subject to
Yt  h
Z
yitdi

where pit is the cost of good yit. Intermediate goods are perfect substitutes in production of
the nal good, in the sense that only the total number of intermediate good produced matters
for nal good production19.
The corresponding input demand for each variety i is determined by the FOC of the problem,
i.e.
h0
Z
yitdi

= pt
Therefore the marginal cost of each intermediate good should be equalized.
7.3.3 Intermediate Goods
Firms use capital and labor to produce a homogeneous intermediate good yt. The technology
for production combines capital and labor according to f and productivity is Hicks neutral.
19With a continuum of intermediate producers this assumption allows me to avoid dening the production
function h over a continuum of types. One could have assumed an arbitrary substitution pattern and a CES
aggregator or alternatively, assumed a nite number of intermediate goods, and a very general substitution
pattern across them.
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yt  stzt nf(lt; kt)
Under Assumption 3, the owners of the rms (the household) receives a fraction of the
production yt as prots. Firms are assumed to be entirely equity owned.
Dene xnit as the vector of idiosyncratic state variables of rm i, i.e. x
ni
t = (zt;  
ni
t ). Let Xt
be dened as before and dene  f as the law of motion for the aggregate state as perceived by
any arbitrary rm; i.e. Xt+1 =  f (Xt). The static problem of a rm i producing intermediate
goods in any period t is
(xnit ; Xt) =Maxpt;lt;kt (ptyit   wtlit   rtkit)
subject to
yit  stxnit f(lit; kit)
kit = [k
ni ;1) (it)
The optimality conditions yield
kit
lit
=
wt
rt   it
fkkit
fllit
where it is the shadow value of capital when the rm is constrained by the minimum capacity,
and fkkfll corresponds to the ratio of factor shares of total output under Assumption 3.
If the minimum capacity requirement is binding, the rm adjusts its resource allocation
through the exible factor, in this case labor. However, capital labor ratios are not equalized
across production units 20. The capital labor ratio of constrained rms is higher than that of
unconstrained rms. In a static model with complete markets, disparate capital labor ratios
are a sign of ine¢ ciencies in the allocation. In the current set up however, these gaps might be
consistent with optimality.
Under Assumption 8 one can describe labor and capital demands as a function of the pro-
20 In models where rms are nancially constrained, the capital labor ratios of constrained rms is usually lower
than that of unconstrained rms. Constrained rms hold less capital than they would if unconstrained, and have
a higher marginal product of capital than the equilibrium cost of capital. In this model, constrained rms hold
more capital than otherwise, and their MPK is lower than the interest rate.
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ductivity of the rm, and its marginal product of capital.
l(xnit ; Xt) =
f 1l (x
ni
t ; rt   it)R
f 1l (x
nj
t ; rt   jt)dj
k(xnit ; Xt) = Kt
f 1k (x
ni
t ; rt   it)R
f 1k (x
nj
t ; rt   jt)dj
where f 1l indicates the inverse of the marginal product of labor, and f
 1
k is dened likewise.
In the analysis that follows it is useful to dene two statistics, namely Z l =
R
f 1l (x
nj
t ; rt  
jt)dj and Zk =
R
f 1k (x
nj
t ; rt   jt)dj. Both are statistics of productivity adjusted by the
marginal product of capital across all the rms in the economy.
7.3.4 Exit and Upgrade
An active rm using process n get prots according to the state of the aggregate demand through
its impact on the price of intermediate goods; a measure of productivity (adjusted by marginal
product dispersion) as summarized by Zk and Z l; the productivity of the rm, xnit ; and the
share of capital expenses in total revenue. Under Assumption 3, the latter can be described as
fkkit
f = t. Prots read
(xnit ; Xt) = h
0
Z
yitdi

stx
ni
t f
 
f 1l
Zl
;
f 1k
Zk
Kt
!
[(1  )  t( rt
MPKit
  1)]
Whenever the minimum capacity constraint is binding the marginal product of capital of
the rm is lower than the cost of capital in the market, and prots drop below those of an
unconstrained rm with the same productivity. The drop in prots equals the gap between the
cost of capital in the market and the rms marginal product of capital times the rms capital
demand.
The value of the rm is Wt(xnt ; Xt) when the aggregate state is Xt;is as described in the
body of the paper.
If n = N the rm is already operating the best process in the economy. Hence, there is no
upgrade in technology available and the value of the rm reads
Wt(x
N
t ; Xt) = maxfNe (st); fWt(xNt ; Xt)g
subject to Xt+1 =  f (Xt)
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7.3.5 Entry
A fraction Mt of the total mass of rms operating in the market Mt, are forced out of the
market at the end of each period, after production took place. At the beginning of next period,
after the shocks have been realized some rms select themselves out of the market. There is a
continuum of rms ready to enter the market at any period t. They invest I(st) units of the
numeraire and get a draw of productivity zit from an exogenous distribution G(z) with support
[z; z]. At that point, they can decide whether to exit or operate in the market, and if operating,
which process to use. They may choose to upgrade technology immediately at cost
Pm
n=2 I
n
t (st)
if choosing the m-th process available.
The rst part of Assumption 6 prevents entrepreneurs from creating resources by entering
and exiting immediately from the market. The second part bounds the di¤erence in cost
of entry across aggregate states, and will be used to assure procyclicality of the measure of
entrants. Intuitively, if the cost of entry increases "too much" in good times, it is possible for
entry to be discouraged altogether.
The mass of entrants M entt is determined by the free entry condition,
I(st) 
Z
W (zit;  
1; Xt)dG(zit) (12)
with equality if M entt > 0.
7.3.6 Dividends
Dividends in the economy are
dnt (Xt) =
Z
(xnit ; Xt) dv
n
t (zit) + 
n
e (st)M
n
et(Xt 1; Xt) M entt (Xt)I(st) if n = 1
dnt (Xt) =
Z
(xnit ; Xt) dv
n
t (zit) + 
n
e (st)M
n
et(Xt 1; Xt) if 1 < n < N
  In(st)

Mnut (Xt) +M
ent
t (Xt)
 
G(zu( n+1t ; Xt)) G(zu( nt ; Xt))

dnt (Xt) =
Z
(xnit ; Xt) dv
n
t (zit) + 
n
e (st)M
n
et(Xt 1; Xt) if n = N
  In(st)

Mnut (Xt) +M
ent
t (Xt) (1 G(zu( nt ; Xt)))

Hence, they equal the prot of active rm plus the scrap values of the ones that get liquidated,
minus entry and upgrade costs. If we replace them in the budget constraint of the household
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we obtain the feasibility condition of this economy in terms of nal goods.
7.3.7 Properties of the Value Function
Proof of Proposition 1. First notice that (xt; Xt) is bounded and continuous in z 2 Z
which follows from the boundness of the support of z and the continuity of f .
(xt; Xt) = h
0
Z
yitdi

stzt 
nf
 
f 1l
Zl
;
f 1k
Zk
Kt
!
[(1  )  t( rt
MPKit
  1)]
Claim 3 Prots are increasing in z.
Proof. By denition, MPKit = min frt; stzit nt fkg. Hence, the term in brackets in the prot
function is either zero or negative. MPKit is increasing in z so that the term in brackets also
increases in z. The claim follows.
Second, let W (xt; Xt) be the unique xed point to the operator T ,
T (W (xt; Xt)) =Max
n
e; (x;Xt) + Et
et+1(Xt; Xt+1) (1  )W (xt+1; Xt+1) ;W (xt+1; Xt)  In+1o
We rst show rst that W ( x;X) is non-decreasing in z.
Let C(Z) be the set of continuous bounded functions in z, and let C 0(Z) a closed subspace
of non-decreasing functions. Take W 2 C(Z) and z1 < z2. then
T (W (z1;  
n; Xt)) =Max
8><>: e; (z1;  
n; Xt) + Et
et+1(Xt; Xt+1) (1  )W (xt+1; Xt+1) ;
W (z1;  
n+1; Xt)  In+1
9>=>;
Max
8><>: e; (z2;  
n; Xt) + Et
et+1(Xt; Xt+1) (1  )W (xt+1; Xt+1) ;
W (z2;  
n+1; Xt)  In+1
9>=>;
= T (W (z2;  
j ; Xt))
When n = N the last term in the operator disappears because there is no possibility of upgrade.
Hence, the inequality in the second line follows from the monotonicity of prots in z; Assumption
9 and the denition of s (it satises the Feller condition), which implies that the expectation
is increasing in z (Lemma 9.5 in Stokey et al. (1989)). This implies that W (z1;  N ; Xt) is non-
decreasing. The same can be shown for n < N by backward induction. All in all, T (C 0(Z)) 
C 0(Z) and using the Contraction Mapping Theorem W  2 C 0(Z).
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Now, we want to prove that for each ( n; X) the function fW (z;  n; Xt) is strictly increasing
in z. Take z1 < z2
fW (z1;  n; Xt) = (z1;  n; Xt) + Et et+1(Xt; Xt+1) (1  )W (z;  n; Xt+1)
< (z2;  
n; Xt) + Et
et+1(Xt; Xt+1) (1  )W (z;  n; Xt+1)
= fW (z2;  n; Xt)
which proves the claim. The inequality in the second term follows from the monotonicity of
prots and as before, Lemma 9.5 in Stokey et al. (1989).
Given the monotonicity of the continuation values, the optimality of the trigger strategy
follows. Suppose not. Hence, there is a rm with productivity z, such that z < ze( n; Xt)
and the rm does not exit the market. But the rm with productivity z +  < ze( n; Xt)
did, so Max
n
e;fW (z +;  n; Xt)o = e. From the monotonicity of fW , it follows thatfW (z +;  n; Xt) > fW (z;  n; Xt). In other words, e > fW (z;  n; Xt) so that remaining in the
market cannot be optimal. Analogous arguments hold for the upgrade threshold.
Proof of Lemma 2. The value of a rm operating technology n < N is
Wt(x
n
t ; Xt) = max
n
Wt(x
n+1
t ; Xt)  In+1(Xt); fWt(xnt ; Xt);ne (Xt) o
with continuation value given by
fWt(xnt ; Xt) = h0Z yitdi [(1  ) stxtf
 
f 1l (x
ni
t ; rt   it)
Zl
;
f 1k (x
ni
t ; rt   it)
Zk
Kt
!
+ Et
het+1Wt+1(xnt ; Xt+1)i
Using Assumption 4, rewrite the continuation value as
fWt(xnt ; Xt) = xtf  f 1l (xnit ; rt   it); f 1k (xnit ; rt   it)h0Z yitdi [(1  ) stf  1Zl ; KtZk

fWt(xnt ; Xt) = zt$( n)f  f 1l (zt; rt   it); f 1k (zt; rt   it)h0Z yitdi [(1  ) stf  1Zl ; KtZk

where, $( n)   nt f
 
f 1l ( 
n
t ; 1); f
 1
k ( 
n
t ; 1)

: The Value of a rm with the top technology can
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be described in terms of $( N ) as
Wt(x
N
t ; Xt) = max
n
$( N )fWt(zt; 1; Xt);Ne (st) o = $( N )maxfWt(zt; 1; Xt); Ne (st)$( N )

Wt(x
N
t ; Xt) = $( 
N )max
nfWt(zt; Xt); bNe (st) o
where bNe (Xt) = Ne (Xt)$( N ) : Notice that zt that solves for the exit threshold is the same in the
"normalized" problem, versus the original one as fWt is also homogeneous in a function of
idiosyncratic productivity. The previous equations indicate that Wt(xNt ; Xt) is homogenous in
 N .
The value of a rm of an arbitrary rm with technology n = N   1 is
Wt(x
n
t ; Xt) = max
n
$( n)Wt(zt; Xt)  In+1(st); $( n)fWt(zt1; Xt);ne (st) o
Wt(x
n
t ; Xt) = $( 
n)max
n
Wt(zt; Xt)  bIn+1(st); fWt(zt1; Xt); bne (st) o
where, bIn+1 = In+1(Xt)$( n) Hence, homogeneous in  n. The same argument holds for any n < N
which proves the statement.
7.3.8 Properties of the Allocation
The properties of the allocation depend on the characteristics of the value of the rms.
Lemma 5 (Homogeneity) If the rm is unconstrained, its value is homogenous in productiv-
ity. Hence,W (xnt ; Xt) W (zt;  nt ; Xt) = $( n)W (zt; 1; Xt) with $( nt )   nt f
 
f 1l ( 
n
t ; 1); f
 1
k ( 
n
t ; 1)

The homogeneity allows us to order optimal thresholds for upgrade and exit in terms of the
process operated by the rm.
Assumption 8: The scrap values are such that 
e( n+1)
$( n+1)
< 
e( n)
$( n) 8n < N
The assumption implies that the scrap value relative to a measure of productivity of the
rm drops in the productivity of the process it operates. Hence there are less incentives to exit
for larger more productive rms.
Assumption 9: The Markov Chains describing the paths of z and s do not display negative
serial correlation.
Proposition 6 Under Assumptions 1-9, the equilibrium allocation is such that
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1. If rms are not minimum capacity constrained, exit thresholds for rms operating worse
processes are higher than for rms running better processes, i.e. ze( nt ; Xt) > z
e( n+1t ; Xt).
2. The exit thresholds are increasing in the cost of capital, i.e. @z
e( n;Xt)
@rt
 0 8n:
3. The upgrade threshold is higher than the exit threshold for a given technology, i.e. zu( nt ; Xt) >
ze( nt ; Xt):
4. The measure of entrants is procyclical.
Proof.
1. It been shown in the previous section that (xt; Xt) is monotonic in the rm exogenous
idiosyncratic productivity. Analogous arguments hold for the technology shifter,  n:
It was also shown that fWt is increasing in idiosyncratic productivity. The optimality
condition for the exit thresholds equalizes the rm value to its scrap value. Under ??, it
can be written as
e( 
n; Xt)
$( n)
= fWt(zt; 1; Xt)
Assumption 7 then assures that ze( nt ; Xt) > z
e( n+1t ; Xt).
2. The prot function is such that @(xt;Xt)@rt  0. The continuation value of the rm satises
fW (z;  n; Xt) = (z;  n; Xt) + Et et+1(Xt; Xt+1) (1  )W (z;  n; Xt+1)
and W  is independent of the current interest rate (except possibly through its impact on
the equilibrium distribution). Hence, the continuation value of the rm is non-increasing
in the interest rate. The optimality condition for the exit threshold yields the result.
3. The result follows from Assumption 5.
4. The free entry condition dictates
I(st) 
Z
W (zit;  1; Xt)dG(zit)
By denition of W ,
I(s) 
Z
W (zit;  1; Xt)dG(zit) 
Z
1e(s)dG(zit)
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Pick s0 < s. By Assumption 6
I(s0) +
Z
1e(s)dG(zit) 
Z
1e(s
0)dG(zit) >
Z
1e(s)dG(zit)
I(s0) >
Z
1e(s
0)dG(zit)
Which implies that M ent(s) > M ent(s0):
7.4 Market Allocation versus E¢ cient Allocation
7.4.1 Capital and Labor Allocation.
Using the equation for the shadow value of labor and capital (lt; 
k
t ), and the optimality con-
ditions of the rms,
kit
lit
fllit
fkkit
=
lt
kt
kit
lit
fllit
fkkit
=
wt
rt
Hence, the relative price of capital to labor in the market allocation coincides with the
relative shadow values, only if the capital labor ratio of unconstrained rms is the same across
allocations.
7.4.2 Aggregate Capital Accumulation.
The optimal path for aggregate capital in the e¢ cient allocation is dictated by
U 0 (Ct ) = Et
h
U 0
 
Ct+1



kt+1 + 1  bi
In the market allocation the optimal capital accumulation decision of the household is charac-
terized by
U 0 (Ct) = Et
h
U 0 (Ct+1)

rt+1 + 1  bi
If the pricing kernels are the same and the shadow value of capital is the same, both allocations
yield identical paths for aggregate capital.
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The shadow value of capital for the planner is
kt = fk
 
K=0tP
n
R
(=0) f
 1
k (zit;  
n ; st)di
!
whereK=0t is the total capital intake of rms that are not constrained by the minimum capacity
constrain, and ( = 0) is the set of those rms operating in the market
In the Market allocation, the interest rate solves
rt = fk
 
K=0tP
n
R
(=0) f
 1
k (zit;  
n ; st)di
!
Hence, the shadow value of capital in the planners allocation and in the market allocation can
di¤er because the set of rms that are currently unconstrained is di¤erent set ( = 0) across
allocations. Those di¤erences may in turn imply disparities in capital intake, as summarized by
K=0t . If the allocation of rms across technologies di¤er, and the distribution of constrained
rms does too, the induced di¤erences in the cost of capital will a¤ect also the pattern of
aggregate capital accumulation.
7.4.3 Process Selection
Exit.The exit condition for a rm operating technology n in the plannersproblem reads
t

@Yt
@zet ( 
n; Xt)
+ ne (st+1)
@Mnet
@zet ( 
n; Xt)

+ E
@V (t+1)
@zet ( 
n; Xt)
= 0
The envelope condition can be written in terms of the expected value of the rm which
V Fnt+1(zt+1; zet; t+1) =
nt+1
t+1
Z zut+1
zet+1
P (zt+1; zet)dzt+1
+
N 1X
m=n+1
0@mt+1
t+1
 
mX
j=n+1
Ijt+1
1AZ zu;j+1t+1
zu;jt+1
P (zt+1; zet)dzt+1
+ (
Nt+1
t+1
 
NX
j=n+1
Ijt+1)
Z z
zu;Nt+1
P (zt+1; zet)dzt+1
+ne (st+1)
Z zet+1
P (zt+1; zet)dzt+1 (13)
for n < N .
44
If the rm is operating the best technology,
V FNt+1(zt+1; zet; t+1) =
Nt+1
t+1
Z z
zet+1
P (zt+1; zet)dzt+1 +
N
e (st+1)
Z zet+1
P (zt+1; zet)dzt+1
The derivative of output reads
@Y t (Xt)
@zet ( 
n; Xt)
1
dvn(zet )
= h0
Z
yitdi

f(1  ) stzt nf(f
 1
l
Zl
;
f 1k
Zk
Kt) 
  f
 1
l (z
e
t )
Zl
fl(z
e
t )stz
e
t 
n[
X
n
Z
stzit 
n
stzet 
ne
fl(zit;r   it)
fl(z
e
t ; r   et)
f 1l
Zl
di  1] 
  f
 1
k (z
e
t )
Zk
Ktfk(z
e
t )stz
e
t 
n [
X
j
Z
stzit 
n
stzet 
ne
fk(zit;r   it)
fk(z
e
t ; r   et)
f 1k
Zk
di   1]g
The second term cancels out because there is no dispersion in marginal products, stzit 
n
stzet 
ne
fl(zit;r it)
fl(z
e
t ;r et) =
18i and feasibility in the labor market yields Pj R f 1lZl di = 1:
Upgrades. The optimality condition is
In+1u (st)dv
n
t (z
u
t ) =
@Yt(t)
@zut ( 
n+1;t)
+ Et
et+1 @V (t+1)
@zut ( 
n+1;t)

The envelope condition can be written in terms of the di¤erence in the value of the rms. The
derivative with respect to output is
@Yt
@zut
= (1  )h0
Z
yitdi

stz
u
t
 
 n+1f(
f 1l
Zl
;
f 1k
Zk
Kt)   nf(f
 1
l
Zl
;
f 1k
Zk
Kt)
!
dvnt (z
u
t )
  kn+1ut fk(zut )stzut  n+1[
1
Kt
X
j
Z
kt   it
kt   ut
kitdi   1]
+ knutfk(z
u
t )stz
u
t  
n[
1
Kt
X
j
Z
kt   it
kt   ut
kitdi   1]
I now prove the propositions in section 3.
Proof of Proposition 4. The rst part of the proposition follows from comparing the contri-
bution to output and the prots of the marginal rm, if that marginal rm were to be the same
in both allocations. Because the rm is not constrained, the relevant terms for comparison read
(1  )  t
 
1
Kt
X
n
Z
kt   it
kt
kitdi   1
!
> (1  )
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As 1Kt
P
n
R kt it
kt
kitdi < 1. The optimality condition for exit implies then that the exit thresh-
old for the planner is lower than the one in the market allocation (as the foregone output is
higher than rms prots for ex ante identical rms).
To prove the second part of the proposition, compare(1  ) t

1
Kt
P
n
R kt it
kt et
kitdi   1

and (1  )  t

rt
MPKet
  1

:The proposition assumes kt   et =MPKet . Hence, if
1
Kt
X
n
Z 
kt   it

kitdi < rt
the foregone output of liquidating the rm is higher in the planners problem, than the prots
accounted by the rm. Hence, the threshold for exit is lower in the e¢ cient allocation than in
the market one.
Proof of Proposition 5. The rst part of the proposition follows from comparing the contri-
bution to output and the prots of the marginal rm, if that marginal rm were to be the same
in both allocations. Because the rm is not constrained, and the second term in both the output
contribution of a rm, and the prots do not depend on the rm idiosyncratic type, they cancel
out when computing the di¤erences in the output contribution and prots across processes.
Hence, both the planner and the rm in the market account for an increase in current value of
h0
 R
yitdi

stztf

f 1l
Zl
;
f 1k
Zk
Kt

(1  )   n+1    n :This di¤erence is also accounted for in the
expected value of the rm, which because rms are unconstrained, is homogeneous in  . The
optimality conditions coincide.
For the second part, it is assumed that while the rm is currently unconstrained it might
be constrained after upgrade. Hence the current value of the upgrade in terms of additional
output is
h0
Z
yitdi

stztf
 
f 1l
Zl
;
f 1k
Zk
Kt
!
(1  )
 
 n+1(1  t
 
1
Kt
X
n
Z
kt   it
kt   ut
kitdi   1
!
)   n
!
while expected prots for the rm read
h0
Z
yitdi

stztf
 
f 1l
Zl
;
f 1k
Zk
Kt
!
(1  )

 n+1(1  t

rt
MPKut
  1

)   n

: As in the exit condition, it is assumed that the shadow value of capital is the same after
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upgrade, i.e. kt   ut =MPKut . Hence, if
1
Kt
X
n
Z 
kt   it

kitdi < rt
the output gain is higher in the planners problem, than the gains in prots accounted for by
the rm. Hence, the threshold for upgrade in lower in the e¢ cient allocation.
Proof of Proposition 6. The result follows from the free entry condition (which by construc-
tion is the same in the e¢ cient allocation and the market allocation) and the results obtained
for upgrade and exit thresholds. Whenever rms that upgrade are unconstrained, the upgrade
policy is e¢ cient, ceteris paribus. Hence, disparities in the free entry condition between the
e¢ cient and market allocation stem only from di¤erences in the marginal exit threshold and
the value of the marginal exiting rm. If the marginal rm exiting the market for  1 is not
constrained, proposition ?? shows that the value of a rm for the planner is higher than for the
rm in the market. Hence, for the same marginal rm, the free entry condition is not satised
in the e¢ cient allocation.
tI(st) < 
1
t (G(z
2
ut) G(z1et))+
N 1X
n=2
(nt   tIn(st)) (G(zn+1ut ) G(znut))+
 
Nt   tIN (st)

(1 G(zNut))
Entry is higher in the e¢ cient allocation.
When the marginal rm is constrained, proposition 4 shows that whenever
1
Kt
P
n
R  
kt   it

kitdi < rt the value of the marginal rm is higher in the planner problem
and hence there is more entry than in the market allocation.
7.5 Equivalence with the decentralized solution
To prove the equivalence between the centralized and decentralized solution dene

(

ze( nt ;t); z
u( n+1t ;t)
	N
n=1
;M ent(t); t)

NX
n=1
ne 
n
e (st)M
n
e (t) +
N 1X
n=1
n+1u I
n+1(st)M
n+1
u (t) + (st)I(st)M
ent(t) + Y   Y 
Lemma 6 
(

ze( nt ;t); z
u( n+1t ;t)
	N
n=1
;M ent(t); t) is continuous in the exit and up-
grade thresholds as well as in the measure of entrants.
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Proof. Continuity in the measure of entrants is straightforward from the denition. Continuity
in the thresholds follows from the denition of aggregate output and the measure of upgrades
and exits in terms of the distribution of rms, jointly with the absolute continuity of vnt proved
in Lemma (AC).
Lemma 7 There exist a transfer scheme T(t) such that

(

ze( nt ;T;t); z
u( n+1t ;T;t)
	N
n=1
;M ent(T;t); t) = T
Proof. Lemma (M) shows that the measure of rms operating in the market is bounded.
Hence, there exist B such that 
(

ze( nt ;t); z
u( n+1t ;t)
	N
n=1
;M ent(t); t) < B: The feasible
measure of entrants is also bounded by Lemma (M). Let   [0; B], which is convex and compact
by construction. The optimal thresholds are the maximizers of Pseudo-Planner Problem. By
the theorem of the maximum they are u.h.c. in T(t). Hence, 
 is an upper hemicontinuous
convex valued correspondence and 
 6= ? for any T 2 . Thus, 
 has a xed point (Kakutani).
Note that there might be di¤erent combination of thresholds that generate the same transfer,
and hence the xed point is not unique. In other words, the decentralization need not be unique.
Proof of Theorem 2. Dene, p (t) = cb(t) where b(t) generates T(t) (the xed
point of 
)
When the Pseudo-Planner Problem is solved at Tt = T(t) the budget constraint reads
Ct +Kt+1   (1  b)Kt + IM entt +Upgrade Cost  Yt + NX
n=1
neM
n
et
which is the market clearing condition in the decentralized allocation. Hence, for this cost struc-
ture the feasibility constraint of the planner coincides with that of the competitive equilibrium.
The dynamic optimality conditions for the rms need to hold at

ze( nt ;T;t); z
u( n+1t ;T;t)
	
:
Claim 4 There exist an industrial policy b(t) such that at the thresholds of the competitive
equilibrium, the generated transfer Tt is a xed point of 
;T (b(t)) = 
(T ).
Proof. Note that the pseudo-planners optimality conditions in terms of the allocation of rms
across technologies and entry levels are linear in the cost of entry, upgrade and the scrap value
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( Equations 2 to 4). For notational convenience I collapse them to the following equation
p = p

ze( nt ;t); z
u( n+1t ;t)
	N
n=1
;M ent(t)

Dene b(t) to solve this system of equations at the equilibrium threshold and entry level of
the competitive allocations, i.e.
cb(t) = p ze( nt ; Xt); zu( n+1t ; Xt)	Nn=1 ;M ent(Xt)
The wedges b(t) are well dened because they solve a perfectly identied system of equations.
Suppose that T(b(t)) is not a xed point of 
. The level of output generated in by the
centralized allocation is the same as in the decentralized allocation because the thresholds and
measure of entries are the same. If T(b(t)) is not a xed point of 
, the budget constraint of
the planner reads
Ct +Kt+1   (1  b)Kt + IM entt +Upgrade Cost  Yt + NX
n=1
neM
n
et +
cb(t)
which implies that the market clearing condition in the goods market in the competitive allocation
is violated, which yields a contradiction.
Using the denition of the cost of capital in the market allocation, it is possible to show
that as long as the allocation of rms is the same in the decentralized and centralized prob-
lem, the shadow value of capital coincides with the interest rate. Hence incentives for capital
accumulation are the same in the market and planners problem.
rt = fk
 
K=0tP
n
R
(=0) f
 1
k (zit;  
n ; st)di
!
= kt
Proof of Corollary 2. The indi¤erence conditions for the rms in the decentralized problem
are linear in the costs too as seen from 25. To simplify notation, dene the system of equations
as
c = c

ze( nt ; Xt); z
u( n+1t ; Xt)
	N
n=1
;M ent(Xt)

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Given the cost structure, the e¢ cient allocation solves,
c = p

ze( nt ;t); z
u( n+1t ;t)
	N
n=1
;M ent(t)

Dene, b c (t) to solve the system of equations c at the e¢ cient threshold and entry level,
i.e.
cb c (t) = c ze( nt ;t); zu( n+1t ;t)	Nn=1 ;M ent(t)
The wedges b c (t) are well dened because they solve a perfectly identied system of equations.
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Chapter II: Industry Dynamics, Investment and Business
Cycles
1 Introduction
Dispersion in marginal products within narrowly dened industries is a stylized fact of modern
economies21. There are many reasons for which marginal productivity of inputs may di¤er across
rms. Some of the most extensively analyzed mechanisms in the literature are size dependent
policies 22, subsidies or taxes for particular rms23 and market incompleteness (i.e. nancial
frictions 24). These mechanisms can explain a large portion of the documented dispersion. They
also imply that if this dispersion is eliminated, e¢ ciency can be improved. In Caunedo (2014),
I argue that dispersion in marginal products may arise as the outcome of an e¢ cient allocation
and that allocations that display lower equilibrium marginal product dispersion can be further
away from the e¢ cient allocation than those displaying lower marginal product dispersion. In
this paper, I quantify aggregate productivity losses associated to dispersion in marginal product
and ine¢ cient rm selection in the US manufacturing sector. The latter has been extensively
used as a benchmark for e¢ ciency in many quantitative analysis comparing resource allocations
across countries and hence a relevant starting point for our analysis. Additionally, I describe
the policies that would induce the e¢ cient allocation as a market outcome.
I extend the framework studied in Caunedo (2014) where rms face irreversibilities and
indivisibilities in investment and operate under uncertainty, to allow for imperfect competition.
The decisions to enter and exit the market, as well as the selection of technologies are costly
and modelled as real options. A technology is a productivity level and an associated minimum
capacity in terms of capital. More productive technologies have a higher minimum capacity
associated to them. I assume away idiosyncratic shocks, so that at the moment of entry, each
investor is assigned a blueprint (a technique to produce a good), the quality of which varies
over a continuum of types and is constant in time. I solve for the industry equilibrium by
21For cross country evidence refer to Asker et al. (2013). For evidence for Korea, refer to Midrigan and Xu
(2009). Also, Hsieh and Klenow (2009) provide evidence for the US, India and China. For evidence in Latin
America, see Buso et al. (2013).
22Barstelman et al. (2013) document and study the impact of distorsions that are correlated with the size of
rms.
23Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) analyze a broad range of policy distorsions.
24See Buera and Shin (2011), Moll (2013), Midrigan and Xu (2009) and the extensive literature thereafter.
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means of a centralized problem whose allocation coincides with the market allocation for a
given cost structure. I calibrate this stylized economy to the US manufacturing sector, and
ask whether the allocation can be pareto improved either by narrowing di¤erences in marginal
product or by changing the industry dynamic. I show that shifts in the patterns of entry, exit
and investment have a larger contribution to productivity gains than those associated to drops
in marginal product dispersion. This nding is consistent with micro empirical analysis that
documents substantial productivity improvements associated to shifts in the patterns of rm
churning (Haltinwanger (2011), Davis et al. (2007) and Eslava et al. (2004)).
In terms of the macro implications of the asymmetry in capacity constraints there are two
pieces of empirical evidence, that put together, suggest that this model can be in line with the
data. First, measures of dispersion in the marginal product of capital uctuate with the cycle
(Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006)), they are countercyclical. In the model the aggregate state of the
economy dictates uctuations in the distribution of marginal products along this line. Second,
there is also evidence that dispersion in revenue TFP at the plant level is countercyclical, and
that the increase in dispersion is explained mostly by a larger right tail, i.e. more rms with lower
revenue productivity (Kehrig (2011)). With constant return technologies, revenue productivity
is proportional to marginal product of inputs. It is possible to argue that part of the increase
in the right tail observed in the data is accounted for by an increase in dispersion in marginal
product of capital, mostly through the right tail of its distribution. The model economy implies
that recessions are periods where more rms operate with lower marginal product of capital
which supports the empirical evidence25.
In this economy, the equilibrium allocation is ine¢ cient. On the one hand, monopolistic
competition generates a gap between the social and private of the rm, equal to the constant
markup charged by the rms in the decentralized market. On the other hand, markets are not
complete in the arrow debreu sense. As explained in Caunedo (2014) when there is marginal
product dispersion, an additional rm in the market (a rm can be interepreted as a new asset)
may span a whole new dimesion of transfers across production units. The planner uses the
average product of capital to account for the opportunity cost of capital, while the rms in
the market allocation use the marginal product of capital of unconstrained rms,as reected
in the equilibrium interest rate. The gap between the private and social value of a rm varies
25The nancial frictions story predicts more rms with higher marginal product of capital. Hence, dispersion
should increase because the upper tail of the distribution of marginal products is getting larger.
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endogenously with the conditions in the market. During downturns, it is more likely that rms
hold excess capacity and hence, the decentralized allocation might be further away from the
e¢ cient one. It is worth to point out that if marginal products are equalized in equilibrium, the
gap between decentralized and centralized allocations disappears and the allocation is e¢ cient
(the average and marginal product of capital are the same)
I characterize the policies that would bring the market and the e¢ cient allocation with
equilibrium marginal product dispersion. For the economy calibrated to the US manufacturing
sector, the planners allocation dictates higher equilibrium investment, and a shift in output
production towards larger, more productive rms. Improvements in aggregate productivity are
11% under the optimal policy. In the model, e¢ ciency gains from the implementation of the
optimal policy are accounted mostly by a change in rms entry, exit and investment patterns.
Only a third of the gains in productivity are explained by reallocation of labor and capital
across incumbent rms. The employment distribution varies slightly between the decentralized
and planners allocation. The optimal policy implies subsidies to entry, and the size of the
subsidy is predicted higher in good times. In equilibrium there are more rms operating in the
market under the e¢ cient allocation. Upgrade costs are subsidized to induce better selection
of rms in the market. The policy as of scrap values varies with the aggregate state and the
technology operated by the rm. In good times, scrap values are lower for all capacities except
for the bottom ones, to generate exit of the least productive units. In bad times, scrap values
for the bottom capacities are predicted lower, and the scrap value of the rms at the top of
the productivity/size distribution is higher. The latter induces exit by rms that are possibly
capacity constrained.
1.1 Literature Review
Models of industry equilibrium with complete markets (for example Hopenhayn (1992) ) display
aggregation. Hence, there is very little e¤ect of heterogeneity in equilibrium allocations except
possibly through selection. As marginal product and capital labor ratios are equalized, the
model boils down to one of a representative rm with average productivity. Firm selection
determines the equilibrium mean productivity in the market. When the relationship between
productivity, size (employment or assets) and output is non-monotonic, heterogeneity matters
in a non-trivial way.
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Economies where heterogeneity cannot be reduced away are for example those of Lee and
Mukoyama (2008), Clementi and Palazzo (2010) and Khan and Thomas (2008) (in incomplete
markets). Lee and Mukoyama (2008) provide evidence of di¤erential entry and exit behavior
along the business cycle and propose a model to quantitatively explain those facts. They analyze
the e¤ect of uctuations in xed production costs and labor adjustment costs on the industry
dynamic in a model with no capital. Clementi and Palazzo (2010) analyze the propagation of
aggregate shocks due to entry and exit of rms when rms are allowed to accumulate capital.
Khan and Thomas (2008) study the e¤ect of irreversibilities and collateral constraints in equi-
librium allocations in an economy with idiosyncratic shocks and without exit and entry. They
nd that both frictions reinforce each other in slowing down reallocation.
Khan and Thomas (2008) show that quantitatively the interaction of irreversibilities with
nancial frictions may explain large drops in aggregate e¢ ciency and slow recoveries. As de-
scribed by Caballero (1999) irreversibilities might have important consequences for the aggregate
behavior of the economy when interacted with market incompleteness or informational asym-
metries. In this paper, when irreversibilities are interacted with uncertainty in a fully edged
industry dynamic model, they generate a disparity between investment decisions of entrants
and incumbents in the market. The vintage of the rm becomes relevant in explaining their
investment behavior.
The most salient di¤erence between this paper and previous work by Veracierto (2002), is
that he abstracts from the entry and exit problem while it is determined endogenously in this
paper26. Also, the nature of noncovexities in production is di¤erent from the one exploited in
Veracierto (2002): while there partial irreversibility is allowed, here there is full irreversibility
and invisibilities in technology adoption. The mechanism generating marginal product disper-
sion is close to that explored in Asker et al. (2013). In their model however, endogenous entry
and exit is abstracted away. The results of the paper in terms of e¢ ciency gains from the
implementation of the optimal policy rely not only on the static gains from reallocation, which
they explore, but also from the endogenous selection mechanism. This paper is also related to
the work of Cooper and Schott (2014), who study productivity gains in the US manufacturing
sector in response to cyclical factor reallocation. In their environment aggregate shocks do
not generate cyclical losses in productivity, but shocks to the shadow value of capital or the
26As can be seen from table 4 in Veracierto (2002), when there is full irreversibility, the change in the exogenous
death rate has considerable e¤ect on investment dispersion across production units.
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dispersion in idiosyncratic shocks do. In their model, entry and exit is abstracted away.
While I allow rms to endogenously determine e¢ ciency through investments in distinct
technologies, I assume that the idiosyncratic productivities of the rms are constant. I assume
that the log productivity is drawn from an exponential distribution, so that the model can be
interpreted as the limiting case of a model in which rms idiosyncratic productivity is stochastic
and follows a Brownian Motion (See Luttmer (2010) for an example). The mechanism of the
model does not vanish when idiosyncratic productivity is allowed to change in time. It can
rather be reinforced, as negative idiosyncratic shocks may render previous investment decisions
statically ine¢ cient. Assuming idiosyncratic risk away allows me to separate the impact of
technological restrictions versus market incompleteness.
Finally, as mentioned in the introduction, one of the main contributions is the characteriza-
tion of the optimal industrial policy. This has been done for models of international trade under
oligopolistic competition in prices and quantities (Eaton and Grossman (1986)). For a model
of industry dynamic without capital accumulation Lee and Mukoyama (2008) study the impact
of alternative policies on labor regulations. However, their policies are ad hoc in the sense that
there is no notion of e¢ ciency associated to them. Lee and Mukoyama (2008) study the impact
of taxes to output and inputs in production over aggregate TFP, for both i.i.d. policies and
policies correlated with the productivity of the rms. Guner et al. (2008) study policies that
target the size of the establishment, which in turn is correlated with their idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity, and nd substantial role in shaping aggregate productivity. Distinctively, this paper
characterizes the optimal policy in an environment in which the e¢ cient allocation does not
dictate equalization of marginal products across all rms in the economy.
2 Model
This is an innite horizon economy with time indexed by t: There is a nal good which agents
use for consumption and capital accumulation. It is produced by means of a continuum of
intermediate goods. Intermediate goods are produced by combining capital and labor. Each
intermediate good is perfectly di¤erentiated and each rm producing it faces a constant elas-
ticity demand. Final goods are traded competitively while there is monopolistic competition
in intermediate goods. The technology for production of intermediate goods is endogenously
chosen, and each one is associated to a minimum running capacity in terms of capital goods.
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There is aggregate uncertainty in the economy. The exogenous shock is denoted st that
takes two values, i.e. fg; bg, g > b associated to the "good" and "bad" state; respectively. The
transition probabilities are given by the matrix P 
264 g 1  g
1  b b
375 where P (st+1 = g=st =
g) = g and P (st+1 = b=st = b) = b.
2.1 Households
The representative household derives utility from consumption of the nal good Ct.
The household is endowed with a unit of labor that for simplicity is supplied inelastically to
the rms. She receives a wage wt for the services. She can also accumulate capital Kt, priced
in terms of the nal good (the numeraire) and rent it at price rt to the rms. The aggregate
stock depreciates at rate b:The household can buy shares of two di¤erent mutual funds that
entitled it to the dividends generated by the rms operating in the economy. The rst mutual
fund consist of all the rms running with low minimum capacity technology, and the second
is build with all rms using a technology with higher minimum capacity. After dividends are
paid, assets can be traded.
Her problem reads
Max Ct;nLt ;nHt ;Kt+1E0
" 1X
t=0
tU(Ct)
#
(14)
subject to
Ct +Kt+1   (1  b)Kt + X
j=L;H
P jt n
j
t = wt + rtKt +
X
j=L;H

djt + P
j
t

njt 1 (15)
Xt+1 =  c(Xt) (16)
where P jt is the price of shares n
j
t of a mutual fund of rms of technology with minimum capacity
j = L;H at period t+1, which pay dividends djt+1 and can be sold tomorrow at price P
j
t+1: In
computing the return to the share holdings, the agent needs to forecast the law of motion of
the distribution of rms in the market for each possible realization for the exogenous aggregate
shock, st. The aggregate state Xt =
 
st; v
L
t ; v
H
t ;Kt

includes the exogenous shock, st ; the
distribution of rms per technology, vjt for j = L;H;and the available aggregate stock of capital.
To save on notation I denote vjt (z)  vjt ([0; z)) the measure of rms with productivity at most z
and technology j. The subjective law of motion for the representative consumer is denoted by  c.
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U fullls the standard assumptions of concavity, monotonicity and di¤erentiability.  2 (0; 1) is
the discount factor. The optimality conditions of the problem are standard. Dynamic optimality
yields
U 0(Ct)P kt = Et
h
U 0(Ct+1)

dkt+1 + P
k
t+1
i
(17)
For a standard CES specication U(Ct) =
C1 t 
1  one can rewrite the price of shares as the present
discounted value of all future dividends of rms that are active in period t+ 1with technology
j, adjusted by the corresponding pricing kernel
P jt = Et
1X
=t+1
 t
C 
C t
dj (18)
2.2 Final Goods Sector
There is a a representative competitive rm with a CES technology that produces nal goods
Yt out of intermediate inputs yit. The rm maximizes prots as
Maxyit Yt  
Z
pityit di
subject to
Yt 
Z
yitdi
 1

where pit is the cost of good yit. It is assumed  2 (0; 1) so that goods are substitutes in
production.
The corresponding input demand for each variety i emerges from the FOC of the problem,
i.e.
Y 1 t y
 1
it = pit
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2.3 Intermediate Goods Sector
2.3.1 Capital and Labor Allocation
To produce each di¤erentiated good, rms use capital and labor which are available at cost wt
and rt; respectively, in units of the composite good. The technology is Cobb-Douglas,
yt  stz j l1 t kt
There are two alternative technologies associated to a minimum capacity and a productivity
shifter,

kj ;  
j
	
for j = L;H. For simplicity we assume,  L = 1 and  H > 1. The capital choice
sets are [kL;1) and [kH ;1) for each technology, respectively. We interpret this indivisibility
as the construction of a plant, or the set up of machinery which entails a particular capacity.
The adoption of technology is costly. The problem of adoption, entry and exit into the market
will be analyzed later. In this section, I study the allocation of capital and labor only.
Dene xt as the vector of idiosyncratic state variables to the rm, i.e. xt =
 
z;  j

. Let Xt
be dened as before and dene  f as the law of motion for the aggregate state as perceived by
any arbitrary rm; i.e. Xt+1 =  f (Xt). The problem of a rm producing an intermediate good
i in any period t is
(xt; Xt) =Maxpt;lt;kt (ptyt   wtlt   rtkt)
subject to
yt  stz j l1 t kt
Y (Xt)
yt
1 
= pt
kt = [kj ;1)
Firms are assumed to be entirely equity owned. Because the elasticity of the demand is
constant, the optimal price set by a rm is a constant markup over marginal cost. In particular,
pt =
(rt   t)w1 t
(1  )1 stz
where t  0 is the lagrange multiplier associated to the feasible set for capital. If the minimum
capacity requirement is not binding then, t = 0, otherwise t > 0 and the markup for this rm
is lower than otherwise.
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From the FOC of the rms we can compute the labor and capital demand as follows
lt = (stz j )

1 
"
1  
wt
 1

  
rt   t
# 1 

1
1 Y (Xt) (19)
kt = max
8<:kj ;
"
stz j

1  
wt
(1 )
rt
 1

 (1 )# 1 

1
1 Y (Xt)
9=; (20)
The higher the relative e¢ ciency in production the higher the demand of labor when interme-
diate goods are substitutes in production. Labor and capital demands are non-creasing in their
costs, and they are increasing in the demand level as summarized by Y (Xt).
Importantly, capital labor ratios need not be equal across all rms in the economy as the
shadow value of capital depends on whether rms are constrained or not
kt
lt
=
wt
rt   t

1  
If the minimum capacity requirement is binding, the rm adjusts its resource allocation through
the exible factor, in this case labor. However, the last condition indicates that constrained
rmslabor demand does not increase enough to equalize the rms capital labor ratios across all
rms 27. This disparity is at the heart of the dynamics studied in this paper. In a static model
with complete markets, disparate capital labor ratios are a sign of ine¢ ciencies in the allocation.
In the current set up however, these gaps might be consistent with an e¢ cient allocation as
described later in the paper.
Dene Z l =
R
(
 ji zi
(rt(Xt) it)
 )

1 di and Zk =
R
(
 ji zi
(rt(Xt) it)
1 (1 )

)

1 di, both statistics of
productivity adjusted by the shadow value of capital across rms in the economy. Labor and
capital demand are proportional to these statistics
l(xt; Xt) =
1
Z l
(
 jz
(rt(Xt)  t) )

1  (21)
k(xt; Xt) =
Kt
Zk
(
 jz
(rt(Xt)  t)
1 (1 )

)

1  (22)
If no rm is constrained, shadow values of capital equalize across rms, and capital and
labor demand are only a function of the relative productivity of the rms versus the average in
27 In models where rms can be nancially constrained, the capital labor ratios of constrained rms is usually
lower than that of unconstrained rms. Constrained rms hold lower capital than they would if unconstrained,
while in our model, constrained rms hold more capital.
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the economy. When some rms are capacity constrained, the allocation of labor and capital is
adjusted so that constrained rms can indeed retain more capital and labor inputs than if they
were unconstrained.
2.3.2 Exit and Upgrade
Firms are exogenously liquidated with probability , getting a scrap value of fe :They can
select out voluntarily, getting a scrap value of e, net of exit costs. Assume 
f
e = 0; e > 0,
so that the option to exit is meaningful. For simplicity, I assume the latter is constant along
the cycle and across sizes, but the model can accommodate richer structures in which the value
depends on the technology operated by the rm and potentially di¤erent across states. This is
depicted in the quantitative section. Finally, an incumbent rm in the market may choose to
upgrade its process at any point in time at cost IH .
A rm using a high minimum capacity technology may choose to operate or exit in the
current period. If it operates it will get prots according to
(xt; Xt) = (1  )Y 1 t
"
stK

t
(Zk)

(Z l)
1 
#
z j
MPKt
 
1 
  rt  MPKt
MPKt
Kt
Zk

z j
MPKt
 
1 
Prots depend on the aggregate demand, a measure of productivity in the economy summarized
by
 
Zk
  
Z l
1 
and the productivity of the rm, adjusted for the value of its marginal product
of capital. Whenever the minimum capacity constraint is binding the marginal product of capital
of the rm is lower than the cost of capital in the market, and prots drop according to their
gap and the demand of capital.
Before any production and endogenous technology, exit and entry decision take place, the
rms can be exogenously liquidated with probability  or continue operating. If it continues, it
can exercise the option to exit irrespective of which state of the world st is realized. To save
notation, let xjt = z 
j for j = L;H:The value of the rm Wt follows
Wt(x
H
t ; Xt) =Max
n
e; (x
H
t ; Xt) + Et
et+1(Xt; Xt+1)Wt+1(xHt ; Xt+1)o (23)
subject to
Xt+1 =  f (Xt)
where et+1(Xt; Xt+1)   (1  ) U 0(C(Xt+1))U 0(C(Xt)) is the stochastic discount factor of the household
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adjusted for the probability of survival of the rm, et+1 to save notation.
On the continuation region, when the option to exit is not exercised, the value of the rms
is the present discounted value of all future expected prots. We call it fWt and it reads
fWt(xHt ; Xt) = (xHt ; Xt) + Et et+1Wt+1(xHt ; Xt+1)
Next, we move to the problem of rms currently holding a low minimum capacity require-
ment technology. After observing the aggregate state, they may decide to exit the market, to
upgrade capacity or to operate at the current one. The cost of upgrade in technology is IH
units of the composite good that should be paid in the period of upgrade, after the aggregate
shock is realized.
Wt(x
L
t ; Xt) =Maxfe;Wt(xHt ; Xt)  IH ; fWt(xLt ; Xt)g (24)
subject to
Xt+1 =  f (Xt)
Their continuation value is
fWt(xLt ; Xt) = (xLt ; Xt) + Et et+1Wt+1(xLt ; Xt+1)
Let the function ze( j ; Xt) determine the threshold for exit of j technology rms when the
aggregate state of the economy is Xt. Let the function zu( H ; Xt) determine the threshold for
upgrade.
Proposition 7 fWt(xjt ; Xt) is monotonic increasing in idiosyncratic productivity; z. The opti-
mal exit and upgrade strategy for the rm is such that if z < ze( j ; Xt), the rm exits the
market; if z  zu( H ; Xt) the low minimum capacity technology upgrades; otherwise the rm
holds a low minimum capacity requirement technology.
2.3.3 Entry
A fraction Mt of the total mass of rms operating in the market Mt, are forced out of the
market each period. There is a continuum of rms ready to enter the market at any period
t. They observe their productivity before investing IL units to buy a low minimum capacity
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technology. Their productivity z is drawn from an exogenous distribution G(z) with nite
support [z; z]. For the problem to be well dened we need to assume IL  e. Otherwise,
entrepreneurs could create resources just by entering and exiting immediately from the market.
After entry, they may choose to upgrade technology immediately at cost IH .
The mass of entrants M entt is determined by the free entry condition,
IL 
Z
ze( L;Xt)
W (z;  L; Xt)dG(z=z  ze( L; Xt)) (25)
with equality if M entt > 0.
It is worth noting that the equilibrium distribution of rms across productivity and tech-
nologies, which is used in the computation of the expected value of the rms (summarized in
Xt), is indeed endogenously determined by the choice of exit and upgrade thresholds of rms
in the market. Entrants correctly anticipate their future expected prots, so that pre-entry
expected prot equalize the post entry value.
3 Aggregates
Let the measure of rms operating in the market Mt = vLt (z
u( L; Xt)) + v
H
t (z) and dene a
scaled measure bvjt = vjtMt : Replacing capital and labor demands in the aggregate production
function, we obtain
Y (Xt) = TFPtK

t
where
TFPt = stM
1 

t

Z l
 1 


Z l
Zk

(TFP)
In other words, aggregate e¢ ciency is determined by the realization of the exogenous shock,
the measure of rms operating in the market (as usual in models of monopolistic competition),
and a moment of the productivity of the rms operating in the market. If there are no rms
capacity constrained, Z
l
Zk
= r; and the model boils down to the canonical rm dynamic one
where TFPt = stM
1 

t
P
j
R
( ji zi)

1 dbvjt (zi) 1  . Also, as alpha goes to zero, disparity in
marginal products becomes irrelevant for aggregate productivity, because the share of the factor
for which the minimum constraint may bind becomes negligible. In general none of those is the
case. It is important to note also that there might be multiple allocations (distributions across
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technologies) that yield the same TFPt conditional on the aggregate state and the measure of
operating rms.
Before moving to the denition of the equilibrium, let me close the model description by
computing the dividends received by the household. They correspond to the sum of the prots
of operating rms, plus the scrap value of the liquidated ones minus the costs of entry and
upgrade.
dLt (Xt) =
Z
(z;  L; Xt) dv
L
t (z) + eM
eL
t (Xt 1; Xt)  ILM entt (Xt)
dHt (Xt) =
Z
(z;  H ; Xt) dv
H
t (z) + eM
eH
t (Xt 1; Xt) 
  IH

Mut (Xt) +M
ent
t (Xt)
1 G(zut ( H))
1 G(zet ( L))

where M ejt (Xt 1; Xt) the measure of exits for rms running technology j, Mut (Xt) is the
measure of incumbent upgrades in state Xt; M entt (Xt) the corresponding measure of entrants,
and M entt (Xt)
1 G(zut ( H))
1 G(zet ( L)) is the measure of entrants that upgrade immediately. The mea-
sure of exits is zero if ze( j ; Xt)  ze( j ; Xt 1) and positive otherwise, i.e. M ejt (Xt 1; Xt) =
(1  ) vjt 1(ze( j ; Xt)) if ze( j ; Xt) > ze( j ; Xt 1).
Also,Mut (Xt) = (1  )

vLt 1(zu( H ; Xt 1))  vLt 1(zu( H ; Xt))

whenever zu( H ; Xt 1) >
zu( H ; Xt) and zero otherwise.
4 Equilibrium
Denition 2 A competitive equilibrium is a system of thresholds

ze( j ; Xt); z
u(Xt)
	1
t=0
, dis-
tribution of rms

vLt (z); v
H
t (z)
	1
t=0
, a law of motion for the dynamic of the distributions of
rms,  , entrants

M entt
	1
t=0
with productivities drawn from G(z), and consumption, aggregate
capital and share holdings functions ,

C(Xt);Kt+1(Xt); n
H(Xt); n
L(Xt)
	1
t=0
such that given
prices

r(Xt); w(Xt); P
L(Xt); P
H(Xt)
	1
t=0
, the cost structure c =

e; IH ; IL

, the initial
stock of capital in the economy K0, share holdings, nH0 = n
L
0 = 1; and the exogenous law of
motion for aggregate shocks st as characterized by P,
i) The representative consumer maximizes utility (as in (14))
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ii) Firms in the intermediate goods sector maximize their value as described by (23) and (24)
given their residual demand and productivity z:
iii) Firms in the nal good sector maximize prots.
iv)
Z
ze( L;Xt)
W (z;  L; Xt)dG(z=z  ze( L; Xt))  IL with equality if M entt > 0
v) Mt =M entt + (1  )Mt 1  
 
M eLt +M
eH
t

where Mt = vLt (z
u( H ; Xt)) + v
H
t (z):
vi) Markets clear
(a)
R
l(xt; Xt)dv
L
t (z) +
R
l(xt; Xt)dv
H
t (z) = 1
(b)
R
k(xt; Xt)dv
L
t (z) +
R
k(xt; Xt)dv
H
t (z) = Kt
(c) njt = 1; j = L;H
(d) Ct+Kt+1 (1 b)Kt+ILM entt +IH hMut +M entt 1 G(zut ( H))1 G(zet ( L)) i = Yt+e  M eLt +M eHt 
vii) Consistency for the law of motion of the aggregate state:   =  f =  c.
Existence of the equilibrium is shown in Chapter I of this dissertation.
4.1 Properties of the allocation
Proposition 8 The optimal allocation is such that
1. Assume costs and technologies are such that 
e( H)
 
H
1 

< 
e( L)
 
L
1 

. Then, exit thresholds for
rms running the low minimum capacity technology are higher than for rms running the
high minimum capacity one, i.e. ze( L; Xt) > ze( H ; Xt) if neither rm is constrained by
the minimum capacity or both are.
2. Exit thresholds are increasing in the cost of capital, i.e. @z
e( j ;Xt)
@rt
 0:
3. The upgrade threshold across technology is higher than the exit threshold for high minimum
capacity rms, i.e. zu( H ; Xt) > ze( H ; Xt):
4. The measure of entrants is procyclical.
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5 Quantitative analysis
The rst result indicates that rms running the low minimum capacity technology nd optimal
to exit before rms of the same idiosyncratic productivity running the high capacity technology
. The second, that increases in the cost of capital, increase the likelihood of voluntary exit as
equilibrium prots drop. The third result is important as it assures that costs are such that
there is no upgrade in technology and immediate exit. Finally, the levels of entry are procyclical
as they are in the data .Quantitative Analysis
In this section I assume there is a nite level (N) of minimum capacities/technologies, and
there is no further investment in capacity conditional on a particular technology. I assume that
there is a stock of capital ready to be used in any particular company. The stock is large enough
so that any rm that decides to invest in capacity or enter the market can be supplied with the
corresponding stock. The dynamic of the aggregate stock of capital will be pinned down by the
consumption decisions of the planner, which in turn will pin down the dynamic of the measure
of rms in the economy.
Production under each alternative technology is given by
yt = stzk

j l(xt; Xt)
1  for j = 1; ::::; N
where kj < kj+1 for any j. A detailed explanation of the algorithm for computing the equilib-
rium is provided in Appendix A.
5.1 Calibration
The model is calibrated to the USA economy28. Although business cycle statistics are typically
presented at quarterly frequency, industry dynamics statistics are only available on a yearly
basis. Hence, the time unit of the model is a year. Some of the calibrated parameters are
standard in the RBC literature. The persistence of expansions and recession periods were set
to match the average duration of the phase of the business cycle in the USA. In particular,
s = 1  1=ts where ts is the average length of a particular phase of the business cycle s = g; b.
The average duration of an expansion was set to 3.175 years (or 12.7 quarters), and that of a
recession to 1.425 years (or 5.7 quarters). The discount factor was set to match a steady state
28There are substantial di¤erences in the rm size distribution of the USA versus other OECD countries (see
Barstelman et al. (2009)). In particular, the right tail of the distribution is "fatter" in the USA than in other
developed economies. Alternative calibrations can be accomodated.
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interest rate of 2%, 1 + r =  1. Log utility was assumed.
The substitutability across intermediate goods in the nal good aggregator was set to match
returns to entrepreneurship ( shapes the curvature of the prot function). Atkenson and Kehoe
(2005) set a value of 15% to the returns to entrepreneurship, whose analogous in the model
is 1    ( = 0:85). The share of capital in value added is set to 1/3 as standard in the
literature. The hazard rate for exogenous exit,  was set to 5,5%. It corresponds to the mean
exit rate reported in Lee and Mukoyama (2008) based on statistics from the Annual Survey of
Manufactures. Finally, the number of technologies is set arbitrarily to 4 and the lower bound
of possible productivities equal to 0.0129.
The remaining parameters of the model were calibrated jointly to match moments of the
rm size distribution, as well as features of the industry dynamic and the aggregate volatility
of the economy. To calibrate them I simulate the model economy via Montecarlo: I run the
optimal policies for 1000 periods (discard the rst 200) over 100 alternative paths for a variety
of parameter specications. The list of parameters calibrated jointly is presented in Table 2
While some parameters have closer tights to certain moments, they are not independent of
the remaining variables of the economy. Let me describe their roles briey. First, the size of
aggregate shocks measured by sg sb is closely related to the volatility of the cyclical component
of log GDP. The target in the data corresponds to the standard deviation of the hp-ltered series
of log GDP from 1930 to 2011, equal to 2.1%. Positive shocks take a value of 1.027 and negative
shocks of 0.97 (shocks are assumed symmetric around one). The observed variation in aggregate
output is not independent however of the cost structure of the economy, as the latter determines
how much investment or exit is observed in equilibrium, which in turn a¤ects aggregate output.
The set of capacities as well as the range for idiosyncratic productivities, are related to
the levels of log employment produced by the model30. The upper bound on capacities was
set to 4 while the upper bound on productivities was set to 4:25. The rms at the top of
the employment have a level of employment slightly above 10000 employees, consistent with
the data. The distribution of sizes in the economy inherits also some of the properties of
the exogenous distribution of idiosyncratic productivity, G(z). The distribution of entrants is
calibrated such that the log(z) is exponential with parameter G = 1:9. In other words, G(z) is
Pareto with parameter G.
29The minimum e¤ective productivity operating in the market is determined endogenously.
30The nite level of capacities model predicts that relative labor demands are described by li
lj
=
(ziki )

1 (1 )
(zikj )

1 (1 )
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The generated rm size distribution is also related to the entry and upgrade costs per
capacity, through the equilibrium allocations. To calibrate the cost structure, I assumed state
independent costs for the pseudo planner problem. Once the allocations generated by the
economy matched the targets for the US, I backed out the cost structure in the decentralized
allocation. In other words, I computed the costs that would make the exit and upgrade threshold
of the decentralized allocation coincide with the ones in the calibrated economy.
The total number of parameters for calibration is thirteen. The complete list of moments
that were targeted to calibrate them are found in Table 3.The identied costs indicate slightly
higher entry costs during expansions, fairly constant scrap values across states, but increasing
in the capacity of the rms as expected. Upgrade costs are identied higher during expansions.
In the ergodic distribution of the model, upgrades in capacity for incumbent rms average 2.8%
of the total population of active rms, costs of upgrade should raise when incentives to upgrade
increase to avoid shifts in the rm size distribution that will make it inconsistent with its fairly
constant shape in the data. The establishment and employment shares are as reported by Lee
and Mukoyama (2008), as well as the average exit and entry rates. Overall, the model predicts
well the behavior of the establishment and employment distribution. The share of employment
for rms at the top of the log employment distribution is slightly underpredicted. The model
predicted share of establishments with less than 19 employees is below the observed number in
the data. The rms at the top of the distribution reported by the BDS have 10.000 or more
employees. They correspond to 6% of the total population of establishments in the economy.
The model is conservative in this sense as the largest rm in the economy employs 10.829
employees.
In terms of rm entry and exit rates the model overpredicts exit rates by 0.7%, and under-
predicts entry rates 0.6%. For the measure of rms to be stable in the ergodic distribution,
these ows should be roughly the same, the model is calibrated to go half the way the di¤er-
ence in entry and exit rates reported in the data.I also targeted the percentage of rms with
positive investment spikes as reported by Dums and Dunne (1998). A spike is dened as rm
that reports an investment rate of 30% or higher in any given year. Given the capacity grid,
any upgrade in capacity will be considered an investment spike, as well as any entry decision.
The model produces a measure of spikes of about 1% higher than in the data once we account
for investment of entrants. In the model, 40% of the measure of rms with investment spikes
corresponds to incumbent rms. The contribution is rather small as for the calibrated aggre-
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gate shocks, investment thresholds move mildly. The introduction of rm specic shocks will
increase uctuations in the thresholds, potentially inducing more equilibrium investment for
incumbents.
5.2 Results
5.2.1 Productivity
We rst describe the predictions of the model for aggregate Total Factor Productivity (TFP). To
express the results as close as those in the literature, note that when technology is Cobb[Douglas,
total factor physical productivity (TFPQi) per rm is proportional to a geometric average of
capital and labor productivity
TFPQi

=MPKi MPL
1 
i
where the marginal product of capital and marginal product of labor are dened as MPKi =
 yiki and MPLi = (1  )
yi
li
respectively. Aggregating up, we obtain
TFPt =
0@ X
j=L;H
Z
(TFPQzi)
 dvjt (zi)
1A 1 (26)
This expression is analogous to (TFP ) presented in the aggregates section and is our baseline
measure.
If there is no dispersion in marginal product across rms, aggregate total factor productivity
simplies to
TFPMCt = st
24 X
j=L;H
Z
(zi)

1  dvjt (zi)
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1 

(27)
Although in this case there are no losses in e¢ ciency stemming from the technological friction,
the presence of monopolistic competition might still a¤ect productivity through the equilibrium
number of operating rms in the market. We use this measure to test the properties of the
baseline model against.
Table 4 shows the e¤ect of irreversibilities and indivisibilities in production on computed
aggregate TFP. All values are reported in log points. The rst column reports the statistic
described in (26) :The second column reports the same statistic for the optimal allocation of
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rms which is computed imposing the decentralized cost structure into the pseudo-planner
problem absent of transfers. The rst row reports aggregate productivity and the second row
the standard deviation of the time series. The third row reports a measure of dispersion in
computed TFPQ across rms. I report the coe¢ cient of variation across economies.
Aggregate productivity under the optimal allocation is 11% higher than in the Baseline
economy. While the optimal policy induces a drop in the coe¢ cient of variation of TFPQ
across rms, it induces higher volatility of productivity in the time series. From the denition
of TFP one can see that the gains in e¢ ciency in the constrained optima may stem from
disparities in the allocation of rms across technologies and productivity, or from di¤erences in
the equilibrium measure of rms operating in the market. Further analysis on the sources of
gains is included when describing the optimal policy.
To isolate the e¤ect of irreversibilities and indivisibilities from the changes in the equilibrium
measure of rms due to the monopolistic competition, I normalize the measure of active rms
to one. Table 5 reports the statistics described in the previous table for the baseline economy,
the optimal policy, and an economy in which marginal product of inputs in production equalizes
across rms, i.e.(27). The allocation in which marginal products are equalized across rms yields
the highest aggregate productivity and the lowest coe¢ cient of variation for TFPQ. This is not
surprising since the constrained optima cannot completely undo the impact of indivisibilities
and irreversibilities on marginal product dispersion. The di¤erences between them are large,
while aggregate productivity almost double, the cross sectional dispersion drops to a third.
Also time series productivity volatility raises even more when marginal products are equalized.
Fluctuations in productivity in such economy stem from changes in the productivity of the
marginal rm operating in the market. The irreversibilities and indivisibilities in the model
induce lower adjustment, and less volatile aggregate productivity.
The measure of dispersion in TFPQ potentially hides distributional issues, i.e. the distortion
generated by the irreversibility and the indivisibility is disparate across capacities/technologies.
I compute the ratio of mean productivity per capacity in the model and under the assumption
that rms equalize marginal products. An entry equal to 1 in Table 6 indicates the same
mean productivity. The results suggest that the friction in the model generates rms with low
capacity to held few resources (hence high marginal products), and productive rms running
high capacity technologies, with too many resources compared to what they would held if
marginal products were equalized. The friction in the model generates selection towards bigger
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more productivity rms. In the economy with equalization of marginal products, labor is
shifted from the high capacity, low marginal productivity rms to low capacity higher marginal
productivity ones. It is worth noting that the improvement in aggregate productivity induced
for the optimal policy, is attained for a distribution of employment that resembles largely the
one in the baseline economy.
5.2.2 Optimal Policy
As mentioned in the previous section e¢ ciency gains may stem from improvements in the
allocation of rms across technologies and productivity, or from di¤erences in the equilibrium
measure of rms operating in the market. For the calibrated economy, while total e¢ ciency
gains associated to the optimal policy are 11%, only a third of them stem from pure reallocation
of resources. The rest, is induced by a larger measure of rms operating in the market in
equilibrium: 17% more rms than in the baseline economy.
Accordingly, the industry dynamic is di¤erent. While entry and exit rates are lower under the
optimal policy, the upgrade rate increases. Both combined indicate that there is a shift toward
more productive larger rms. Upgrade rates of incumbent rms raises by 1% if compared
to the baseline economy. Table 10 reports the rm dynamic. These patterns are consistent
with the planner assigning a higher value to holding an additional large capacity rm than the
private value of the rm in the decentralized equilibrium. The thresholds for upgrade and exit
move accordingly. While in the baseline economy the exit thresholds are lower, the upgrade
threshold are above the optimal levels as dictated by the e¢ cient allocation. Average output
per rm increases in the optimal allocation by 24.7% and average consumption increases 27%.
The consumption equivalent compensation that would make an agent indi¤erent between living
in the e¢ cient or in the baseline economy should be 44% of the consumption in the baseline
economy. Note that in this economy consumption equals output minus the good cost of entries
and upgrades, plus the scrap value of the rms in the economy. Di¤erences in the rm dynamic
across allocations will be reected in di¤erences consumption equivalent measures even if the
yield the same levels of output.
The optimal policy induces shifts in the contribution to output across rm sizes. It predicts a
slightly larger share of output to be accounted for rms with more than 500 employees, as well as
a larger contribution in employment. Capital however is allocated in the opposite direction, with
a slightly higher share of the total used by the rms at the bottom of the distribution. This is
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not surprising since the marginal products at the bottom tend to be higher than those predicted
by an economy with equalization of marginal products. Table 9 compares the predictions of the
model and the optimal policy for the distribution of output, capital and employment.
One of the advantages of having the second welfare theorem to hold, is that we can study
the characteristics of the optimal industrial policy, i.e. the cost structure that would induce a
decentralized allocation that is e¢ cient. Table 11 reports such cost structure and the one from
the calibrated economy. The optimal policy dictates subsidies to the cost of entry in recessions
and higher entry costs during booms. Both policies combined induce less uctuations in the
measure of entrants to the market. Upgrade costs are subsidized across all aggregate states.
Less costly upgrades induce shifts in the productivity distribution of the rms operating in the
market to the right. Scrap values are identied lower than in the calibrated economy for all
capacities except at the very bottom. Lower scrap values are consistent with lower exit rates
predicted in by the optimal policy.
Note that I only describe di¤erences across stationary equilibria. The exercises are silent as
of the gains/losses that the economy may incur along the transition. Studying the path across
equilibria is particularly challenging in economies like this one, where not only a statistic of
the distribution needs to be carried along in the state space, but potentially full histories of a
continuum of rms need to be considered. In the case where only two capacities are operated
and there is no aggregate uncertainty the transition can be computed. In that case, the gains
across stationary equilibrium are a lower bound to total gains whenever the transition occurs
from an economy with a relatively low measure of active rms, to one with higher level of
operating rms. For an increase in the measure of rms comparable to the one observed across
steady states in the full model (17%), predicted transition gains are 60% larger than the steady
state gains. Steady state gains in the simplied economy are 1%. This number is not readily
comparable to the ones in the full economy because the cost structure and investment strategies
do not map to each other. However, the exercise is useful to gain intuition. Gains are larger
accounting for the transition because consumption convergence occurs from "above". By doing
so, the planner avoids entering rms in the transition that will later on nd themselves holding
more capital that what they would need at the new steady state. In the transition the upgrade
threshold jumps an overshoots the new steady state upgrade threshold. Any entrant that nds
optimal to upgrade in the beginning of the transition will nd optimal to do so all along it.
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Also, induced entry decreases the relative measure of rms that are holding more capacity that
what they would have chosen if entering the market this period. Hence, if the measure of rms
is increasing in the market, the e¤ect of the irreversibility on rms holding high capacity in the
initial steady state vanishes in the aggregate.
5.2.3 Volatility and Aggregate TFP
In this section I investigate how features of the business cycle impact the entry and exit behavior
of rms as well as our measures of aggregate productivity. The spirit of the exercise is to
understand how the level of uncertainty that rms face a¤ects aggregate productivity and
equilibrium dispersion in marginal products.
In particular, I focus on changes in the unconditional variance of the shock. Suppose the
aggregate shock st follows an AR(1)
st = st 1 + es
where  is the persistence of the shock and es an i.i.d. shock with mean zero and standard
deviation e. The unconditional volatility of the aggregate shock is
2s =
2e
1  2
Hence, changes in unconditional volatility can be brought about by changes in the persistence
or in the variance of the es shock. If the AR(1) process is approximated by a two state Markov
chain, a la Rouwenhorst (1995), then

sg   sb
2
2
= 2e
and
g + b   1 = 
I rst study whether changes in the persistence and the variance of es (for a given un-
conditional volatility) have di¤erent impact in entry and exit patterns as well as in aggregate
e¢ ciency. Second, I vary the unconditional variance by changing the variance of es only, and
assess the implications for aggregate e¢ ciency.
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I assume that expansions are shorter than in the calibrated economy (g = :237), about 1.1
years on average. I will call this Case G, for change in gamma. Alternatively, I set g back to
its calibration value, and increase sg   sb to generate the same unconditional volatility. I will
call this Case S, for change in the size of the shock.
Table 7 reports the results. The rst row reports aggregate TFP, the second its volatility.
The third row reports the coe¢ cient of variation of TFPQ across rms. The fourth, the ratio
of aggregate TFP dened as (26)/(27) when the measure of rms is normalized to 1. The
fourth row reports the implied volatility of output. The fth and sixth columns report the
cross sectional dispersion in productivity. As expected the predicted volatility of output is
larger in the cases under study than under the calibrated model. In this particular example,
the volatility of output is substantially higher when the size of shocks changes rather than
when the persistence of the process does. On the one hand, lower persistence of the shock
a¤ects the discounting of future prots and hence the trade o¤ between current and future
consumption. While shocks are more frequent, rms are also less willing to respond to the
aggregate uctuations by investing or disinvesting On the other hand, the size of the shocks
a¤ects the actual payo¤s of investment. Because the rms have an outside option given by their
scrap value when exiting, increases in the size of the shock improve the payo¤s of investment,
inducing larger responses in output.
A feature to highlight is that the impact on aggregate TFP is not monotonous. While
in Case G productivity raises about 10%, it drops one third in Case S. The cross sectional
dispersion of TFPQ drops by similar magnitudes in both cases, yet aggregate e¢ ciency is very
di¤erent. The volatility of aggregate output raises substantially. In terms of allocations, the
relative e¢ ciency of these economies against their equal marginal products counterparts are
fairly constant. Hence, much of the di¤erences across economies stem from the equilibrium
measure of rms in the market. The economy of Case G has 4 times more rms than the
economy of Case S.
The underlying industry dynamic, i.e. patterns of entry, exit and investment, also di¤er.
Table 8 depicts mean exit, entry and upgrade rates from montecarlo simulations. In both cases
the increase in volatility induces higher upgrade rates. Although in Case S, upgrade rates
augments almost 5 times with respect to the baseline, selection does not induce higher average
productivity (in part because exit rates are also larger). In Case G instead, entry and exit rates
drop with respect to the baseline, while upgrade increase and average productivity raises.
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This example points out that di¤erent features of the underlying process of exogenous shocks,
can produce substantially di¤erent responses of the economy even when the underlying measure
of uncertainty (unconditional volatility) is the same. This is embedded in the non-convexities
of the model. The disparity in the behavior of exit and entry rates as well as investment rates,
may be a promising tool in identifying characteristics of the productivity process. A limitation
however, is that the relationship between the industry dynamic and the nature of shock depends
on the underlying friction in the economy.
Finally, I assess the impact of changes in the unconditional volatility of the shock from
changes in the size of the shocks only. I simulate the economy for a grid of sg sb between 0.04
to 0.15 (equivalent to positive and negative shocks of sizes 0.02 and 0.07, respectively). The
predicted relationship between the volatility of output (and hence the unconditional volatility of
the aggregate shock) and the cross sectional dispersion in productivity is non-monotonic. Also,
the relationship between dispersion in computed productivities at the rm level and aggregate
productivity is not independent of aggregate uncertainty. Figure 5 displays a scatter plot of
measures of dispersion and aggregate TFP under alternative shocks.
5.3 Sensitivity Analysis
I perform robustness check with respect to some of the parameters that characterize the size
distribution of rms. In particular, the parameter &G that parametrizes the exponential distribu-
tion from which productivity draws for entrants are obtained. Second I compare the predictions
of the calibrated Model to one in which the exogenous rate of exit is substantially lower.
I rst set the parameter that characterizes the exponential distribution to 1.01. This number
is not arbitrary as it correspond to the estimated parameter for the Pareto distribution that
characterizes the rm size distribution in the data (See Axtell (2001)). The predicted distri-
bution of establishment across log employment lies to the right of the calibrated one. Note
that a lower parameter for an exponential distribution indicates a "fattertail. In other words,
entrants in this alternative economy start too productive inducing selection at the bottom and
a shift in the allocation towards larger rms.
As the parameter increases the average productivity of entrants gets lower. Entrants with
lower productivity a¤ect the average productivity in the market and the allocation of em-
ployment and capacity across productivities. Matching accurately the rm distribution by
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employment and establishment is important. The economy with &G = 1:2 cannot match the
employment distribution in the data. It generates a distribution highly skewed to the right.
I also test the predictions of the model when the exogenous exit rate drops to 1.1% per year.
The equilibrium industry dynamic changes by construction generating lower entry and exit rates
in equilibrium. The size distribution of rms gets skewed to the right, indicating reallocation
towards high capacity more productive rms. The equilibrium number of rms operating in the
market drops. Finally, the time of the transition to the stationary distribution of rms doubles.
Although transitional dynamics is not the objective of this paper, this result indicates that the
study of the impact of policies that changes the incentives to rm liquidation should account
for longer or shorter transition paths.
6 Conclusion
This paper explores the implications of investment irreversibility and technology indivisibilities
for aggregate e¢ ciency in production. I nd that observed dispersion in marginal products is
not independent of other features of the economy, such as the business cycle or more broadly the
degree of demand uncertainty that rms face. The paper highlights that dispersion in marginal
products is an imperfect measure of the associated e¢ ciency losses.
When the industry dynamic is incorporated in a general equilibrium framework, high aggre-
gate productivity allocations are associated with relatively low dispersion in marginal products.
But low aggregate productivity allocations can also be associated to low dispersion in marginal
products and hence in measured productivity. For a calibrated economy to the US manufactur-
ing sector, I show that most of the gains in productivity from shifting to the e¢ cient allocation of
resources stem from changes in the industry dynamic rather than static reallocation of resources.
Partial irreversibility and higher divisibility in capital allocations will lessen the model gen-
erated excess dispersion in marginal products, for a given volatility of the aggregate process.
However, as long as the movements in investment thresholds are such that the measure of in-
cumbents rms holding capital away from the one chosen by entrants with the same blueprint
does not vanish, non-convexities at the micro level will induce dispersion in marginal products
and computed productivity.
I have abstracted from idiosyncratic risk. If incorporated in the model, I expect higher
induced dispersion in marginal products. Higher uncertainty at the rm level will move optimal
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investment thresholds at the rm level even more than in the economy with aggregate shocks
only. Large regions of inaction for alternative realizations of the idiosyncratic productivity shock
or demand shock, are consistent with sustained disparities in marginal products.
While this paper focuses on the US manufacturing sector, the relationship between uncer-
tainty, investment, industry structure and disparities in marginal products across production
units might be a promising line of research in the context of the study of cross country di¤erences
in aggregate TFP. In other words, are economies characterized by more instability (i.e. political
instability that leads to uncertainty on tax schemes, or uctuations in the terms of trade in
economies with a highly concentrated production base) prone to higher and persistent dispar-
ities in marginal products? How does the industry structure and rm dynamics vary across
these economies? Can those patterns help us identify features of the aggregate productivity
process?
Suppose that one would like to compare alternative economies for which we observe some
statistic of marginal product dispersion. Suppose that these economies di¤er in the process
characterizing the aggregate shock. In the model, it is possible for these economies to have
similar dispersion marginal products and substantial di¤erences in aggregate productivity. At
one extreme, when the volatility of the aggregate productivity process is low, the economy
approximates a stationary one. There is exit and entry in equilibrium as well as upgrades in
technology. However, because the size of the aggregate shock is small, the main determinant of
investment decisions is the rms idiosyncratic productivity (as it will be in an economy with
no shocks). The mechanism discussed in the example at the beginning becomes irrelevant. At
the other extreme, when the volatility of the process is very high, incumbent rms nd it more
valuable to wait and not upgrade. Hence, in equilibrium upgrades in technology are delayed.
Exit rates increase so that rms holding capital away from the level that they would have chosen
in the current period are selected out of the market whenever a bad shock hits the economy.
The mechanism described above vanishes again. While both economies display low dispersion
in marginal products, the one with higher volatility is on average less productive than the one
with lower volatility. Hence, the link between aggregate productivity and dispersion in marginal
products depends on features of the macroeconomy and the patterns of rms entry, exit and
investment.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the results presented in the paper correspond to the
behavior of rm distributions in the long run. The properties of the transitions to the ergodic
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distributions remain to be studied. The presence of indivisibilities in technologies may slow
down the transition, a¤ecting not only the equilibrium technologies adopted but also the return
to capital and the path of output and capital accumulation, as well as the implications for the
design of optimal policy.
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Appendix (A)
6.1 Numerical Solution
Given a cost structure, ;the solution to the pseudo-planner problem is a set of functions
ze(kj ;t; ); zu(kj ;t; ) and a measure of entrants M ent that solves the corresponding
optimality conditions. The algorithm to solve the equilibrium allocations is
1. Assume an arbitrary cost structure for the planner  =

e;e; IH ; IL; 0

(with no
transfers; T ).
2. Compute the dynamic of the joint distribution of capital and productivity for an arbitrary
initial distribution v0.
3. Approximate the value function of the planner
4. For a given optimal policy for the planner, run montecarlo simulations over the predicted
distribution of fvtgTMt=1.
5. Calibration: The moments of v = vTM for TM large enough, are used to matched moments
of rms dynamic in the data.
6. Use the calibrated cost structure of the planner , and the optimality conditions deliv-
ered from the decentralized problem to compute the cost structure of the decentralized
allocation c = [ce(kj ;t); I
c
H(kj ;t); I
c
L; 0] :
7. Use the decentralized cost structure to solve for the optimal policy (planners allocation).
6.1.1 Dynamic of the Distribution
We need rst to construct the grid of capacity levels in the economy, 	k and that of idiosyncratic
productivities 	z. The grid for capacities is equally spaced, and the grid of idiosyncratic
productivities is log spaced. Points in the 	z will be concentrated in the left tail.
Let J be the number of capacity levels. Dene the grid if exit thresholds 	ej for j = 1; :::; J ;
and three grids for upgrade threshold grids 	uj for j = 1; :::; J   1 where 	uj indexes the grid
of upgrade thresholds from capacity j to j + 1. Finally, we need a grid for entry levels, 	ent.
To generate the grids we do it jointly via the Smolyak algorithm. The algorithm constructs
a sparse multidimensional grid.
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The grid and transition matrix for the aggregate exogenous state s is constructed following
Tauchen (1986).
For given 0, I compute 1 using the law of motion described in the body of the paper, for
each of the points in the sparse grid.
6.1.2 Approximation of the Value Function
I implement standard value function iteration over the centralized problem.
To interpolate the value function, I use tensor products using the sparse grid as interpolation
points.
I solve for the coe¢ cients of the interpolating function given an initial guess of the value
function, 0 and the cost structure of the model, :
Then update the guess by optimizing numerically
V1 (v; s;Mt) = Max
fzxjtgJj=1;fzujtgJj=1;Met
U

Ct(

zejt
	J
j=1
;

zujt
	J
j=1
;M et )

+ [Pr(s0 = s1=s)V0
 
v0; s1;Mt(1  ) M eLt  M eHt +M entt

+Pr(s0 = s2=s)V0
 
v0; s2;Mt(1  ) M eLt  M eHt +M entt

]
subject to
Ct + I
LM entt + I
HMupt  Yt + Tt +ej M ej
v0 = (v;

zxjt
	J
j=1
;

zujt
	J
j=1
;M entt ;Mt) X
	k
X
	z
 
zil
1 
i k

j

j(zi)
! 1

= Yt
vjt (zi)  vjt (zi 1)
zi   zi 1 = 
j(zi)Z
lidi = 1
Using the updated value function V1 recompute :Iterate until convergence.
6.1.3 Montecarlo Simulations
From the calibrated transition probabilities of the aggregate shock, generate 100 paths of 1000
periods each and simulate the path of allocations given the optimal policy of the planner.
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Compute statistics of interest characterizing the rm dynamics of the economy, i.e. entry
rates, exit rates and investment rates per capacity, dispersion in productivity, etc.
6.1.4 Cost Structure in the Decentralized Allocation
The optimality conditions for the rms, as well as those of the centralized problem are linear
in the adjustment costs. Hence, if we replace the allocation that solves the pseudo planner
problem into the system of equations that solves the decentralized allocation, we can infer the
cost structure that decentralizes the allocation.
At the centralized allocation, the optimality conditions from the decentralized problem would
typically not hold. To bring the equilibrium about, we redene the adjustment costs faced by
rms as
cj(kj ; st; vt) = e(1 + 
e(kj ; st; vt))
IHcj (kj ; st; vt) = IH(1 + 
u(kj ; st; vt))
ILc(st; vt) = IL(1 + 
ent(st; vt))
and solve a system of nonlinear equations for the tax/subsidy scheme. The cost structure of
the decentralized allocation is c =
n
cj(kj ; st; vt)
oJ
j=1
;
n
IHcj (kj ; st; vt)
oJ 1
j=1
; ILc(st; vt); 0

:
Appendix (B)
6.2 Results
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Figure 3: Establishment Distribution
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Figure 4: Employment Distribution
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Parameter Target Value
g Persistence of Expansions .685
b Persistence of Recessions .298
 Average Annual Interest Rate .98
 Share of Capital 33%
() Returns to entrepreneurship 6.66 (0.85)
 Mean Exit Rate 0.055
 Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution 1 (log utility)
z Lower Bound of Idyosincratic Productivity 0.01
N Number of Technologies/Capacities 4
Table 1: Parametrization
Parameter Denition Value
sg   sb Size of the Shocks (Symmetric) exp(0:0267)  exp( 0:0267)
k; k

Range of Capacities [1; 4]
[z; z] Range for Idiosyncratic Productivity (Upper Bound) [0:01; 4:25]
IL31 Entry Costs

1:09
0:93

IH Upgrade Costs

4:55 11:37 37:1
4:28 4:26 1:98

e Scrap Values

0:85 2:47 9:27 9:1
0:86 2:46 9:2 9:13

&G Pareto Tail of the productivity distirbution at entry 1:9
Table 2: Jointly Calibrated Parameters
Moment Data Model Moment Data Model
Emp. Share, 1-19 0.05 0.04 Estab. Share, 1-19 0.46 0.35
Emp. Share, 20-49 0.14 0.13 Estab. Share, 20-49 0.69 0.67
Emp. Share, 50-99 0.25 0.21 Estab., 50-99 0.83 0.82
Emp. Share, 100-249 0.44 0.36 Estab., 100-249 0.93 0.91
Entry Rate 6.9% 6.24% Exit Rate 5.5% 6.23%
Investment Spikes32 8% 9.1% Log Emp. (upper bound) 10000+ 10829
Output Volatility 2.09% 2.1%
Table 3: Targeted Moments
Baseline Optimal Allocation
Aggregate TFP 3.36 3.73
Standard Deviation TFP 7.9% 8.4%
Coe¢ cient of Variation, TFPQ 3.01 2.66
Table 4: Productivity Statistics
Baseline Optimal Allocation TFPmc
Aggregate TFP 1.31 1.36 2.33
Standard Deviation TFP 2.6% 2.6% 3.3%
Coe¢ cient of Variation, TFPQ 3.01 2.66 1.05
Table 5: Productivity Statistics: Normalized Measure
83
k Ratio mean TFPQ
1 1.02
2 0.99
3 0.99
4 0.98
Table 6: E¢ ciency across capacities
Baseline Case G Case S
g= :685 g= :237 g= :685
sg sb= 0:053 sg sb= 0:053 sg sb= 0:064
TFP 3.36 3.72 2.19
Standard Deviation TFP 7.9% 9.1% 30.4%
Coe¢ cient of Variation TFPQ 3.01 2.7 2.64
TFPM=1/TFPmc 0.56 0.58 0.56
Volatility of Output 2.1% 2.5% 8.6%
Table 7: Features of Aggregate Uncertainty
Model Case G Case S
Entry Rate 6:24% 5:95% 20:4%
Exit Rate 6:23% 5:94% 12:6%
Upgrade Rate 9:1% 9:7% 45:1%
Table 8: Firm Dynamics
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Figure 5: Dispersion in TFP, Aggregate TFP and the Cyclical Component of GDP
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Employment 0-49 50-149 150-499 500+
Output Share 0.14 0.06 0.05 0.75
Opt. Policy 0.13 0.05 0.04 0.78
Capital Share 0.69 0.16 0.08 0.07
Opt. Policy 0.71 0.15 0.08 0.06
Employment Share 0.16 0.11 0.15 0.58
Opt. Policy 0.16 0.11 0.14 0.59
Table 9: Optimal Policy: Distributional Implications
Model Optimal Policy
Entry Rate 6:24% 5:85%
Exit Rate 6:23% 5:84%
Upgrade Rate 9:1% 9:8%
Table 10: Optimal Policy: Firm Dynamics
Good Times Bad Times
Baseline Optimal Policy Baseline Optimal Policy
IL=Y 0:30 0:28 0:30 0:29
IH=Y

0:87 3:28 3:22
 
0:45 0:81 2:51
 
0:87 3:25 3:23
 
0:43 0:83 2:57

e=Y

0:39 1:61 4:02 13:11
 
0:50 0:49 2:27 8:33
 
0:33 1:51 1:51 0:70
   0:02 0:29 0:79 1:84 
Table 11: Tax/subsidy Structure in terms of output per worker
Figure 6: Establishment Distribution, Sensitivity Analysis
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Appendix (C)
6.3 Features of the Solution
Proposition 9 Continuation ValuesfW are monotonic increasing in idiosyncratic productivity; z
and the optimal investment/disinvestment strategy of the rm is a set of thresholds such that if
z < ze( J ; Xt) they exit the market, and if J = L whenever z  zu( H ; Xt) the rm upgrades
capacity.
Proof. First notice that (xt; Xt) is bounded and continuous in z. (Replace the optimal factor
demands in the prot function).
Second, let W ( x;X) be the unique xed point to the operator T ,
T (W (x;Xt)) =Max
n
e; (x;Xt) + Et
et+1(Xt; Xt+1) (1  )W (x;Xt+1)o
We rst show rst that W ( x;X) is non-decreasing in z.
Let C(Z) be the set of continuous bounded functions in z, and let C 0(Z) a closed subspace
of non-decreasing functions. Take W 2 C(Z) and z1 < z2. then
T (W (z1;  
j ; Xt)) =Max
n
e; (z1;  
j ; Xt) + Et
et+1(Xt; Xt+1) (1  )W (x;Xt+1)o
Max
n
e; (z2;  
j ; Xt) + Et
et+1(Xt; Xt+1) (1  )W (x;Xt+1)o
= T (W (z2;  
j ; Xt))
so that T (C 0(Z))  C 0(Z). Hence by the Contraction Mapping Theorem W  2 C 0(Z).
Now, we want to prove that for each
 
 j ; X

the function fW (z, j ; Xt) is strictly increasing
in z. Note that the expectation operator in the last term of the previous equation dened over
the aggregate of the economy and independent of the productivity of the rm except through
the function W . Take z1 < z2
fW (z1;  j ; Xt) = (z1;  j ; Xt) + Et et+1(Xt; Xt+1) (1  )W (z1;  j ; Xt+1)
< (z2;  
j ; Xt) + Et
et+1(Xt; Xt+1) (1  )W (z2;  j ; Xt+1)
= fW (z2;  j ; Xt)
which proves the claim.
87
Given the monotonicity of the continuation values, the optimality of the trigger strategy
follows. Suppose not. Hence, there is a rm with productivity z, such that z < ze( J ; Xt) and
the rm does not exit the market. But the rm with productivity z + < ze( J ; Xt) did, so
Max
n
e;fW (z +;  j ; Xt)o = e. From the monotonicity of fW , it holds fW (z +;  j ; Xt) >fW (z;  j ; Xt) so that e > fW (z;  j ; Xt) and hence remaining in the market cannot be optimal.
Analogous argument hold for the upgrade thresholds.
Proposition 10 The optimal allocation satises
1. If the minimum capacity constraint is not binding, ze( L; Xt) > ze( H ; Xt)
2. The exit thresholds are increasing in the cost of capital, i.e. @z
e( j ;Xt)
@rt
 0:
3. The upgrade threshold across technology is higher than the exit threshold for high minimum
capacity rms, i.e. zu( H ; Xt) > ze( H ; Xt):
4. The measure of entrants is procyclical.
Before proving the results note that the instantaneous prots of a rm are
(xt; Xt) = [(1  )Y 1 t
"
stK

t
(Zk)

(Z l)
1 
#
  rt  MPKt
MPKt
Kt
Zk
]

z j
MPKt
 
1 
1. Proof. Note rst that the prot function (xt; Xt) is monotonic in the rm idiosyncratic
productivity and the technology shifter. We have proved that rmscontinuation values
are also monotonic. Hence W (z;  H ; Xt) > W (z;  L; Xt) for all z whenever the minimum
capacity constraint is not binding. The value of the rm is homogenous in the productivity
of the process (follows from the form of the prot function). The optimality condition for
the exit thresholds equalizes the rm to its scrap value. Hence, if ( 
H)
( H)

1 
< ( 
L)
( L)

1 
then
ze( L; Xt) > z
e( H ; Xt):
Proof. The prot function is such that @(xt;Xt)@rt < 0. Following the same strategy than
for the monotonicity in idiosyncratic productivity one can show that W (z;  j ; Xt) is non
increasing in the cost of capital and the continuation value fW (z;  j ; Xt) is decreasing in
rt. As in the previous proof, the result follows from the optimality condition for the exit
threshold.
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Proof. Given that upgrades in technology are costly and the scrap value at exit is
independent of the technology operated by the rm. It cannot be optimal to upgrade and
exit immediately. For this strategy, IH units of goods are paid , while exiting while running
the low minimum capacity technology yields the same scrap value and no associated cost.
Proof. fWt(z;  L; Xt) is increasing in the aggregate state of technology s. From the free
entry condition the result follows.
The fact that the scrap value of the rm is independent of the cost capital and the idiosyn-
cratic characteristics of the rm is critical to prove the previous results.
6.4 Law of motion for the distribution of rms
For notational convenience I redene any function f(a;Xt) as ft(a). Let  : Cv Cv fsg; sbg
! Cv  Cv be the equilibrium law of motion for the distribution of rms of low and high
minimum capacity technologies. The law of motion is characterized by
vLt (z) = (1  ) vLt 1(z) M eLt +M entt G(z) G(z
e
t ( 
L))
1 G(zet ( L)) z
u
t ( 
H) > z > zet ( 
L)
vLt (z) = 0 o/w
In other words, the measure of rms running the low minimum capacity technology equals
the measure of rms from the previous period with productivity larger than the current exit
threshold, net of exogenous liquidations, plus the measure of entrants with productivity up to
the upgrade threshold.
The dynamic for the distribution of high minimum capacity technology is
vHt (z) = (1  ) vHt 1(z) M eHt zut ( H) > z > zet ( H)
vHt (z) = (1  ) vHt 1(z) +M entt G(z) G(z
u
t ( 
H))
1 G(zet ( L)) z > z > z
u
t ( 
H)
whenever zut 1( H)  zut ( H):Otherwise
vHt (z) = (1  ) vHt 1(z) M eHt zut ( H) > z > zet ( H)
vHt (z) = (1  ) vHt 1(z) M eHt +Mut (z) +M entt G(z) G(z
u
t )
1 G(zet ( L)) z
u
t 1( H) > z > zut ( H)
vHt (z) = (1  ) vHt 1(z) M eHt +Mut (zut 1( H)) +M entt G(z) G(z
u
t )
1 G(zet ( L)) z > z > z
u
t 1( H)
The measure of rms running at high minimum capacity equals the measure of rms that
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survived from the previous period, minus exits, plus entrants with productivity larger than the
current upgrade threshold. If the current threshold is above the previous one, this measure
also includes rms that upgraded technologies under the previous threshold rule and decide to
remain in the market under the current exit rule.
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Chapter III: Aggregate Fluctuations and the Industry
Structure of the US Economy
1 Introduction
The input output structure (a summary of the trade in intermediate inputs across sectors)
is usually assumed constant in time. However, recent input output data reported at annual
frequencies, suggests that the structure changes in time and that those changes are correlated
with aggregate activity in the economy.
1. The average absolute change of intermediate inputscost shares in the equipment produc-
tion (consumption goods) sector is 1.9% (1.1%) annually.
2. The o¤ diagonal terms of the input output matrix change more than the diagonal terms
(intermediate inputs produced by the same sector).
3. Cost shares of intermediate inputs33 produced by the equipment (consumption) sector
correlate positively (negatively) with aggregate activity.
Changes in the entries of the input-output matrix are a reection of the pattern of realloca-
tion in the economy in response to changes in relative prices. Relative price change when the
e¢ ciency in production of certain sectors improve over others in the economy. Hence, cost share
behavior bears information as of the reallocation of factors in response to changes in e¢ ciency
in production across sectors, and through it, of the propagation of shocks in the economy. In
this paper, I revisit an old question in real business cycle theory: what is the role of sectoral and
neutral shocks in aggregate uctuations? To answer this question I study a two sector economy
augmented to allow for intermediate input linkages and consistent with the movements in the
input output structure observed in the data. This framework is homomorphic to the canonical
model with two sectors, and investment specic and neutral shocks (Foerster et al. (2008) and
Abel and Eberly (1997)). The main result is that the augmented economy predicts a stronger
role for neutral shocks in the volatility of aggregate output vis a vis a comparable economy
with a xed input output structure. Also, the amplication of sectoral shocks is stronger in the
exible cost share economy than in the canonical one.
33Based on BEA, description of Annual Industry Accounts this include energy, raw materials, semi-nished
goods, and purchased services
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After the work of Greenwood et al. (1997) we have seen the development of a fruitful research
agenda that studies the role of investment specic versus neutral shocks in long run growth and
aggregate cyclical uctuations (See Foerster et al. (2008) and Abel and Eberly (1997)). I
augment that economy to allow for intermediate good linkages across sectors. The consumption
sector produces nal and intermediate goods out of capital and intermediate goods from the
equipment and consumption sector. In the equipment sector, there are two subsectors. One
produces investment goods out of capital and intermediate goods, and the second on produces
intermediate equipment goods out of capital and intermediate consumption goods. Capital is
sector specic and the stock of capital is xed at the beginning of each period, before shocks are
realized. Although the structure is richer than the canonical model, I show that under certain
conditions on the share of inputs in production, the augmented economy reduces to a two sector
economy indistinguishable from the standard economy studied in the literature. Among others,
the economy is consistent balanced growth and investment specic technical change34.
In a one sector model, the share of intermediate goods in production has a role in determin-
ing the level of GDP, Jones (2011). But GDP growth depends only on aggregate productivity
growth, measured as the change in output not explained by a change in primary inputs (la-
bor and capital). In other words, intermediate inputs are irrelevant in determining aggregate
uctuations. In a multisector neoclassical model instead, the production possibility frontier
is a weighted measure of the Solow residuals in each sector, Hulten (1978). The computed
solow residuals depend not only on the allocation of primary factors but also on the allocation
of intermediate goods across sectors. Hence, aggregate output uctuations are determined by
changes in the allocation of intermediate goods across sectors in response to changes in relative
prices.
If we assume that markets are competitive, cost shares of inputs are equal to the elasticity
of inputs in production, i.e.
CshiJ =
piM i
pJY J
=
@Y J
@M i
M i
Y J
=
"iJ 
where p index prices, Y gross output and M intermediate good consumption. In a frictionless
economy, changes in relative prices reect changes in relative productivity across sectors. When
34While unexplored in this paper, these characteristics are key if the framework is to be used in the empirical
analysis of the role of neutral and investment specic technical change through long run restrictions as in Fisher
(2006)
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input productivity moves along relative prices one to one, cost shares are constant and the
input output structure of the economy does not change. Substitution towards more productively
produced inputs may generate output increases in the sector producing the intermediate good as
well as in the one consuming it. Cost shares can go up or down. Hence, cost shares movements,
jointly with the behavior of relative prices bring us direct evidence of the pattern of reallocation.
Why do these patterns imply di¤erent roles for sector specic and neutral shocks? To
illustrate, lets think of an economy with three sectors. Two sectors produce intermediate
goods out of a linear technology in sectoral productivity. The third sector combines these two
inputs to generate the consumption good in the economy using a Leontief technology.
Y = min

aM1;M2
	
M1 = A1, M2 = A2
where Ai is exogenous. The equilibrium price of output satises
p = p2 +
1
a
p1
Suppose that productivity improves in sector 2. Then A2 > 0, and the cost share for input
2 drops as p2 < 0. The cost share of input 2 is just the relative price of input to output.
Total value added does not change because Y = aA1, but aggregate productivity improves as
TFP = A
2
aM1
A2. Hence, a purely sectoral shock has no impact on aggregate output but
improves productivity. A neutral shock (that raises both A1 and A2) improves both aggre-
gate productivity and output. Furthermore, should the economist analyzing the economy had
imposed a constant cost share structure, it would have predicted an increase in aggregate out-
put after the shock. Substitution towards the now more e¢ ciently produced input would have
induced an increase in output of Y = Csh2YA2.
While in the example the disparity in cost share behavior is fully characterized by the under-
lying production function describing output in each sector, there are many other mechanisms
for which cost shares may change di¤erently across sectors, even when operating the same tech-
nology. Input specicity is one of them. When looking at aggregate sectoral data, many goods
are bundled together. Movements in cost shares may reect the inability to easily switch across
goods that are close together (belong to the same 3 digit NAICS code) but not necessarily the
same. Another potential source of cost share uctuations is the presence of inventories. While
inventories should be accounted independently of intermediate goods, data measurements may
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include items that we would consider inventories. A similar argument follows for equipment
parts, which should be accounted as part of investment goods. If a rm has stock up enough
intermediate inputs for production within a year of production, changes in relative prices any-
time during the year will not be reected in its input intake. In this paper, I assume movements
in costs shares are generated by di¤erences in production technologies only. This allows me to
assess the quantitative impact of changes in cost shares while keeping a structure that is very
close to the canonical two sector model in the literature.
In the paper, conditions are provided for the existence of a balanced growth path in which all
inputs are used in production, yet productivity growth rates in the equipment and consumption
sector may di¤er. When the detrended economy is calibrated to predict the patterns of cost
share movements observed in the data, the contribution of neutral shocks to output volatility
increases relative to a comparable economy with constant cost shares. In other words, the
variance decomposition of an economy calibrated to the same steady state in which constant
cost shares are imposed (Cobb-Douglas technologies), indicates that neutral shocks contribute
8% less to aggregate output volatility than they do in a exible cost share economy. Aggregate
output impulse responses to persistent and fully temporary shocks depend on the underlying
reallocation patterns embedded in the economy.
Finally, the impact of sectoral shocks is amplied in the exible cost share economy versus
the constant one. In other words, to generate the same volatility in aggregate GDP, and gross
output in the consumption and equipment sector, the identied size of the shocks in the economy
with a xed input output structure is larger, than that in the exible cost share economy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 described the related literature,
Section 3 documents the main nding in the data. Section 4 describes the model and the
characterization of the BGP. Section 4 presents the calibration and quantitative results. Section
5 concludes.
1.1 Literature Review
The literature on the role of sectoral shocks is extensive. The seminal work by Hulten (1978)
paved the way for the study of the role of input output linkages in the transmission of sectoral
shocks. While the authors nd a substantial role for sectoral shocks in shaping aggregate uc-
tuations in output, much discussion has been triggered since on the plausibility of transmission
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of idiosyncratic shocks to the aggregate economy. At the heart of the arguments is whether law
of large arguments apply to the units that we dene as sectors35.
There are quantitative approaches that exploit the factor structure of a model with input
output linkages as in Long and Plosser (1983). The work of Foerster et al. (2008) show that
the role of sectoral shocks in explaining aggregate volatility has increased (in relative terms)
after the great moderation. Key to the econometric strategy of the paper is the assumption
that the input output structure is stable. This paper departs fundamentally from it by allowing
trade intensities in intermediate goods to change across time. More recently, Abel and Eberly
(1997) has used intermediate input purchases to identify the relative importance of industry-
specic shocks. In his framework he estimates an elasticity of substitution between value added
and intermediate goods di¤erent than one. In this paper, I assume the elasticity is between
intermediates and value added unitary so that while sector productivity trends may di¤er across
sectors, the economy is consistent with a balance growth path in which all intermediate goods
are used in production.
After the work of Greenwood et al. (1997), the analysis of economies with neutral and
investment specic shocks, is the preferred choice in the literature studying business cycles.
Both the consistency with long run growth and a trend a in the relative price of equipment to
consumption is key in a two sector economy like the one I study in this paper. While the papers
described earlier allow for a large degree of heterogeneity across sectors in the economy, I keep
the economy as close to the now plain vanilla business cycle model as possible. By doing this,
I can uncover the role of the input output structure, while 1) providing a exible framework
that a) can be enriched to analyze a richer shocks structure as in Smets and Wouters (2007),
b) can accommodate stochastic trends between the investment and consumption sector (as in
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2011)) 2) paving the way for future research on the its implications
for long run identication strategies as in the seminal work of Gali (1999), augmented later to
allow for investment specic shocks in Fisher (2006).
There is an extensive literature in business cycles studying the impact of investment specic
35Dupor (1999) shows that when the network that describes the input output structure is a balanced one,
sectoral shocks indeed do not a¤ect aggregates. We have learn much about the characteristics of the network
structure since. Horvath (2000) shows that when the input output structure is sparse (as is the case in the data)
sectoral shocks do not fade away in the aggregate. Alternatively, Carvalho and Gabaix (2013) show that when
the role of sectors in the economy is unbalanced, in the sense that a few sectors account for most of the value
added in the economy, the law of large numbers fails and sectoral shocks can have aggregate impact. Along the
same line are the network results by Acemoglu et al. (2012) and Obereld (2011). Hence, there is nowadays
consensus that sectoral shocks can be transmitted to the aggregate economy and have quantitative impact.
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and neutral shocks for aggregate uctuations. Justiniano et al. (2010) show that in a full
DSGE model with price markup shocks, neutral technology shocks, Calvo pricing, wage markups
shocks, preference shocks, and investment shocks, most of the variability of output is explained
by shocks to the marginal e¢ ciency with which nal goods are transformed into capital. The
structure of intermediate goods trade across sectors is abstracted away. In this paper, the
economy is strip out from the rich shock structure and augmented to allow for intersectoral
trade in intermediates. This allows me to highlight the relevance of modeling the input output
structure with endogenous uctuations vis as vis an economy with a xed input output structure.
It is shown that the amplication of sectoral shocks is stronger in this economy, than in a
comparable economy with a constant input output structure. The particular modelling strategy
in which the equipment production sector is split into an investment good producing sector and
an intermediate good producing sector allows me to identify the di¤erential impact of shocks
to each of these activities. Shocks to the production of investment and intermediates goods are
in nature disparate and are shown to have distinct relative impact in output volatility.
Finally, there is an incipient literature applying notions of networks to understand the
generation of trade linkages between rms (Obereld (2013) and Carvalho and Voigtlander
(2014)). While the focus of the analysis is di¤erent from the one in this paper, both are
complementary to each other. Is through the coordinated behavior of all those rms that the
decision on trade linkages matters for the aggregate dynamic of the economy. In this paper
I show that cost shares of fairly aggregated sectors uctuate in time and they are relevant in
understanding the role of investment specic and neutral shocks in the economy. It remains to
be shown that the uctuations in aggregate cost shares are consistent with the rm behavior
observed in the data.
2 Empirical Facts
2.1 Input-Output structure
I study make-use tables from 1993 to 2012 as reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics based
on BEA data. The series are presented for 195 sectors, and values are current US dollars. The
data Appendix describes in detail the sectors that have been included in the analysis.
The objective of this analysis is to describe the changes in the input output structure vis a
vis the aggregate level of activity in economy. The level of aggregation across sectors is key in
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producing the facts documented in this section. For the purpose of the analysis in an economy
with two sectors as the one presented in the body of the paper, aggregation of consumption
and equipment/investment sectors is enough. However, in the analysis of the empirical facts I
present results where I aggregate sectors to build an Input Output matrix with 33 industries,
consistent with the KLEMS sectoral data available at BEA. Then I further classify these 33
sectors as investment/equipment, consumption sector, agricultural and mining sector.
Independent of the level of aggregation, the investment sector is constructed to include
equipment producing sectors consistent with the analysis in Cummins and Violante (2002). In
other words, the aggregation rule is consistent with the construction of relative price indexes
that are used to describe the path of investment specic technical change.
In the analysis I abstract from the behavior of agricultural and mining sectors for several
reasons. First, the assumption of constant returns to scale in technology that I use later in
the model economy is unlikely to hold in these sectors, where there are large xed costs of
operation. Second and most important, uctuations in price of these commodities may not be
tight to changes in relative productivity vis a vis other sectors in the economy, but rather to
developments in international commodity markets. The government, except postal services, has
been abstracted away from this analysis.
The cost share of input i in sector j is dened as
CshiJ =
piM iJ
pJY J
where Y J denotes gross output in sector j, M iJ is the intermediate good i intake of sector j and
p denote prices. Hence, cost shares uctuate whenever changes in relative prices are not fully
translated into changes in input productivity ( Y
J
M iJ
).
Figures 7 to 12 display time series of cost shares of consumption and equipment intermediate
goods for various sectorial aggregations. The period of analysis includes the Great Recession,
where the input output structure experienced a substantial shake out. The nature of those
changes are out of the scope of this particular analysis. However, the panels include a line
identifying the date collapse in the US nancial market. This panel are constructed singling
out the behavior of particular sectors that might be driving the behavior of the aggregate cost
shares of equipment and consumption. In the rst two panels I present data with all sectors
are described in the baseline classication in the appendix. In the next two panels, I single out
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the behavior of the construction sector, potentially important in the developments of the late
90s and 2000s up to the recession in 2007. I also single out Utilities. In the last two panels
I show the behavior of cost shares of the nance sector and the real state sector. In each of
the last 4 panels,the cost shares of consumption and equipment have the corresponding sector
under analysis, substracted out.
In Figures 7 and 8 I show the behavior of cost shares of each type of intermediate goods in
the consumption and equipment sector, and for completeness, in the agricultural and mining
sector. Own cost shares uctuate substantially (consumption in consumption, and equipment
in equipment). These sectors aggregate up changes in relative prices across subsectors, so it
is possible for the within sector cost share to uctuate with movements in relative prices and
not only with input productivity. The cost share of consumption intermediates in equipment
displays a slight upward trend up to 2000s that reverts in the next decade. The cost share of
equipment intermediates in equipment displays a mirror dynamic, with the cost share dropping
up to the 2000s and increasing later on. The cost share of equipment in consumption displays
a downward trend that may well be explained by the drop in the relative price of equipment
to consumption goods. If we normalize cost shares to account only for those sectors accounted
in the consumption and equipment sectors36, the cost share of consumption in the equipment
sector averages 43% in the sample period, while the cost share of equipment intermediates in
consumption averages 7% and displays a declining trend. If only these two aggregate sectors
are considered in the sample, the cost share structure is as depicted in Table (12) :In the sample
period, gross output of the consumption sector is four times larger than gross output of the
equipment sector. Also, in the consumption(equipment) sector 67% (48%) of gross output is
used as intermediate input in other sectors. The rest is either consumed or adds to the capital
stock.
In Figures 9 and 10 I disaggregate the behavior of the construction and utilities sector from
the overall consumption sector. The exercise is designed to understand if some of the dynamic
described before are explained by particular sectors. When construction and utilities are ab-
stracted away the consumption sector, the cost share of equipment in consumption displays a
less steep downward trend than for the full sector, in particular after 2000.The cost shares of i
equipment intermediate inputs in construction is relatively stable. The cost share of consump-
36This normalization is consistent with the model presented in the next section, in which only this two sectors
are accounted for.
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tion intermediate drops substantially up to 2000 and raises thereafter. Utilities cost shares of
equipment and consumption intermediate goods behave as mirror images. The dynamic of the
cost share in of consumption in consumption is very similar to the one depicted in the previous
panel. This indicates that neither construction nor utilities explain the decrease in cost share
of consumption intermediates in consumption from the 2000s onwards.
Figures 11 and 12 display a disaggregation for the nance sector and real state sector.
The share of consumption intermediates in the consumption sector displays a downward trend
for the whole sample period, indicating that part of the raise in the early 2000 are explained
by the consumption intermediate share in the nance sector, which remains relatively stable.
Noticeably, the cost share of consumption in equipment is much more volatile when the nance
and real state sector are abstracted from consumption.
In summary, cost shares uctuate substantially. The cost share of equipment in consumption
sectors displays a downward trend, while the remaining cost shares are relatively stable. Cost
shares of consumption intermediates went up on average up to the beginning of the 2000s and
then down to the end of the sample period. The cost share of equipment in equipment sectors
behaved as mirror image of that pattern.
Next I would like to describe the year on year changes in cost shares. In other words, I would
like to describe changes in (12). To study variation across inputs I compute average absolute
changes year on year. Those are presented in table (13)
The o¤ diagonal terms, are larger than the diagonal terms, and in particular, the largest
movements are for equipment intermediates in the consumption sector. Relative price changes
within a category, i.e. computers and transportation equipment, are aggregated out in the
changes reported in the diagonal of the table. Changes in the relative price of consumption
and equipment basket are reected in the uctuations in the o¤ diagonal terms. To grasp the
magnitude of these changes,one could compute the absolute average deviations from the mean
share over the sample period, as in table(14)
Changes in the cost share of equipment in consumption are accounted large (10.1% on
average), and those of consumption in the equipment sector average 3% of the mean. However,
as depicted in gures 7 to 12, some of the share series contain longer term trends. To avoid
imputing changes in cost shares as just shifts along the trend, I also report deviations from
an hp-trend. These absolute deviations are reported in (15). Once we account for this trend,
deviations in own intermediate inputs cost shares drop below 1% per year. and deviations in
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the cost share of consumption in equipment and equipment in consumption are 1.3% and 1.5%
respectively.
To summarize, changes in cost shares are not negligible whether accounted as year on year
changes or as deviations from trend. Changes in cost shares of intermediate inputs produced
by other sectors (the o¤ diagonal terms in the last three tables) are larger than those in the
diagonal terms.
The asymmetry in the industry structure depicted in Table(12) and the contribution of
each sector in value added and gross output are important features that the model economy
needs to capture to assess: a) the elasticity of the cost shares to changes in relative prices, b) the
aggregate impact of those changes. Elasticities of substitution across inputs (hence, cost shares)
depend on the industry structure as summarized by (12) :However, the relevance of shocks in
the aggregate depend on their contributions to value added and gross output.
Finally, let me describe the correlation of cost share changes with aggregate activity. I dene
value added as the sum of the dollar value of value added in the equipment and consumption
sectors. I report correlations for three di¤erent time series. The full sample includes the Great
Recession (GR), the second sample only focuses on the periods up to the GR. The third sample
interpolates the pre and post 2008 values abstracting from the drop in activity in 2008. Table
(16) shows that cost shares of consumption intermediate goods are countercyclical irrespective
of the sample period. Cost shares of equipment intermediates in the equipment sector are
procyclical in the full sample, but acyclical if we consider the period pre 2008 or the interpolated
data. The correlation of the cost share of equipment intermediates in the consumption sector
with aggregate value added displays the largest disparities across sample periods. While for the
full sample the correlation is positive , in the pre 2008 period it is identied negative of about
the same magnitude. When we interpolate to abstract from the GR the cost share appears
acyclical.
For the calibrated exercise at the end of the paper I will use data from the full sample. The
particular shifts in the input output structure that occur during the break out of the recession
remain to be studied, possibly at a higher level of disaggregation.
The countercyclicality of the cost share of consumption in equipment is important in view of
the extensively documented countercyclicality of the price of equipment. Negatively correlated
cost shares indicate that input productivity drops less than the drop in the relative price of
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equipment to consumption. In good times the relative price goes down, inducing the cost share
of consumption in equipment to increase if there are no changes in input productivity. For the
cost share to drop, input productivity has to increase in the equipment sector.
If we abstract from the changes in relative prices that are certainly occurring within each of
these fairly aggregate sectors, the correlations on the diagonal terms of the table indicate that:
a) input productivity increases in the consumption sector when aggregate activity booms on
average, and b) that input productivity in the equipment sector drops during activity booms
on average. Note that if the relative price of one of the categories within a sector is dropping
dramatically, say the price of computers relative to transportation equipment, that shift in
prices might be reected as a procyclical cost share for intermediates produced in the same
sector.
As mentioned early, these results are not invariant to the degree of aggregation in the
economy. In Figures 13 and 14 I compute the correlation of cost shares of equipment and
consumption intermediate goods for 33 sectors, and for the full sample of 170 sectors (abstracting
the government).
To conclude this section, let me summarize the main features observed in the data:
By studying an economy consistent with these features I will argue that these facts are key
in understanding the role of sectoral and neutral shocks as well as the amplication of shocks
in the economy.
1. Sectors have disparate roles as input suppliers of other sectors in the economy.
2. The average absolute change of intermediate inputscost shares in the equipment produc-
tion (consumption goods) sector is 1.9% (1.1%) annually.
3. The o¤diagonal terms of the input output matrix change more than the diagonal terms(intermediate
inputs produced by the same sector).
4. Cost shares of intermediate inputs produced by the equipment (consumption) sector cor-
relate positively (negatively) with aggregate activity.
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3 Model
3.1 Environment
This is a discrete time, innite horizon economy.
There are two nal goods produced in the economy, equipment and consumption goods.
Additionally, intermediate equipment goods are produced.
There are three production sectors in the economy. I assume there is a representative rm in
each sector. All markets are competitive and the technologies are constant returns to scale. The
diagram 17 displays the input output structure of the economy under analysis. A cross indicates
a positive entry in the matrix. To distinguish between goods produced by the equipment sector,
I call X2 the sector producing intermediate equipment and X1 the sector producing investment
goods (capital)37.
Total value added in this economy equalizes the sum across entries in the last two columns
(GDP). Gross output per sector corresponds to the row sum across all columns. Total cost
corresponds to the column sum per sector. The cost share is the ratio between a particular
entry in the intermediate demand section and gross output. The cost shares in the model are
constructed as in the data, separating out expenses in capital services.
There is a representative household with standard preferences over nal consumption goods.
She maximizes lifetime utility by choosing a consumption stream as well as purchases of invest-
ment goods.
3.2 Representative Household
The representative household maximizes lifetime utility subject to its budget constraint. Her
income stems from the rental of capital to the rms in the economy and from claims to the
prots of those rms. Note that capital is specic to a sector and hence capital cannot be instan-
taneously reallocated from one sector to another. The non-negativity constraint in investment
goods should hold for each capital type.
max
cst ;c
m
t ;xt
1X
t=0
t U(ct)
37This distinction is useful for the analysis of the balance growth path in particular. I will show that under cer-
tain conditions, this economy reduces to a two sector economy where both sectors produce nal and intermediate
goods, and it is possible to observe investment specic technical change.
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subject to
pyt ct + p
x1
t x1  rt (kx1 + kx2 + ky) +
X
j=y;x1;x2
jt
k
0
x1   kx1(1  x) = ix1 (x)
k
0
x2   kx2(1  x) = ix2 (x)
k
0
y   ky(1  y) = iy (y)
iy + ix1 + ix2 = x1 and ij  0 for j = y; x1; x2
where  is the discount factor; pj indexes prices for alternative goods j = y; x1, i.e. nal
consumption and investment goods, respectively; the capital stock is kjt with rental rate rt and
the prots of the rms in each sector are jt . The depreciation rate is allowed to di¤er between
equipment production sectors and consumption production sectors.
3.3 Consumption Goods Sector
The representative rm in the consumption sector maximizes prots each period. It has available
a technology that uses intermediate goods (M) and capital goods. Once the productivity of all
sectors is realized, it chooses its input purchases. The problem of the rm reads
max
Myyt ;M
xy
t ;k
y
t
pyt Y
y
t   pytMyyt   px2t Mxyt   rtkyt
subject to
Yt = exp(A
g
t ) (k
y
t )
y1 (y2 (M
yy
t )
y + (1  y2) (Mxyt )y)
my
y
where Agt is a Hicks Neutral productivity shock. For simplicity we have assumed that shocks
to the productivity of the consumption good sector correspond to aggregate shocks38. The
intermediate good purchases from sector j are M jyt ; k
y
t is the stock of capital used in produc-
tion, y1 is the share of the capital/value added in gross output; (1   y) 1 2 ( 1; 1) is the
elasticity of substitution across intermediate goods in the equipment sector; my is the share
of intermediates in value added; and y2 corresponds to the share of consumption intermediate
38Shocks particular to this sector can be incorporated. However, we expect the predictions of that economy to
be analogous to this one. The current set up correspond in which any change in idyosincratic productivity in this
sector is reected in changes in the relative productivity of the other two sectors in the economy. Quantitatively,
the modeling strategy may make a di¤erence in the variance decomposition exercise, so robustness checks will be
run.
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inputs in the production of consumption goods when y = 0 (Cobb-Douglas technology).
Labor is assumed away in this analysis. Or in other words, one could assume that capital
and labor are one to one in production, with an elasticity of substitution equal to zero, i.e.
a Leontie¤ technology. It might be potentially important to model the substitution patterns
between labor and capital as in Koh and Santaeulalia-Llopis (2014). This substitution patterns
can be complementary to the shifts in intermediate input intake generated by the model.
3.4 Equipment Sectors
3.4.1 Investment Goods
The representative rm in the equipment investment sector maximizes prots by choosing inter-
mediate good purchases of both consumption and intermediate equipment goods. Its problem
reads
max
Mxxt ;M
yx1
t
px1t X
1
t   px2t Mxx1t   pytMyx1t
subject to
X1t = exp(A
g
t ) exp(A
x1
t ) (k
x1
t )
x1 (x2 (M
xx1
t )
x + (1  x2) (Myx1t )x)
mx
x
where Ax1t is a Hicks Neutral sectoral productivity shock,M
ix are intermediate good i purchases
in sector X1; (1  x) 1 2 ( 1; 1) is the elasticity of substitution across intermediate goods in
the equipment sector; mx is the share of intermediates in value added; and x2 corresponds to
the share of intermediate equipment inputs in the production of investment goods when x = 0.
3.4.2 Intermediate Goods
The representative rm in this sector maximizes prots by choosing capital and intermediate
goods from the consumption sector. Its problem reads
max
M
yx2
t ;k
y
t
px2t X
2
t   pytMyx2t   rtkx2t
subject to
X2t = exp(A
g
t ) exp(A
x2
t )
 
kx2t

(Myx2t )
mx2
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where Ax2t is a Hicks Neutral productivity shock, M
yx2
t is the purchase of intermediate con-
sumption goods; kx2t is the stock of capital used in production; and & corresponds to the share
of capital in the production of intermediate equipment goods and mx2 is the share of inter-
mediates in value added.
3.5 Productivity
Each sector takes the realization of the productivity process as given. Productivity has two
elements, a deterministic trend and a noise term. Let At  fAgt ; Ax1t ; Ax2t g be the current
realization of the shocks in the economy. The dynamic of A is described as
At =  (At 1)
At = (1 + t)A0 + t
where t is a vector collecting the time trends and t is the noise in the process, E(t) = 0:
The noise term has in turn two elements. One that is purely temporary and I call t and
a persistent component zt with persistence  and innovation t. In other words, the noise
structure is
t = zt + t
zt = zt 1 + t
t = t 1   t 1 + t + t
t v N(0;) and t v N(0;). The variance covariance matrix of the shocks are  and 
independent from each other. Whereas the t shocks are purely temporary, the time series of
gross output and value added at the sector level will display persistence, through the impact
of these shocks on the accumulation of sector specic capital. Also, whereas both persistent
and purely temporary shocks may be independent across sectors, the economy will display
comovement due to the intermediate input linkages.
4 Equilibrium
Before dening the equilibrium let me introduce some additional notation. Let pt  fpyt ; px1t ; px2t g
be the vector of prices in the economy,Myt  fMyx1t ;Myx2t ;Myyt g be the vector of intermediate
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consumption goods, Mxt  fMxx1t ;Mxyt g be the vector of intermediate equipment goods.
Denition 3 A competitive equilibrium is an allocation of consumption,investment and capital
ct;
n
ijt ; k
j
t+1
o
j=y;x1;x2
1
t=0
, as well as intermediate good consumption fMyt ;Mxt g1t=0, such that
given a system of prices, fp(At); r(At)g1t=0, the exogenous dynamic for sectoral productivity
At+1 =  (At) and the initial stock of capital k
j
0,
1. The representative household maximizes utility
2. The representative rm in each sector maximizes prots
3. Markets clear:
(a) ct +M
yy
t +M
yx1
t +M
yx2
t = Yt
(b) iyt + i
x1
t + i
x2
t = X
1
t
(c) Mxx1t +M
xy
t = X
2
t
I now describe how the production possibility frontier changes in this multisector economy.
As in Hulten (1978), the PPF is a weighted average of Solow residuals of di¤erent sectors in
the economy. Let ext be the log deviation of variable x from its steady state value. Deviations
in aggregate e¢ ciency in period t, can be described by
eTt =X
J
pJt Y
J
tP
j p
j
t

Y jt 
j
t
 eZJt (28)
Fluctuations in the solow residual in each sector are characterized by
eZyt = eYt   SX
i=1
CshiyfM iyt   Cshkyekyt (29)
eZxjt = eXjt   SX
i=1
CshixfM ixt   Cshkxekxjt (30)
Hence, the residual is the change in aggregate output not explained by changes in the input
of production. Using the denition of cost shares, movements in intermediate input intake per
sector can be characterized by
fM iJt = gCshiJt + epJt   epit + eY Jt
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Hence, whether equilibrium prices adjust so that the log deviation in intermediate purchases is
the same in the constant and exible cost share economy should be assessed in the context of a
general equilibrium model. There is no reason to believe this will be the case. If predicted log
deviations in intermediate purchases di¤er across economies, so will productivity and through
them, predicted aggregate productivity changes.
4.1 Balanced Growth Path
Before moving on to the quantitative assessment of the model, I describe the balance growth
path of the economy and the conditions that reduce this economy to a plain vanilla two sector
economy as in Greenwood et al. (1997).
A Balance Growth Path is a path of gross output in the consumption, aggregate consump-
tion, intermediate inputs intake, and equipment intermediate sector gross output such that they
all grow at a constant equal rate, and a path of aggregate investment, capital and investment
at the sectoral level, such they also grow at a equal constant rate, possibly di¤erent from the
one of aggregate consumption.
Theorem 5 Given the technologies assumed for this economy, a Balanced Growth Path (BGP)
where all intermediate goods are used in production exists i¤ technology is Cobb Douglas in
capital and intermediates and either 1) the elasticity of substitution across intermediate goods,
equals unity (Cobb-Douglas technology); or 2) there are no linkages through intermediate goods
between the equipment and consumption sector; 3) productivity growth in the consumption sector
and intermediate equipment sector are proportional by a factor (gx)y1  (gy)my mx2 ;where gx
is the growth rate of gross output in the investment sector and gy is the one in the consumption
sector.
The rst result is analogous to that in Ngai and Pissarides (2007) in an economy with
structural change. The second result is well know as it reduces the economy to one like the
one in Greenwood et al. (1997). The third one allows me to study the economy that has been
described in the previous section. One with non-trivial heterogeneous productivity processes
across di¤erent sectors while allowing for uctuations in cost shares. It is worth mentioning
that while cost shares are allowed to change, in equilibrium they will be constant along the
BGP. In the third case, productivity growth in the intermediate equipment and consumption
sector are allowed to di¤er i¤ the shares of capital and intermediates in value added are di¤erent
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across sectors. If productivity growth rates are proportional, then output in the intermediate
equipment sector and in the output sector grow at the same rate.
Corollary 3 For a given productivity growth rate in the investment sector, it is possible to
nd a set of parameters (share of capital and intermediates) such that productivity growth in
the intermediate equipment sector equalizes the one in the investment sector and the BGP is
preserved. Productivity gains should satisfy
x = x2 = (y)
1+ x2(y1 )+ y2(my mx2 )
1  x1(y1 )+ y1(my mx2 )
Hence, if the previous relationship is satised between productivity gains in the investment
and the consumption sector, the economy resembles an economy with two sectors in which the
only shocks are a neutral and an investment specic one.
It is worth describing equilibrium growth rates for the case that will be analyzed in the rest
of the paper (3). Growth rates of gross output along the BGP are convex combinations of the
productivity growth in the investment and consumption sector.
gx = (x) x1 (y) x2
gy = (x) y1 (y) y2 = gx2
 x1 =
1 my
(1 x1)(1 my) mxay1 and  x2 =
amx
(1 x1)(1 my) mxay1 :Also,  y1 =
ay1
(1 x1)(1 my) mxay1
and  y2 =
1 ax1
(1 x1)(1 my) mxay1 :
In an economy with constant returns to scale and no labor, so that ay1 + amy = 1 and
ax1 + amx = 1, the growth rates of output are identical across sectors. In an economy where
ay1 + amy < 1 and ax1 + amx = 1, the consumption sector gross output will grow slower than
the investment sector. If instead, ay1 + amy = 1 and ax1 + amx < 1, the consumption sector
will grow faster than the investment equipment sector. In other words, whenever the share
of intermediates in production in the equipment (consumption) sector is relatively small, the
consumption sector grows faster (slower) than the investment equipment sector.
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5 Quantitative Exercises
The quantitative strategy is as follows. First the model is detrended using the BGP results
from the previous section. In particular, the following transformation of variables generates a
stationary economy
Yt
Qyt
;
X2t
Qyt
;
M ijt
Qyt
;
Ct
Qyt
;
X1t
Qxt
;
kit
Qxt
;
iit
Qxt
where
Qxt = (A
x1) x1 (Ay) x2 and Qyt = (A
x1) y1 (Ay) y2
Second, I calibrate the model to match the steady state behavior of the industry structure
(i.e. the share of intermediate inputs in each sector), the volatility of gross output and value
added. To match the cyclical behavior of cost shares observed in the data, I calibrate the
variance covariance matrix of the shock structure as well as the elasticities of substitution
across intermediate goods.
Third, I calibrate a comparable economy with Cobb-Douglas technologies (constant cost
shares) to generate the same steady state of the baseline economy.
With these two economies I run alternative experiments. First, I compute impulse responses
for identical shocks to test the propagation properties of each economy. Second, I simulate each
economy and compute a variance decomposition of the generated path for output and aggregate
TFP, for neutral and investment specic shocks.
I have used data from the Capital Flow Table of 1997 to compute investment levels across
sectors. Capital stocks for the same year across sectors were obtained from the EUKLEMS
database. Nominal shares of intermediate inputs were obtained from annual Input Output tables
at chained dollars of 2005 as reported by BLS. The relative price of equipment to consumption
good was obtained as averages of quarterly data as reported in DiCecio (2009), computed
following Cummins and Violante (2002) methodology.
For these exercises, I assume that the share of intermediates in value added is the residual
after deducting the share of capital to assure constant returns in each sector. Under such
specication, growth rates of gross output are the same across all sectors (as explicit in the
denition of  xi ;  yi whenever j1 = (1  mj))
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5.1 Calibration
The model is calibrated to annual frequencies mainly because the data on intermediate good
cost shares is available at that frequency. Table 18 describes the set of parameters that were set
independently of the model conditions. The discount factor was set consistent with a annual
interest rate of 2%. The capital depreciation was set to 5% per year (as in Cooley and Prescott,
1995). I also need to calibrate the growth rate along the BGP. The trends are obtained as gross
output weighted average sector growth rates by KLEMS. These are computed 1978 to 200739.
Because there is no labor in the economy, the model is bounded to generate the same growth
trend in the equipment and consumption sector. In the baseline calibration I use the growth
rate for the equipment sector equal to 3.15% per year. I later draw sensitivity analysis assuming
instead the average growth rate observed in the consumption sectors, 1.5%.
From the optimality conditions for capital (x corresponds to the steady state value of
variable x) we obtain,
1 + gx   (1  )

kx1
X1
= x1
Hence, I need either a measure of capital output ratio in the investment sector, or a measure
of capital capital services in gross output, x1. I use the latter. The feasibility condition that
dictates that gross output in sector X1 corresponds to total investment in the economy as
reported in the Flow of Funds. Capital services are obtained from KLEMS data.
Following a similar strategy we can calibrate the share of capital in the consumption sector
as
1 + gx   (1  )

xky
yY 
= y1
Consistent with the literature (Hornstein and Praschnik (1997) and Hu¤man and Wynne
(1999)), the calibrated share of capital in the consumption sector is slightly higher than the one
in the investment sector.
We are left to calibrate, two elasticities of substitution ( 11 x ;
1
1 y ) and the shares of input
in production, as well as the variance covariance matrix of the shocks. I calibrate them jointly
matching moments of the data. The moments targeted are twelve, described in Table 20. They
include the industry structure (the cost shares reported in Table (12)); the correlation of cost
shares to aggregate value added (reported for the pre Great Recession period in Table (16));
39 If the average is computed over a time frame comparable to the input output data, the growth rate in the
equipment sector raises 1% and in the consumption sector raises 0.2%. Productivity growth for these period is
5.99% in the equipment sector and 1.5% in the consumption sector (value added measures of TFP).
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the volatility of aggregate GDP, and the volatility of gross output in each sector as well as the
persistence of the cyclical component (hp ltered) of each series.
Table 19 describes the set of calibrated parameters. The rst two parameters are closely tight
to the share of intermediates from each sector. The elasticities of substitution across inputs and
the full structure of shocks are identied through the correlations of cost shares with aggregate
activity, as well as the persistence of shocks and volatility of the aggregate series. The persistence
parameters  where taken as primitive in the simulations, and several sensitivity analysis done
over the values of the primitive. The calibrated persistence and volatility of the aggregate series
are particularly sensitive to the underlying persistence of the shock in the investment sector
x. I choose & to assure that the steady state of the model is well dened, i.e. there is a set of
non-negative prices that solve the allocation.
In the preferred calibration, the share of consumption intermediate across sectors is similar
in the investment and consumption sectors. The elasticities of substitution across intermediate
goods are identied less than one in both sectors. The elasticity of substitution is higher in the
consumption sector. The shock structure is such that the volatility of neutral shocks, temporary
and persistent are always lower than the volatility in the equipment sector. Among equipment
producing sectors, we identify higher (lower) volatility for purely temporary(persistent) shocks
in the production of intermediates, than in the investment production sector. Finally the
covariance of temporary shocks in the equipment production sector is identied negative at -0.72.
Intermediate equipment goods are typically parts and unnished goods that would eventually
contribute to the stock of capital in the economy. When the nal equipment sector entails
a positive shock capital goods turn cheaper vis a vis intermediate equipment goods. Output
in the equipment sector raises and the relative price of nal to intermediate equipment goods
drops. In the data, we have identied that cost shares in the equipment sector are procyclical.
Hence, in input productivity in the equipment nal goods sector raises, it may possible o¤set
the impact of the change in relative prices, inducing countercyclical cost shares which is at
odds with the data (recall that the elasticity of substitution across intermediate inputs in the
investment sector is close to one).
With this calibration the model is able to generate an industry structure where the cost
shares of consumption and equipment in the equipment sector are very close to the ones observed
in the data (the cost share of consumption goods in equipment is 57% and the model predicts it
to be 53%). The model however generates a cost share of consumption goods in the consumption
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sector 10% lower than in the data(the cost share of consumption goods is 81% in the model and
93% in the data).
In terms of the correlations of cost share movements with aggregate value added, the model
replicates the countercyclicality of consumption sector cost shares observed in the data. Almost
by construction however, it is not able to generate the disparity in correlations across di¤erent
types of intermediate inputs. The size of the correlation is slightly overestimated for the cost
share of equipment and consumption intermediates in equipment. The model predicts a lower
correlation of cost shares in the consumption sector. The predicted correlation is closer in
magnitude to the one documented in the data for the cost share of equipment in consumption.
The model underestimates the correlation of the cost share of consumption in consumption.
Correlations between aggregate output and cost shares increase when the size of the shocks, in
particular the neutral shock, increases. However, higher volatility of the neutral shocks implies
a much larger volatility of output than observed in the data.
Regarding the volatility of output, the statistic in the data is slightly higher than predicted
by the model(1.5% in the data versus 1.35% in the model). The model generates higher volatility
for gross output in consumption and equipment than in aggregate value added, and higher
volatility in the equipment sector. The standard deviations of gross output in the consumption
sector is 1.8% in the data and 2% as predicted by the model; while the standard deviation in
the equipment sector is 4.8% in the data and 5.3% in the model. Finally, the model predicts
autocorrelations close in magnitude to the ones observed in the data. The correlation predicted
in the equipment is lower than in the consumption sector (as observed in the data).
5.2 Results
5.2.1 Aggregate and Sectoral Shocks
Table 21 presents the variance decomposition across shocks for aggregate value added, aggregate
productivity, investment and consumption. Shocks to the equipment sector combined explain
about 20% of the volatility of output in out baseline calibration. Roughly 60% of those move-
ments are accounted by the volatility of the transitory component of the intermediate equipment
sector,and the remaining to the persistent and transitory component of the innovations in the
investment equipment sector. Neutral shocks explain the remaining of the volatility of GDP,
with two thirds of it accounted by the transitory component of shocks, and the rest by persistent
shocks.
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s shown in the body of the paper, the aggregate production possibility frontier shifts with
changes in the relative intensity with which inputs are used in production across di¤erent
sectors, and the relevance of each sector for gross output. For our baseline calibration, 47%
of the volatility of aggregate productivity is explained by shocks to the equipment sector; 27%
of the uctuations in aggregate productivity originate in persistent shocks. Neutral shocks
explains 53% of the induced variation in TFP, with roughly 60% of it contributed by the
transitory component. It is important to highlight that shocks to the intermediate production
of equipment goods account for most of the volatility induced by shocks to the equipment
sector. This model implies that changes in the productivity with which intermediate goods are
produced have a stronger impact on aggregate productivity than shocks to the investment good
production. Quantitatively the introduction of intermediate goods production is important in
explaining changes in aggregate TFP.
The contribution of shocks to the volatility of aggregate investment is very similar to the
one found for aggregate productivity. The volatility of aggregate consumption in the model
is mostly explained by transitory shocks (87%), and most of it contributed by shocks to the
investment equipment sector (67%). Shocks to the equipment intermediate sector barely a¤ect
aggregate consumption volatility.
5.2.2 Constant versus Flexible Cost Shares
In the previous section I highlighted the importance of modelling intermediate input in a the
standard two sector economy, in particular for the impact of shocks in TFP and aggregate
output. Now, I would like to show that allowing for a exible cost share structure is also
relevant in assessing the impact of neutral and sectoral shocks for aggregate volatility. To do
so, I compare the calibrated exible cost share economy with a comparable economy assuming
a constant input output structure. I calibrate an economy where the elasticity of substitution is
equal to one (Cobb Douglas technology) to generate the same input structure as the benchmark
economy in steady state. The steady state input structure is important because the elasticities
of inputs to changes in relative prices (in the exible cost share economy) depend on the initial
shares of inputs in production. I do this in two steps, rst I only focus on generating the same
input structure in steady state given the shock structure. As it turns out, the constant cost
share economy, generates consistently lower volatility for the aggregates in the economy (i.e.
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value added, and gross output in each of the sectors), indicating that the amplication of shocks
is weaker than in the exible cost share economy. I hence recalibrate the shock structure to
match the volatility and autocorrelation of GDP and gross output in the economy with exible
cost shares and compare results.
Table 22 reports the calibration of the model and compares it to the benchmark allocation.
The shares of capital are identical across specications, except in the intermediate equipment
sector, where the share is computed to assure that the steady state is well dened. The elastici-
ties of substitution across intermediate inputs are set to 1 ( = 0), so that the technology is Cobb
Douglas in all inputs. The share of equipment (consumption) intermediates in the investment
(consumption) sector is slightly higher than in the benchmark economy. As in the benchmark
calibration, both models predict relatively well the input composition in the equipment sector,
but do not account for all the disparity in intermediate input intake in the consumption sector.
Without adjustment of the cost structure the economy with constant cost shares generates
much lower volatility of the series of GDP and gross output in the consumption and equipment
sector. This is already a symptom of the di¤erential impact of shocks in a exible and constant
cost share economy that I will describe through the predicted impulse response functions.
When I recalibrate the shocks to generate the moments of the exible cost share economy
I identify a standard deviation for the investment equipment sector shock twice as large as the
one identied in the benchmark model. The standard deviation of the transitory component of
the shock in the intermediate equipment sector is identied 50% as large as in the benchmark
economy. Finally, while the transitory component of the neutral shock is as large as in the
exible cost share economy, the standard deviation of the persistent shock is identied almost
twice as large and in the latter.
Variance Decomposition Table 24 displays the contribution to the variance of GDP, ag-
gregate productivity, investment and aggregate consumption from neutral and sector specic
shocks when we only match the industry structure across economies.
If we compare the variance decomposition of GDP, both the constant and exible cost share
economy predict similar contributions from temporary and persistent shocks. The benchmark
economy predicts a slightly higher contribution of neutral shocks with value added volatility
(2%) and a slightly lower contribution of temporary equipment sector shocks (3% in the invest-
ment sector and 1% in the equipment intermediate sector).
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The contribution of neutral shocks to the variance in total factor productivity is lower in
the constant cost share economy (5% in temporary shocks, and 2% for persistent shocks) and
shocks to the intermediate equipment sector are predicted to explain relatively more of TFP
variance. The variance decomposition of aggregate investment is very close across economies,
and the variance of aggregate consumption is mostly explained by investment shocks as in the
benchmark economy.
When the constant cost share economy is recalibrated to generate the volatility and autocor-
relation of the aggregate series, the predictions of each of the models depart substantially. The
economies that compare next generate the same steady state industry structure and the simu-
lated series have the same statistical properties. Yet, the constant cost share economy predicts
that 60% of the volatility of aggregate output is explained by shocks to the equipment sector
while in the benchmark economy they explain 50%. The temporary (persistent) component of
neutral shocks explains 19% (22%) of output volatility in the constant cost share economy and
35% (15%) in the benchmark one. Hence, the economy with a xed input output structure
predicts larger contribution for equipment sector shocks, but also if shifts the contribution of
neutral shocks from temporary to persistent shocks.
This shift across type of shocks also occurs in the contributions to the volatility of aggregate
TFP. More important, while investment equipment sector shocks are negligible in explaining
TFP volatility in the benchmark economy, they are predicted to explain 27% of its volatility
in the constant cost share economy. As described in the body of the paper the production
possibility frontier of a multisector economy depends not only on the productivity of each sector,
but also on the contribution of each of them to aggregate gross output. It is not surprising then
that in a exible cost share economy (where those contributions are responding to shifts in
relative e¢ ciency in production) the contribution of intermediate equipment sector shock to
the volatility of TFP is larger than in the economy with a xed input output structure (its
transitory component contributes almost twice as much, and its persistent component 4 times
more).
The comparison in the variance decomposition of aggregate investment is very close to the
one described for TFP. In the case of consumption volatility, the role of transitory investment
sector shocks is stronger in the constant cost share economy, reaching above 90% of consumption
volatility.
Given that the predicted aggregate volatility in each economy di¤er, I recalibrate the con-
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stant cost share economy to generate volatility and persistence of the aggregate series closer to
the ones predicted by the exible cost share economy (See 26). Then, I compute a variance
decomposition of the shocks and compare it to the baseline economy (as shown in 27).
The most salient feature in this comparison is that shocks to the equipment sector become
substantially more relevant in explaining both aggregate output volatility and aggregate pro-
ductivity volatility. While in the baseline case they only explain 20% of GDP volatility, they
account for 45% of GDP volatility in the recalibrated economy. Also, while they explain roughly
45% of TFP volatility in the baseline economy, they are predicted to account for 60% of it in
the recalibrated constant cost share economy. This shifts are substantial and depict the value
in modelling carefully the input output structure, and in turn the variance covariance matrix
of the underlying shocks.
Impulse Responses This section presents the predicted responses of key macroeconomic
variables to shocks to productivity in alternative sectors. The focus in on a comparative analysis
of responses in the exible versus the constant cost share economy.
I study the behavior of aggregate output, TFP, aggregate consumption, gross output in the
consumption sector, investment, and the relative price of new capital goods versus consumption
goods. Figures 6.3 to 6.3 depict the responses of this variables to transitory neutral shocks,
investment specic shocks, and shocks to the equipment intermediates sector. Figures 6.3 to
6.3 display the responses to shocks in the persistent component of productivity for the same
three alternatives.
In general terms, on impact the economy with exible cost shares reacts more to a given
shock than the constant cost share economy does. Purely transitory shocks can have persistent
e¤ect on aggregate variables through the e¤ect on equilibrium capital accumulation in each of
the sectors. The persistent e¤ect is stronger in the benchmark economy, except for aggregate
TFP, which in both economies returns to its steady state level after one period.
Let me describe the response to each of the possible shocks one at the time. If the shock
is neutral, a one standard deviation shock induces a three fold raise in aggregate output. In
the constant cost share economy, the predicted increase in activity is 3/4 of the one predicted
under exible cost shares. As expected, aggregate consumption reacts less than aggregate value
added, and investment and gross output in the consumption sector almost one to one with the
increase in GDP. The relative price of intermediate inputs (equipment to consumption) drops
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on impact but convergences above steady state after that. The drop in the relative price in
response to the neutral shock is slightly above 10% of its steady state level. Although the shock
is neutral in nature, the disparity in input intensity across sectors generates changes in relative
prices, and asymmetric responses of gross output in di¤erent sectors.
When the shock originates in the investment sector and it is persistent, one standard devi-
ation shock (0.01) generates a reaction on GDP upon impact of 7% of the size of the shock. In
the long run, GDP augments to 10% of the size of the shock in the investment sector. Gross
nal output falls upon impact to then overshoot its steady state level. This is explained mostly
by the increase in the capital stock. The relative price of intermediate equipment goods raises
15% on impact and drops to slightly below 13% in the long run. In the constant cost share
economy, the predicted change in relative prices is only 11% and converges to 9% in the long
run. The disparity in the behavior of relative prices after impact is related to the more pro-
nounced response of aggregate investment on impact for the exible cost share economy. If the
shock is purely transitory instead, gross value added is predicted to drop upon impact and raise
above steady state levels after that. This is expected in response to the raise in investment
upon impact.
Finally, if the shock originates in the intermediate equipment sector and is transitory, a one
standard deviation shock (0.014) generates a positive reaction of GDP upon impact of about one
third of the size of the shock. Gross output in the consumption sector increases half as much as
the size of the shock in the exible cost share economy, but slightly about a quarter of the size of
the shock in the constant cost share economy. Investment increases 60% of the size of the shock
and 40% in the constant cost share economy. The disparity in the behavior of gross output is
mostly explained by the di¤erences in the predictions for aggregate total factor productivity.
While in the benchmark economy it is predicted to increase three times the size of the shock
(recall that the Domar weights in the computation of TFP shift with the composition of gross
output and value added in the economy) in the constant cost share economy, productivity raises
two thirds of that.
In summary, while the dynamic predicted in either economy are comparable. Quantitatively
the amplication of shocks in the exible cost share economy is larger than in the constant cost
share economy.
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6 Conclusion
This paper studies the e¤ect of uctuations in the cost shares of intermediate inputs for the
volatility of output. The model economy is calibrated to match the industry structure of the
USA economy and the cyclical cost share behavior documented in the data. When tested
against a comparable constant cost share economy, neutral shocks account for 8% more of
aggregate output volatility. Responses of aggregate output and productivity to sectoral shocks
are magnied when patterns of reallocation of factors are consistent with constant cost shares.
The disparities in cost share behavior across sectors may provide identifying restrictions for
the nature of shocks to the economy. The results stems not only from the disparate contribu-
tion of sectors to value added, but also from degree of substitutability in inputs of production.
Additional empirical analysis on the latter might be a promising avenue for further work. Fur-
thermore, the disparities in the predictions of the dynamic of key aggregate variables may
provide additional identication restrictions for the nature of shocks in the economy.
The paper illustrate the quantitative implications of disciplining the model economy to
generate the pattern of reallocation observed in the data. It is still an open questions which
are the mechanisms that generate those patterns. Are they consistent with factor specicity?
do inventories play a role? do these patterns change when credit conditions change? Analysis
of the input output structure dynamic for more disaggregated sector can shed light to some of
these questions.
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Figure 7: Consumption Cost Shares
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Input/Sector Equipment Consumption
Equipment 43% 7%
Consumption 57% 93%
Table 12: Share of Service and Manufacturing Inputs (intermediate goods from the Agriculture
and Mining sector have been factored out)
Input/Sector Equipment Consumption
Equipment 1.6% 2.9%
Consumption 2.2% 0.9%
Table 13: Yearly average absolute change
Input/Sector Equipment Consumption
Equipment 2.4% 10.1%
Consumption 3.5% 0.9%
Table 14: Average absolute deviation relative to mean share
Input/Sector Equipment Consumption
Equipment 0.9% 1.5%
Consumption 1.3% 0.4%
Table 15: Average absolute deviation relative to HP- trend (smoothing factor, 6.25)
Full Sample Pre-2008 without GR
Input/Sector Eq Co Eq Co Eq Co
Equipment (Eq) 0.22 0.10 0.05 -0.14 0.07 -0.08
Consumption (Co) -0.22 -0.27 -0.13 -0.33 -0.12 -0.23
Table 16: Correlation with Industrial Value Added
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Figure 8: Equipment Cost Shares
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Figure 9: Consumption Cost Shares
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Figure 10: Equipment Cost Shares
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Figure 11: Consumption Cost Shares
Figure 12: Equipment Cost Shares
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Figure 13: Correlation with Aggregate Output
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Figure 14: Correlation with Aggregate Output
Intermediate Demand Final Demand
Sector E C
X2 X1 Y Equipment Consumption
E X2 x x
X1 x
C Y x x x x
Capital x x x
Table 17: Input Output matrix of the economy
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Appendix(A)
6.1 Balance Growth Path
Theorem 6 A BGP where all intermediate goods are used in production exists i¤ technol-
ogy is Cobb Douglas in capital and intermediates and either 1) the elasticity of substitution
across intermediate goods, equals unity (Cobb-Douglas technology); or 2) there are no link-
ages through intermediate goods between the investment and consumption sector; 3) productivity
growth in the consumption sector and intermediate equipment sector are proportional by a factor
(gx)y1  (gy)my mx2 ;where gx is the growth rate of output in the investment sector and gy is
the one in the consumption sector.
1) and 2) are special cases of 3), hence I prove the latter rst.
Proof. Suppose that productivity in the investment durable sector grows at rate x and
productivity in the consumption and intermediate equipment sector grows at rate y and x2
respectively: Let gj be the growth rate of output in sector j = y; x; x2.
The feasibility restrictions in the economy imply
gy = gMyy = gMyx = gc
gx2 = gMxx = gMxy
gx = gij = gkj for any j = y; x; x2
Given production technologies, for intermediate goods from the consumption and equipment
sector to be used in production along the BGP, the growth rate of output in the consumption
and intermediate equipment should equalize. Such feature stems from the optimality conditions
of the rms in intermediate inputs.
myy2

Y
Myy

1
y2 + (1  y2)

Mxy
Myy
y = 1 (31)
Unless the growth rates of input intake from the equipment and consumption sector are the
same, the optimality condition would not be satised along the BGP.
gx2 = gy
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From the production technology in the consumption sector and intermediate equipment
sector we obtain
gy = y (gx)y1 (gy)my
gx2 = x2 (gx)& (gy)mx2
Hence,
x2 = y (gx)y1  (gy)my mx2
which depends on the relative capital intensity of the consumption sector and intermediate
equipment sector.
Finally, from the investment sector technology, we have
gx = x (gx)x1 (gy)1 x1
Combining this equation with the one describing growth rates in the consumption sector, we
obtain the BGP of the economy, i.e.
gx = (x) x1 (y) x2
gy = (x) y1 (y) y2
 x1 =
1 my
(1 x1)(1 my) mxay1 and  x2 =
amx
(1 x1)(1 my) mxay1 :Also,  y1 =
ay1
(1 x1)(1 my) mxay1
and  y2 =
1 ax1
(1 x1)(1 my) mxay1
To show number 1), note that the problem that was pointed out in 31 is not present anymore,
for  = 0. Hence, the condition gx2 = gy need not hold. The algebra gets more cumbersome
but it is possible to show that the BGP will solve
gx = x (gx)x1

(gx2)x2 (gy)1 x2
mx
gy = y (gx)y1

(gx2)1 y2 (gy)y2
my
gx2 = x2 (gx)& (gx2)mx2
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Number 2) is analogous to number 3) but now the system of equations to be solved is
gx = x (gx)x1 ((gx2)x2)mx
gy = y (gx)y1 ((gy)y2)my
gx2 = x2 (gx)& (gx2)mx2
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6.2 Optimality and Steady State
Feasibility dictates
k
0
x1(1 + g
x)  kx1(1  ) = ix1 (x)
k
0
x2(1 + g
x)  kx2(1  ) = ix2
k
0
y(1 + g
y)  ky(1  ) = iy (y)
iy + ix1 + ix2 = X1 (x)
Mxx +Mxy = X2 (x2)
C +Myy +Myx = Y (y)
Myx =Myx1 +Myx2
The corresponding optimality conditions are
x(1 + g
x) = 0x
"
x1
 
X
0
1
k0x1
!
+ (1  )
#
x(1 + g
x2) = 0x
"
0x2
0x
x
 
X
0
2
k0x2
!
+ (1  )
#
x(1 + g
y) = 0x

0y
0x
y1

Y 0
k0y

+ (1  )

(1  y1)y2

Y
Myy

(Myy)
y
y2 (Myy)
y + (1  y2) (Mxy)y = 1 (Myy)
y (1  y1) (1  y2)

Y
Mxy

(Mxy)
y
y2 (Myy)
y + (1  y2) (Mxy)y = x2 (Mxy)
x (1  x1)x2

X1
Mxx

(Mxx)
x
x2 (Mxx)
x + (1  x2) (Myx1)x = x2 (Mxx)
x (1  x1) (1  x2)

X1
Myx1

(Myx1)
x
x2 (Mxx)
x + (1  x2) (Myx1)x = y (Myx)
x2(1  x)

X2
Myx2

= y (Myx2)
This is a standard convex economy. Hence, the equilibrium exits and its unique. Also the
welfare theorems hold.
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6.3 Steady State
From the production function, we obtain
X1
Mxx
=

kx1
Mxx
x1
(x2 + (1  x2)

Myx1
Mxx
x
)
1 x1
x
Using the optimality condition in intermediate goods and capital we can rewrite the equation
as
x2
x
1
(1  x1)x2 =

x1
(1  x1)x2

1 + gx   (1  )
x2
x
x1 "
x2 + (1  x2)

1  x2
x2
x
y
 x
1 x
#(1 x1) 1 xx
(32)
which denes the equilibrium relative prices of investment goods versus consumption goods.
Using the production function in the nal good sector we can solve for x2y as
Y
Myy
=

ky
Myy
y1
(y2 + (1  y2)

Mxy
Myy
y
)
1 y1
y
Following the same procedure as before, we can express this equation as a function of the relative
price of investment and nal goods.
1
(1  y1)y2 =

y1
(1  y1)y2

1 + gy   (1  )
y
x
y1 "
y2 + (1  y2)

1  y2
y2
y
x2
 y
1 y
#(1 y1) 1 yy
(33)
Finally, the production technology in the third sector dictates
X2
kx2
=

Myx2
kx2
(1 &x)

1 + gy   (1  )

x
x2
1
&x

=

1 + gy   (1  )

x
y
1  &x
&x
(1 &x)
(34)
Hence, equations (32), (33) ; (34) dene a system of three equations and three unknowns.
Given the calibrated parameters I impose conditions on the share of value added in the third
sector so that the system is exactly determined.
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From the feasibility condition in intermediate goods of the investment sector we obtain
Mxx
kx2
+
Mxy
kx2
=
X2
kx2
x
x2
(1  x1)x2
x2 + (1  x2)

1 x2
x2
x2
y
 x
1 x
X1
X2
+
y
x2
(1  y1) (1  y2)
y2

y2
1 y2
x2
y
 y
1 y
+ (1  y2)
Y
X2
= 1
which determines the ratio of gross output in the production of equipment, as well as the ratio
of consumption good production to intermediate investment goods, as a function of parameters
and equilibrium prices.
If we now turn to the feasibility condition in the nal production investment sector, we
have
(1 +
ky
kx
+
kx2
kx
) =
X1
kx
(1 +
y
x
Y
X2
y1
x1
X2
X1
+

x2
x

x
x1
X2
X1
) =
1 + gx   (1  )

1
x1
If we put both feasibility conditions together we obtain a system of two equations in two
unknowns, i.e. the ratios of gross output across sectors.
To pin down the levels of the variables use the feasibility constraint in the consumption good
sector.
U 1(y)
Myy
+ 1 +
Myx
Myy
=
Y
Myy
where YMyy =
y2+(1 y2)

Mxy
Myy
y
(1 y1)y2 : As we have shown before,
Mxy
Myy
is a function of the prices in
the economy. In other words, Myy solves
U 10(y)
Myy
+ 1 +
y2 + (1  y2)

Mxy
Myy
y
(1  y1)y2 [
X1
Y
x
y
(1  x1) (1  x2)
x2

Mxx
Myx
x
+ (1  x2)
+

x2
y

(1  &x)
(1  y1)y2
X2
Y
]
=
y2 + (1  y2)

Mxy
Myy
y
(1  y1)y2
where MxyMyy =

y
x2
1 y2
y2
 1
1 y and MxxMyx =

x2
1 x2
y
x2
 1
1 x .
Once Myy is determined Myx is too, as well as Y , ky;Mxy from the optimality conditions.
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kx is determined using
ky
kx

and then K can be computed. X is solved by the equilibrium ratio
X
Y

and Y .
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Parameter Definition Model
x1 Capital Share, Equipment 0.182
y1 Capital Share, Consumption 0.210
& Capital Share, Equipment Intermediates 0.901
g Consumption Shock Persistence 0.2
x2 Equipment Intermed. Shock Persistence 0.25
x1 Investment Shock Persistence 0.25
gx Gross Output Growth Rate, Equipment 3.15%
 Discount Factor 0.98
 Capital Depreciation 0.05
Table 18: Parameters calibrated outside the model
Parameter Definition Value
x Elasticity of Substitution Mxx1 ;Myx1 -0.12
x2 Share Equipment Intermediates, Equipment 0.579
y Elasticity of Substitution Myy;Mxy -1.36
y2 Share Consumption Intermediates, Consumption 0.658
Volatility Transitory Shocks
g" Neutral 0.0023
x1" Investment 0.01
x2" Intermediate Equipment 0.014
Corr
 
"x2; "x1

Covariance Equipment Sector -0.728
Volatility Persistent Shocks
g Neutral 0.0016
x1 Investment 0.0033
x2 Intermediate Equipment 0.0001
Table 19: Jointly calibrated Parameters
Moment Model Data
Cost Shares
Consumption Goods in Consumption 0.81 0.93
Consumption Goods in Equipment 0.52 0.57
Correlation, GDP Cycle and Cost Shares
Consumption Goods in Consumption -0.27 -0.13
Equipment Goods in Consumption 0.10 0.13
Equipment Goods in Equipment 0.22 0.26
Consumption Goods in Equipment -0.22 -0.26
Standard Deviation
GDP 0.013 0.015
Gross Output, Consumption 0.02 0.018
Gross Output, Equipment 0.053 0.0476
Autocorrelation (1)
GDP 0.36 0.38
Gross Output, Consumption 0.39 0.36
Gross Output, Equipment 0.36 0.29
Table 20: Moments
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Transitory, " Persistent, 
Ag Ax1 Ax2 Ag Ax1 Ax2
Gross Domestic Product 52.8 8.12 12.1 26.8 0.08 0.00
Total Factor Productivity 35.4 9.22 28.58 18.39 8.67 0.00
Investment 34 10.5 28.8 17.6 9.1 0.00
Consumption 14 66.8 1.73 6.99 10.5 0.00
Table 21: Variance Decomposition, Baseline
Parameter Definition CES Cobb-Douglas
x Elasticity of substitution, Equipment -0.12 0
x2 Share of equipment intermediates, Equipment 0.579 0.49
y Elasticity of substitution, Consumption -1.36 0
y2 Share of consumption intermediates, Consumption 0.658 0.81
x1 Share of capital, Equipment 0.182 0.182
& Share of capital, Equipment intermediates 0.901 0.973
y1 Share of capital, Consumption 0.210 0.210
Table 22: Parametrization, Baseline CES vs. Cobb Douglas technology
Moment CES CD Data
Cost Shares
Consumption Goods in Consumption 0.81 0.81 0.93
Consumption Goods in Equipment 0.52 0.52 0.57
Correlation, GDP Cycle and Cost Shares
Consumption Goods in Consumption -0.27 . -0.13
Equipment Goods in Consumption 0.10 . 0.13
Equipment Goods in Equipment 0.22 . 0.26
Consumption Goods in Equipment -0.22 . -0.26
Standard Deviation
GDP 0.013 0.01 0.015
Gross Output, Consumption 0.02 0.015 0.018
Gross Output, Equipment 0.053 0.041 0.0476
Autocorrelation (1)
GDP 0.36 0.26 0.38
Gross Output, Consumption 0.39 0.41 0.36
Gross Output, Equipment 0.36 0.37 0.29
Table 23: Moments
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Transitory, " Persistent, 
GDP Ag Ax1 Ax2 Ag Ax1 Ax2
CES 52.8 8.12 12.1 26.8 0.08 0.00
Cobb-Douglas 47.7 12.09 15.6 24.4 0.06 0.00
TPF
CES 35.4 9.22 28.58 18.4 8.67 0.00
Cobb-Douglas 39 20.26 12.57 20.17 7.8 0.00
Investment
CES 34 10.5 28.8 17.6 9.1 0.00
Cobb-Douglas 34.5 12.52 25.9 17.9 9.1 0.00
Consumption
CES 14 66.8 1.73 6.99 10.5 0.00
Cobb-Douglas 8.06 78.1 0.12 4.03 9.71 0.00
Table 24: Variance Decomposition
Parameter Definition CES CD
Volatility Transitory Shocks
g" Neutral 0.0023 0.0036
x1" Investment 0.01 0.028
x2" Intermediate Equipment 0.014 0.037
Corr
 
"x2; "x1

Covariance Equipment Sector -0.72 -0.72
Volatility Persistent Shocks
g Neutral 0.0016 0.0036
x1 Investment 0.0033 0.0068
x2 Intermediate Equipment 0.0001 0.0009
Table 25: Calibrated Shocks, Constant Cost Share Economy
Moment CES CD CD Recalibrated
Cost Shares
Consumption Goods in Consumption 0.81 0.81 0.81
Consumption Goods in Equipment 0.52 0.52 0.52
Correlation, GDP Cycle and Cost Shares
Consumption Goods in Consumption -0.27 . .
Equipment Goods in Consumption 0.10 . .
Equipment Goods in Equipment 0.22 . .
Consumption Goods in Equipment -0.22 . .
Standard Deviation
GDP 0.013 0.01 0.023
Gross Output, Consumption 0.02 0.015 0.033
Gross Output, Equipment 0.053 0.041 0.032
Autocorrelation (1)
GDP 0.36 0.26 0.37
Gross Output, Consumption 0.39 0.41 0.40
Gross Output, Equipment 0.36 0.37 0.37
Table 26: Moments
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Transitory, " Persistent, 
GDP Ag Ax1 Ax2 Ag Ax1 Ax2
CES 52.8 8.12 12.1 26.8 0.08 0.00
Cobb-Douglas* 26.7 19.4 25.3 28.2 0.06 0.03
TPF
CES 35.4 9.22 28.58 18.4 8.67 0.00
Cobb-Douglas* 19.4 34.6 18.5 20.7 6.73 0.02
Investment
CES 34 10.5 28.8 17.6 9.1 0.00
Cobb-Douglas* 16.6 21.8 36.3 17.7 7.5 0.05
Consumption
CES 14 66.8 1.73 6.99 10.5 0.00
Cobb-Douglas* 2.8 88.2 0.12 2.93 5.92 0.00
Table 27: Variance Decomposition: Cobb Douglas Economy, recalibrated
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Figure 15: Alternative Aggregate Growth Rates
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Figure 16: Alternative Aggregate Growth Rates, Constant and Flexible Cost Shares
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7 Data Appendix
The following tables include a description of the sectors under analysis. Our denition of the
equipment sector entails sectro 33 in the NAICS.
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Industry/Commodity Description NAICS
Agriculture, forestry, shing and hunting 11
Crop production 111
Animal production 112
Forestry 1131, 1132
Logging 1133
Fishing, hunting and trapping 114
Support activities for agriculture and forestry 115
Mining 21
Oil and gas extraction 211
Coal mining 2121
Metal ore mining 2122
Nonmetallic mineral mining and quarrying 2123
Support activities for mining 213
Utilities 22
Electric power generation, transmission and distribution 2211
Natural gas distribution 2212
Water, sewage and other systems 2213
Construction
Construction 23
Manufacturing 31, 32, 33
Animal food manufacturing 3111
Grain and oilseed milling 3112
Sugar and confectionery product manufacturing 3113
Fruit and vegetable preserving and specialty food manufacturing 3114
Dairy product manufacturing 3115
Animal slaughtering and processing 3116
Seafood product preparation and packaging 3117
Bakeries and tortilla manufacturing 3118
Other food manufacturing 3119
Beverage manufacturing 3121
Tobacco manufacturing 3122
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Industry/Commodity Description NAICS
Textile mills and textile product mills 313,314
Apparel manufacturing 315
Leather and allied product manufacturing, including footwear manufacturing 316
Sawmills and wood preservation 3211
Veneer, plywood, and engineered wood product manufacturing 3212
Other wood product manufacturing 3219
Pulp, paper, and paperboard mills 3221
Converted paper product manufacturing 3222
Printing and related support activities 323
Converted paper product manufacturing 3222
Printing and related support activities 323
Petroleum and coal products manufacturing 324
Basic chemical manufacturing 3251
Resin, synthetic rubber, and articial synthetic bers and laments manufacturing 3252
Pesticide, fertilizer, and other agricultural chemical 3253
Pharmaceutical and medicine manufacturing 3254
Paint, coating, and adhesive manufacturing 3255
Soap, cleaning compound, and toilet preparation 3256
Other chemical product and preparation manufacturing 3259
Plastics product manufacturing 3261
Rubber product manufacturing 3262
Clay product and refractory manufacturing 3271
Glass and glass product manufacturing 3272
Cement and concrete product manufacturing 3273
Lime, gypsum and other nonmetallic mineral product 3274, 3279
Iron and steel mills and ferroalloy manufacturing 3311
Steel product manufacturing from purchased steel 3312
Alumina and aluminum production and processing 3313
Nonferrous metal (except aluminum) production 3314
Foundries 3315
Forging and stamping 3321
Cutlery and handtool manufacturing 3322
Architectural and structural metals manufacturing 3323
Boiler, tank, and shipping container manufacturing 3324
Hardware manufacturing 3325
Spring and wire product manufacturing 3326
Machine shops; 3327
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Industry/Commodity Description NAICS
Coating, engraving, heat treating, and allied activities 3328
Other fabricated metal product manufacturing 3329
Agriculture, construction, and mining machinery 3331
Industrial machinery manufacturing 3332
Commercial and service industry machinery 3333
Ventilation, heating, air-conditioning, equipment 3334
Metalworking machinery manufacturing 3335
Engine, turbine, and power transmission equipment 3336
Other general purpose machinery manufacturing 3339
Computer and peripheral equipment manufacturing 3341
Communications equipment manufacturing 3342
Audio and video equipment manufacturing 3343
Semiconductor and other electronic component 3344
Navigational, measuring, electromedica manufacturing 3345
Manufacturing and reproducing magnetic and optical media 3346
Electric lighting equipment manufacturing 3351
Household appliance manufacturing 3352
Electrical equipment manufacturing 3353
Other electrical equipment and component manufacturing 3359
Motor vehicle manufacturing 3361
Motor vehicle body and trailer manufacturing 3362
Motor vehicle parts manufacturing 3363
Aerospace product and parts manufacturing 3364
Railroad rolling stock manufacturing 3365
Ship and boat building 3366
Other transportation equipment manufacturing 3369
Household and institutional furniture and kitchen cabinet manufacturing 3371
O¢ ce furniture (including xtures) manufacturing 3372
Other furniture related product manufacturing 3379
Medical equipment and supplies manufacturing 3391
Other miscellaneous manufacturing 3399
Wholesale trade 42
Wholesale trade 42
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Industry/Commodity Description NAICS
Retail trade 44, 45
Retail trade 44, 45
Transportation and warehousing 48, 49
Air transportation 481
Rail transportation 482
Water transportation 483
Truck transportation 484
Transit and ground passenger transportation 485
Pipeline transportation 486
Scenic and sightseeing transportation and support activities for transportation 487, 488
Couriers and messengers 492
Warehousing and storage 493
Information
Newspaper, periodical, book, and directory publishers 5111
Software publishers 5112
Motion picture, video, and sound recording industries 512
Broadcasting (except internet) 515
Telecommunications 517
Data processing, hosting, related services, and other information services 518, 519
Finance and insurance 52
Monetary authorities, credit intermediation 521, 522
Securities, commodity contracts, and other invest 523
Insurance carriers 5241
Agencies, brokerages, and other insurance 5242
Funds, trusts, and other nancial vehicles 525
Real estate and rental and leasing 53
Real estate 531
Automotive equipment rental and leasing 5321
Consumer goods rental and general rental centers 5322, 5323
Commercial and industrial machinery and equipment rental and leasing 5324
Lessors of nonnancial intangible assets 533
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Industry/Commodity Description NAICS
Professional, scientic, and technical services
Legal services 5411
Accounting, tax preparation, bookkeeping, 5412
Architectural, engineering, and related services 5413
Specialized design services 5414
Computer systems design and related services 5415
Management, scientic, and technical consulting 5416
Scientic research and development services 5417
Advertising and related services 5418
Other professional, scientic, and technical services 5419
Management of companies and enterprises 55
Management of companies and enterprises 55
Administrative and support 56
O¢ ce administrative services 5611
Facilities support services 5612
Employment services 5613
Business support services 5614
Travel arrangement and reservation services 5615
Investigation and security services 5616
Services to buildings and dwellings 5617
Other support services 5619
Waste management and remediation services 562
Educational services 61
Elementary and secondary schools 6111
Junior colleges, colleges, universities, prof schools 6112, 6113
Other educational services 6114-7
Health care and social assistance 62
O¢ ces of health practitioners 6211, 6212, 6213
Home health care services 6216
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Industry/Commodity Description NAICS
Outpatient, laboratory, and other ambulatory care 6214, 6215, 6219
Hospitals 622
Nursing and residential care facilities 623
Individual and family services 6241
Community and vocational rehabilitation services 6242, 6243
Child day care services 6244
Arts, entertainment, and recreation 71
Performing arts companies 7111
Spectator sports 7112
Promoters of events, and agents and managers 7113, 7114
Independent artists, writers, and performers 7115
Museums, historical sites, and similar institutions 712
Amusement, gambling, and recreation industries 713
Accommodation and food services 72
Accommodation 721
Food services and drinking places 722
Other services (except public administration) 81
Automotive repair and maintenance 8111
Electronic and precision equipment repair 8112
Commercial and industrial machinery and equipment 8113
Personal and household goods repair 8114
Personal care services 8121
Death care services 8122
Drycleaning and laundry services 8123
Other personal services 8129
Religious organizations 8131
Grantmaking and giving services and social advocacy organizations 8132, 8133
Civic, social, professional, and similar organizations 8134, 8139
Private households 814
Postal Service 491
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